2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

Gems on gems!! What a great daf. Here are just 3 highlights.

1

MISHNA:Despite the fact that the assailant who caused damage gives to the victim all of the required payments for the injury, his transgression is not forgiven for him in the heavenly court until he requests forgiveness from the victim.

You can pay the fines, the medical bills, etc. but you are NOT forgiven if you don’t apologize! Words matter. They give us insight into how you feel. And if we are hurt, we don’t just want the fines paid (nut we DO want that), we also want to heal our trust in humanity. So, say sorry.

2. That if you pray on behalf of others, what YOU need will come to you.

Rava said to Rabba bar Mari: From where is this matter derived whereby the Sages stated: Anyone who asks for compassion from Heaven on behalf of another, and he requires compassion from Heaven concerning that same matter, he is answered first? Rabba bar Mari said to him that the source for this is as it is written: “And the Lord changed the fortune of Job, when he prayed for his friends” (Job 42:10). Rava said to him: You said the proof from there, from a verse in the Writings, and I say the proof from here, from a verse in the Torah. As it is written: “And Abraham prayed to God; and God healed Abimelech, and his wife, and his maidservants, and they bore children” (Genesis 20:17), and it is written immediately following that: “And the Lord remembered Sarah, as He had said” (Genesis 21:1), with the pronoun interpreted homiletically: As Abraham said with regard to Abimelech. Because Abraham prayed for Abimelech that the women of his household should give birth, Abraham himself was answered concerning that matter.

I LOVE this. It’s beautiful, the show of compassion for others. That one who is in need of a miracle would pray for the well-fare of others. But what I love even more is that it’s so true. When we are only thinking about ourselves and what WE want and what our lives our lacking we are miserable. When we do for others and worry about others, our lives are more full.

3. This third one is just one example of a list on today’s daf of popular expressions at the time! This was my favorite because we tend to treat our elderly as if they’re children, condescending. I once went to visit a congregant at an old age home and they were talking to him like he was a 4 year old. I told the aide’s that they needed to call him judge and treat him with respect.

Rava said to Rabba bar Mari: From where is this matter derived whereby people say: When we were small, we were considered to be men; now that we are old, we are considered to be children [ledardekei]?

Three gems on today’s daf! Makes me hopeful for tomorrow.

In rabbinical school, each student leads services for a week. When I went in for my review after leading services, I expected to hear about my teachings, the music selections, maybe that I need to project my voice. That’s not what happened. The entire meeting was only about my clothing choices.

Was I pissed? Yes, I was pissed. Did I think (do I think) this happened to my male colleagues. No, thanks for asking.

When I officiate at weddings, I always wear a robe. Why? I don’t want what people talk about to be my outfit.

Anyway – clothes are important, whether I think they should be or not. Our daf asks if one is liable if they hurt themselves (very interesting and deep topic) and uses one who damages their clothes as a proof text.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: But perhaps garments are different, in that tearing them is a loss that is irreversible, like that practice of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who would refer to his garments as: My honor, and like that practice of Rav Ḥisda, who, when he would walk among thorns and shrubs, would raise his clothing despite the fact that his skin would get scratched by the thorns. He said in explanation of his actions: This flesh will heal if scratched, but that garment will not heal if torn. Similarly, perhaps it is prohibited to rend one’s garments, but it is permitted to injure oneself.

So interesting. First, we see through Rabbi Yohanan that clothing can be a symbol of honor (like that robe!). Second, Rav Hisda, who was a poor but great man, would rather his legs get scratched up than accidentally tear his pants because his legs will heal but his pants wont. What we see is that clothes matter. And not just to aspiring female rabbinical students, but for men who lived around the year 290 as well.

What counts as humiliation? The Talmud says that one of the fines we pay when we injure another is humiliation. We have read that someone who is naked gets less for humiliation than someone clothed (the assumption being a person who is naked in public doesn’t humiliate easily). But today we get a great example of a man humiliating a woman and then the sneaky way he tries to get out of paying a pretty hefty fine. . .

The mishna relates: And an incident occurred involving one who uncovered the head of a woman in the marketplace, and the woman came before Rabbi Akiva to request that he render the assailant liable to pay for the humiliation that she suffered, and Rabbi Akiva rendered the assailant liable to give her four hundred dinars.

That’s a lot of money!!

The man said to Rabbi Akiva: My teacher, give me time to pay the penalty, and Rabbi Akiva gave him time.

Stalling . . ..

The man then waited for her until she was standing by the opening of her courtyard, and he broke a jug in front of her, and there was the value of about an issar of oil inside the jug. The woman then exposed her own head and she was wetting her hand in the oil, and placing her hand on her head to make use of the oil.

The trap has been set!

The man set up witnesses to observe her actions, and he came before Rabbi Akiva, and he said to him: Will I give four hundred dinars to this woman for having uncovered her head? By uncovering her head for a minimal benefit, she has demonstrated that this does not cause her humiliation.

Now we see his plan. Will Akiva agree?

Rabbi Akiva said to him: You did not say anything, i.e., this claim will not exempt you. One who injures himself, although it is not permitted for him to do so, is nevertheless exempt from any sort of penalty, but others who injured him are liable to pay him. In this case as well, the man was liable to compensate the woman for shaming her, despite the fact that she did the same to herself.

Love this. Love that Akiva doesn’t fall for this guy’s plan and I love the lesson – just because someone is okay with something in one context, doesn’t mean they are in another context. Just because you’re okay doing something on your own terms does not mean you’re okay being forced, or an another’s terms.

On today’s daf, we learn that a ruling was made in Usha. What’s Usha? It was a gathering of the entire Sanhedrin and therefore set laws for the entire Jewish people. What ws the ruling? It made it so a woman did not have the right to sell her own usufruct property and keep the money for herself (yay patriarchy!). The gem? An unexpected twist to the tale.

With regard to a slave or a married woman, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured others they are exempt, because they do not have money with which to pay. And if it enters your mind to say that there is no ordinance of Usha, there would be a method by which a married woman can obtain money with which to pay, as the court can have her sell her usufruct property and give the money received to the one she injured. It can therefore be inferred from the mishna that a woman cannot sell her usufruct property, in accordance with the ordinance of Usha.

What’s the twist? Now that the woman can’t sell her property and keep the money for herself, she no longer has to pay for injury she causes. What does that mean? She could smack these sexist rabbis who made this horrible ruling and not have to pay them damages.

You messed up fellas.

Today’s daf debates if a Canaanite slave is paid for humiliation (one of the 5 types payments made for injuries). The whole arguemen5 stems on how you interpret

“When men strive together, a man and his brother” (Deuteronomy 25:11). The formulation “and his brother” teaches that the payment of compensation for humiliation is applicable with regard to someone who has a relationship of brotherhood.

Who is a brother? Only a fellow Jew? Only a free person? Do women count? What about people of other faiths?

While we get some disappointing answers to these questions from some of our sages, the questions are the same ones we need to ask ourselves today. Who can I see as my brother? How can I challenge myself to love even more expansively?

We have learned that the Rabbis see men as obligated to fulfill certain mitzvot and women obligated in certain mitzvot. Most of the time bound mitzvot do not apply to women. Because of this, when the conservative movement was debating ordaining women as rabbis, the question of how a woman can be a rabbi for men when she is not obligated in the same mitzvot as them (and therefore cannot perform them on their behalf) became and issue. The resolution? That women who wanted to be rabbis, while not halakically obligated, would chose to take on the mitzvot required by men. Enter today’s gem where a blind man is also exempt, but chooses to observe the mitzvot anyway:

. . . and so did Rabbi Yehuda exempt a blind person from all mitzvot that are stated in the Torah. Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The verse states: “And this is the commandment, statutes, and laws” (Deuteronomy 6:1), to teach that anyone who is subject to civil laws is also subject to the commandments and statutes, and anyone who is not subject to civil laws, including a blind person, is also not subject to the commandments and statutes. Rav Yosef, who was blind, said: At first, I would say: If I hear one who says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A blind person is exempt from the mitzvot, then I will host a festive day for the Sages. What is the reason? It is that I am not commanded and nevertheless I perform mitzvot. Rav Yosef continues. But now that I heard this statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, as Rabbi Ḥanina says: One who is commanded and performs a mitzva is greater than one who is not commanded and performs it, I say: If I hear one who says to me that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, then I will host a festive day for the Sages. What is the reason? It is that as I am commanded, I have more reward.

Rav Yosef was blind and exempt from the mitzvot. However, he chose to keep them. In fact, he is a rabbi! He was proud, because even though he was not obligated, he did the mitzvot anyway. Then Hanina comes along a rains on his parade by saying that those who are commanded and keep the mitzvot are more praiseworthy than those who aren’t.

Rav Yosef, I hear you. I feel you. And so do all the women rabbis who care about this kind of thing. I say we throw a party for the Sages anyway and show them what choosing mitzvot from love and desire can look like.

I started cutting hair in high school. I had a boyfriend who wanted a pretty easy trim. Then a few months later he wanted a buzz cut. Eventually I started cutting his friends’ hair too and then some of my girlfriends’ as well. So, when I had kids I cut their hair. Until last year… my son’s hair was out for control and needed to be cut. He had just had soccer practice and it was sticky with sweat. I decided to but it without washing it and way too fast. It was a nightmare. It was lopsided and too short and he looked butchered.

Now to the daf which teaches us that we can be liable for a bad haircut, even for a family member.

Rather, here we are dealing with a case where he shaved his father’s hair without causing a bruise. In a case where he shaved him, his hair will return, and this is an example of our dilemma, i.e., of an injury to a limb that will return to its original health. If so, this resolves Rabba’s dilemma.

This was our problem. A bad haircut will eventually grow out. But in the mean time I was causing him humiliation, one of the finest you have to pay an injured party.

The Sages object and say: It is possible that here we are dealing with a case where he smeared his father with a depilatory agent [nasha] that caused his hair to fall out, so that his hair will not return. The Gemara explains how one could be liable for each of the five types of indemnity by smearing a depilatory agent: The father experiences pain in a case where he has fissures on his head and has pain from those fissures. He incurs medical costs because he requires healing for the fissures. He incurs loss of livelihood in a case where he would dance in taverns to earn money, which requires him to make various gestures with his head and his hair while dancing; and now he cannot gesture because of those fissures on his head. He experiences humiliation, because there is no humiliation greater than losing one’s hair.

So, it could have been worse. The lesson for me is that I no longer cut his hair. Let him be mad at a stranger and now me.

Every doctor and individual involved in health care or assessing personal injury fines should study today’s daf. It asks excellent questions in terms of what someone needs to pay to cover loss of limb, loss of livelihood, indemnity and pain. It makes it clear that patients have responsibilities to follow doctor’s orders. It also makes it clear that patients should have choice when it comes to what doctor they allow to treat them. It seeks to protect patients while also seeking to incentivize doctors to treat others. Too much goodness for one gem. The gem for me is how pertinent the conversation still is today.

I love today’s daf. Why? Because the entire dad is dedicated to explaining why “an eye for an eye” doesn’t mean an eye for an eye! Just one example of the arguments made:

Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: “An eye for an eye” (Leviticus 24:20), is referring to monetary restitution. Do you say that this is referring to monetary restitution, or is it only teaching that the one who caused the injury must lose an actual eye? There may be a case where there was a blind person and he blinded another, or there was one with a severed limb and he severed the limb of another, or there was a lame person and he caused another to be lame. In thiscase, how can I fulfill “an eye for an eye” literally, when he is already lacking the limb that must be injured?

While you don’t take the eye of one who took the eyes of another, they are required to pay 4 kinds of fines for the damage they’ve caused. Those fines actually help the injured party. They are not about vengeance. Actually, in Judaism, the only one allowed to take vengeance is God. (And who are we to argue with that? Yet we still do don’t we…)

The idea of an eye for an eye is really just saying that the punishment has to be fitting for the crime.

We often hit back in life. Maybe not literally. But when someone insults us or hurts us, we often lash out back at them. That only drives us further apart; damaging the relationship even more. What do we really want? An apology; for the person to make it better. We want repair.

The quote “An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind” is often attributed to Mahatma Gandhi. It has some truth to it. I say some, because I study the daf and believe that the literal reading is not what God intended. Because if we really did seek an eye for an eye, humanity would have been wiped out long ago.

I Haitian Pastor just asked me where Reform Judaism began. He assumed in the United States. I explained to him the roots of Reform are from the German Jewish community. How we wanted to assimilate in many ways. Wanted to dress and present like our neighbors. Wanted to worship with organ music like our neighbors. And then we discussed the irony of Germany rejecting the idea that Jews could ever assimilate. Perhaps that’s why this story sticks out on our daf today.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel applied this verse to a personal tragedy: There were a thousand children in the household of my father, Rabban Gamliel; five hundred of them studied the Torah, and five hundred of them studied Greek wisdom. All of them were killed by the Romans; and the only ones that remain of them are I, who is here, and the son of my father’s brother, who is in Asia Minor [Asya]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement indicates that it is permitted to study Greek wisdom. The Sages say in response: The household of Rabban Gamliel is different, as they held close ties with the government. Since knowledge of Greek wisdom was crucial for the members of this family, the Sages exempted them from the general decree not to study Greek.

I am reading this and thinking about those descendants who studied Greek, thinking they could assimilate and be accepted, dying next to those who studied Torah.

Neither Torah nor Greek could protect them from being massacred. But which gave them a more fulfilling life before that life was taken?

I find beauty everywhere, in our faith and outside. If only we all could, and other could find it in us…