2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

You know the expression, “once a liar, always a liar.” It warns us not to trust someone who has knowingly been shown to be untrustworthy. On today’s daf, two rabbis, who agree that you can’t trust liars, and say you cannot trust their testimonies in the future, debate whether that means we can’t trust anything they have said up to this point in their testimony (including things they said before the lie) or that we can’t trust them from now on (after the lie).

GEMARA: One who is rendered a conspiring witness is barred from providing testimony in the future. The Gemara cites a fundamental dispute with regard to this disqualification. It was stated concerning a conspiring witness: Abaye says: He is disqualified retroactively, from when he provided his testimony. Any testimony he may have provided after that point in time is retroactively nullified. Rava says: He is disqualified only from that point forward, i.e., from when he was established to be a conspiring witness, but not retroactively from when he provided his testimony.

The Gemara explains the reasons for the two opinions: Abaye says he is disqualified retroactively because it is from that time when he testified that he is considered a wicked man, and the Torah said: “Do not put your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness” (Exodus 23:1), which is interpreted to mean: Do not allow a wicked man to serve as a witness.

Rava says that he is disqualified only from that point forward because the disqualification of a conspiring witness is a novelty, i.e., it is not based on logic.

What a warning not to lie – not even when a friend convinces you (conspires with you). You have ruined your reputation and are no longer trust worthy. Interesting how it feels there is no going back. Here, we also are reminded that, if you lied as a witness so that a person would have to pay a fine, then you are liable to have to pay whatever they would have needed to pay.

It just makes me thing of all the corruption and injustice and wonder why we seem to put up with it. . .

It was a long daf today, full of scenarios where stealing, slaughter, and shabbat violation laws all came into conflict with one another. Maybe that’s why the end of it made me laugh.

Rava and Rav Nachman were having a long, multi-day debate. After Rav Nachman argues his point, the Gemara tells us:

This discussion between Rava and Rav Naḥman occurred in the evening. On the following morning, Rav Naḥman retracted his statement and said to Rava: The Merciful One states: “Five oxen,” and this means that even five half-oxen are included. Rav Naḥman explained his change of mind: And the reason that I did not say this to you last night is because I had not eaten ox meat. In other words, I was fasting yesterday and was unable to concentrate properly.

I loved this. He was hungry and wasn’t thinking straight. I feel like it’s late at night and I am not thinking straight at this point. So, Rav Nahman – thanks for the gem.

Oh the daf . . . today the daf talks about cases where someone would have been liable to pay a four fold or five fold (remember, that’s for a stolen sheep or a stolen ox), but, they violate Shabbat or another law whose penalty is the death penalty – and so they don’t have to pay the fine. (So, save money, but die instead.) The rabbis question if thief stole an animal and then sold it, but didn’t deliver the animal to the purchaser whose instructions were to “pick a fig on Shabbat and thereby acquire the animal) (he is a crook after all) if the purchaser can go to the court to force him to pay. It culminates in the craziest of examples (you can’t make this stuff up):

Rava said: Actually, it is possible to explain the baraita as Rami bar Ḥama did, that the animal was acquired through the picking of a fig on Shabbat. And the objection raised earlier, that this act should not be considered a sale at all, is incorrect. This can be demonstrated by the fact that the Torah prohibits one to bring as an offering an animal given as the payment to a prostitute for services rendered (Deuteronomy 23:19). And this prohibition applies even if the man in question engaged in intercourse with his own mother, which is a capital offense. But if she would bring a legal claim before us, demanding the payment of the animal that was agreed upon as her fee, would we say to him: Arise and pay her the animal? The court would not say this, as the monetary liability was incurred simultaneously with the commission of a capital crime. Rather, one must say that even though if she brings a legal claim against him demanding the payment of the animal that was agreed upon as her fee we do not say to him: Go and pay her, nevertheless, since if he does give it to her it is considered payment to a prostitute, it cannot be used as an offering.

What is this?! Somehow we went from buying a stolen sheep to paying your own mother to have sex with you and her taking you to court when she doesn’t get paid.

My hope is this example is given because it’s so incredibly egregious and ridiculous and something that would NEVER happen (and not something that did happen).

The point being maid is that you can’t win a little cash, or an ox, in court, by admitting to participating in a crime that is punishable by death. That’s fair. But WOW, this example was a lot.

Do we set people up to succeed or to fail? On today’s daf, there is an interesting tangential conversation about a grapevine in its fourth year after planting. The grapes on the vine must be either eaten in Jerusalem or redeemed with money that is then taken to Jerusalem and spent on food. (Thank you to Steinsaltz for the explanation.) The fruit may not be eaten outside Jerusalem without being redeemed. But, you can imagine that someone passing by might see the grapes and eat one off the vine. They might think to themselves that it’s no big deal, not knowing they are 4th year produce and therefore dedicated to Jerusalem. So, the Gemara discusses that people might mark the field with pot shards or limes (yes, limes) to indicate that you shouldn’t eat the grapes. But Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says that they only use these indicators during the Sabbatical year every other year:

Feed it to the wicked man and let him die. That is, one is not required to take precautions to protect the wicked from the consequences of their own sins. Here too, there is no obligation to warn a thief that the grapes he is stealing are prohibited.

So, no warning sign! just let them sin and burn for it. It’s not your responsibility.

But . . . The mishna continues: But the pious ones would set aside some coins and say: Anything that was picked from this vine by passersby shall be desacralized onto these coins. The pious ones were concerned that a passerby might help himself to some of their grapes, thereby transgressing a prohibition. Therefore, they would redeem any of their grapes that might be picked and eaten by passersby.

I love this. Do you set people up to fail? Or put in a guard rail to protect people from sinning without knowing it?

Bu the way. הַצְּנוּעִין is translated here as “pious” but it can also be translated as humble. How beautiful the connection between the two words, and how beautiful the action of the person quietly protecting others from being punished instead of “feeding the wicked man and letting him die.” We should all look out for one another.

Today’s gem starts on the bottom of yesterday’s page of Talmud where we have a fabulous insult:

Rav Sheshet said: I say that when Rav was sleepy and lying down to rest he said this halakha, i.e., he did not give it enough thought.

Hilarious. But the gem is actually:

This ruling is incorrect, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva said: For what reason did the Torah say that if a thief slaughtered or sold a stolen ox or sheep he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment? It is because by selling or slaughtering the animal the thief becomes more deeply entrenched in sin. 

This idea is repeated on todays daf and if my gem:

The Sages say: It is possible to explain the term: Entrenched in sin, in accordance with what Rava said: The thief is liable because he repeated his sin, i.e., he sinned a second time by going through the motions of the sale, regardless of the fact the sale was not legally binding. Here too, one can say that the thief is liable because he repeated his sin.

The more we do the wrong thing, the more we think that doing the wrong thing is not a big deal. The more we do the wrong thing, the more it becomes a habit and not something we even think about. Jews around the world are reading the Torah portion, and seeing Pharaoh hardening his heart. Rabbi question if pharaoh truly had free will if God hardened his heart. But the sages point out that the first 10 times it says Pharaoh hardened his own heart, the second 10 times it says God did. The explanation is that Pharaoh had free will, and kept choosing to do the wrong thing again and again, and eventually that became habit. His heart was hard. He no longer acted out of free, will, but out of habit.
So, don’t entrench yourself in sin. Everybody messes up but don’t double down. Don’t make it worse. Keep your heart soft and open.

Names matter. They do. They elevate and they denigrate. They also matter when it comes to the status of a stolen item. Yesterday we read:

Rather, Rava said that this matter was a difficulty posed by Rabba to Rav Yosef for twenty-two years, and it was not resolved until Rav Yosef sat as the head of the yeshiva and resolved it in the following manner: A change in name of an item, representing a change in status, is similar to a physical change brought about by an action.

Today we read:

Rav Ḥisda says that Rabbi Yonatan says: From where is it derived that a change in a stolen item causes the thief to acquire it? As it is stated: “And he shall return the stolen item that he took by robbery” (Leviticus 5:23). What is the meaning when the verse states the seemingly superfluous phrase “that he took by robbery”? It teaches that only if the item is in the same state as when he took it by robbery it he must return it. But if not, he is required to pay only money; the stolen item remains his to keep.

An item that was stolen that has changed enough to be called something different can no longer be returned, it must be replaced instead. (Imagine stealing paper and the thief writing a novel on the paper. The novel belongs to the thief but the thief is still liable to pay for the paper she stole.)

What I love about this is the reminder that what we call things matters. We can call someone worthless, a bitch, unlovable (fill in your worst) and we debase them. But we can call someone a treasure, a light, lovable and lift them up. So be careful with the names you use.

Today’s gem is a gem for two reasons. Before I give them, here is the little quote from the daf:

Rava said that this matter was a difficulty posed by Rabba to Rav Yosef for twenty-two years, and it was not resolved until Rav Yosef sat as the head of the yeshiva and resolved it in the following manner: A change in name of an item, representing a change in status, is similar to a physical change brought about by an action.What is the reason that a physical change through an action causes the thief to acquire the item? It is because there the stolen items were initially just wood, and now they are vessels. The same can be said for a change in name as well: Initially they called it a hide, and now they call it a table top [abrazin].

I chose this as my gem today for two reasons. The first is that one can spend hours pouring over the daf, tracing the arguments and mapping the opinions and still not know what the answer is. I love this text as it shows it took a rabbinic master/head of the yeshiva more than 22 years to figure out his opinion (and arguments are still posed after that!!).

The second reason I love this text is that studying Talmud is a strange time-warp. You feel as if it’s one conversation being had at a table at one time, but the conversation spans millennia! Somehow, here, where the conversation on the same page, in the same paragraph, jumps 22 years it highlights that the daf is a vast expanse of time – time that includes us the readers. We get to sit with Rav, Rava, Rabba and all these Sages and insert our arguments as well and imagine, as did later sages, what they might argue back.

According to the Torah, someone who steals an animal or an object has to pay back twice the value of the object he stole. If he stole a sheep or a bull and either killed them or sold them, he has to pay back 5 times the value of the bull or 4 times the alue of the sheep. Sounds pretty easy until you get to the question today’s daf grapples with.

Rabbi Ile’a says: If one stole a lamb and it subsequently became a ram, or if he stole a calf and it subsequently became a bull, the stolen item has undergone a change while in the thief’s possession, and he has therefore acquired it as his own property. Consequently, his obligation of restitution consists of monetary payment rather than giving back the stolen item itself. If he subsequently slaughtered or sold the animal, it is in effect his own animal that he slaughters, or it is his own animal that he sells, and he is not obligated in the fourfold or fivefold payment. Rabbi Ḥanina raised an objection to Rabbi Ile’a from a baraita: If one stole a lamb and it subsequently became a ram, of if he stole a calf and it subsequently became a bull, he pays the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold payment according to the animal’s value as of the time when he stole it. And if it enters your mind that in a case of this kind the thief has acquired the animal as his own property by virtue of the physical change the animal underwent when it matured, why does he pay the fourfold or fivefold payment? After all, it is his own animal that he slaughters, or it is his own animal that he sells. Rabbi Ile’a said to him: Rather, what would you conclude from the baraita? That this physical change in the stolen animal does not serve to acquire it for the thief and render it his property? If so, why should he pay according to the animal’s value as of the time when he stole it? Let him pay according to the animal’s value now, i.e., at the time of the slaughter or sale. Rabbi Ḥanina said to him: This is the reason that he does not pay in accordance with the animal’s value now: It is because the thief can say to the animal’s owner: Did I steal a bull from you, or: Did I steal a ram from you? No; I stole only a calf or a lamb, and therefore I will pay you the value of the animal when I stole it. Rabbi Ile’a said to Rabbi Ḥanina: May the Merciful One save us from this opinion of yours! Rabbi Ḥanina said back to him: On the contrary, may the Merciful One save us from your opinion!

Love the question. When someone steals something and then the thing changes status, what do you pay? The value at the time of theft or the value it has now? Here it’s discussing animals that grow and increase in value. It’s rare that something’s value is static so this is a great question. . .

Reminds me of another teaching from Tanna debei Eliyahu Zuta, Seder Eliyahu Zuta 2:

A parable:

To what is this matter similar? To a king of flesh and blood who had two servants, and he loved them with a great love. And he gave to one a kab (a measure) of wheat and to the other a kab of wheat. And he also gave to each one of them a bundle of flax. The wise one of them took the flax and wove a beautiful cloth, and took the wheat and made it into fine flour, and sifted it, and ground it, and kneaded it, and baked it, and set it on the table, and spread the beautiful cloth over it, and left it there until the king should come. And the fool of them did nothing.

After some time the king came into his house, and said to them, to his two servants, “My sons, bring me what I gave you.” One of them brought out the bread of fine flour, on the table, with the beautiful cloth spread over it. And the other of them brought out the wheat in a pile and the bundle of flax upon it.

Oy — what an embarrassment! Oy — what a shame! Which one is more favored? It is the one who brought out the bread on the table with the beautiful cloth spread over it.

One of the things about studying Torah again and again is that the things that I once glossed over become sources of meaning. Today’s gem is a reminder that nothing in Torah is there for no reason. Even things that seem repetitive on first glance and there to teach us something new.

The Gemara answers: This may be explained in accordance with what the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught. As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Any passage that was stated in the Torah and was then repeated, was repeated only for the sake of a matter that was introduced for the first time in the repeated passage. That is, sometimes the Torah repeats an entire passage just for the sake of a single new detail. That single detail will give us a new law, a new insight. They are precious gems. 🙂

Today’s daf discusses when someone who lies and says something was stolen when it really wasn’t.
The gem for me is that people should not get off without consequences when they put lies out into the world. Those lies cause damage, even if the financial damage isn’t immediately apparent. There aren’t victimless crimes.