Kiddushin 4

The Talmud can be a hard book to decipher. When I studied it in rabbinical school, every teacher would ask if there were lawyers in the class. Lawyers learn many of the techniques employed in the Talmud, including a fortiori inferences.
What are these? What does it mean? Good question. According to Merriam Webster, an a fortiori argument is “used in drawing a conclusion that is inferred to be even more certain than another.” Not so helpful. But some example of how it’s used is. For example, If it is known that a person is dead on a certain date, it may be inferred a fortiori that he is exempted from the suspect list for a murder that took place. In the Talmud, where the rule is no word of scripture, or event Mishna, is superfluous, they find a fortiori references everywhere.
Todays daf wonders why the Mishna says a woman is acquired through sex when it could be derived from the biblical text about a captive woman? Why do we need to hear about her being acquired through money when a field is squires through money? And we get this great line;

Sometimes with regard to a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly. 

Oh, if only the whole Talmud was that clear cut!

Kiddushin 3

I love symbolism. I love it in art, poetry, music, and Torah. I love how our rituals are filled with symbolism, covering the eyes, the head, laying hands, circling . . . but sometimes symbolism is not enough – sometimes you need the real thing.

On the daf today the Gemara asks why the Mishna said a woman is betrothed through three acts? What are they trying to exclude by enumerating these three?

The Gemara answers: The number serves to exclude acquisition through symbolic exchange, i.e., a pro forma act of acquisition effecting the transfer of ownership of an article. Although a woman can be betrothed by means of money or an item of monetary value, she is not betrothed if she is given an item by symbolic exchange. The Gemara explains why this needs to be excluded: It might enter your mind to say that since the Sages derive the acquisition of a woman by verbal analogy between the term expressing taking stated with regard to betrothal from the term expressing taking with regard to the field of Ephron, it can be suggested that just as a field can be acquired through symbolic exchange, so too, a woman can be acquired through symbolic exchange. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that this is not the case. The Gemara asks: And perhaps one should say that so too, it is possible to betroth a woman by means of symbolic exchange. The Gemara answers: This cannot be the case, as symbolic exchange is effective using an item worth less than the value of one peruta, and with an item worth less than the value of one peruta, a woman does not render herself acquired by a man.

While the rabbis might compare a woman to many things, even a field, she is not a field at the end of the day, she is a woman and she needs something of real value! I love Rashi’s commentary on this, he says, “It does not acquire her soul – it is a disgrace to her; therefore the method of symbolic exchange is abolished for her when doing kiddushin. And even with a vessel whose worth is greater than that of a pruta, if you bring it to her with the language of symbolic exchange [it does not acquire her soul] until he brings her according to the laws with the language of acquisition or buying or kiddushin.”

He is saying to treat a woman right, treat her as a treasure, she has value, she deserves to get at LEAST the minimum standard and hear the formulaic words.

Sounds like the father of 4 girls. You tell those cheap men Rashi.

Kiddushin 2

Ne day – new tractate! Welcome to Kiddushin, a word that means “sanctification” and refers to the holy act of marriage. When I begin to go over ceremony with my wedding couples, I actually begin by teaching them our first Mishnah on the daf!

MISHNA: A woman is acquired by, i.e., becomes betrothed to, a man to be his wife in three ways. . .She is acquired through money, through document, and through sexual intercourse.

Money is symbolized today through the exchange of rings, document through ketubah (which I always sign at the same time as the State marriage lisence), and yichud – alone time after the ceremony (I always tell my couple that I don’t care what they do in the room, but that taking a few minutes to be alone together immediately after the ceremony is a good idea so that they can process that they just got married before joining their friends and family for the rest of the night).

You might be thinking – hey rabbi, you just skipped over the fact that the Mishna used the word “acquired” instead of “sanctified” when sanctified is the name of the tractate! Well, bravo, you are not alone in being upset about this verbiage – the gemara is too!

The Gemara asks: What is different here that this mishna teaches: A woman is acquired, using the language of acquisition, and what is different there, in the beginning of the next chapter (42a), which teaches: A man betroths, using the language of betrothal?

The daf goes on to prove that a woman cannot marry without giving her own consent (whew), it talks about how important sex is in a marriage (amen), and then we get a gem that talks about how a man longs for his other half (dare I say romantic?):

Rabbi Shimon says: For what reason did the Torah say: “When a man takes a woman” (Deuteronomy 22:13) and did not write: “When a woman is taken by a man? Because it is the way [derekh] of a man to pursue a woman, and it is not the way of a woman to pursue a man. The Gemara cites a parable of a man who lost an item. Who searches for what? Certainly the owner of the lost item searches for his lost item, not the other way around. Since woman was created from man’s lost side, the man seeks that which he has lost. To allude to this statement of Rabbi Shimon, the mishna employs the term derekh in this context.

What a beautiful little text. In this world of the rabbis, where they really only consult with one another, Rabbi Shimon believes that men pine to find a partner, to find their other half. He believes it hurts him, more than her, to be apart. Without her, he is incomplete (excuse the heteronormative images, I am trying to get into his head at the time).

Beautiful. A romantic start to this tractate about marriage.

(PS, Rabbi Shimon is R. Shimon b. Yochai who hid in a cave for 13 years with his son when he was being threatened with death by the Romans. He’s the one who came out of the cave shooting fire from his eyes! So, maybe longing for his other half is something he knew well as he was away from his wife for so long. He also gave advice to a couple who couldn’t have kids that turned out to be quite romantic as well, but that story is for another time. It’s to him that the Kabbala is attributed, that romantic book about the love between God and Israel. All this to say – that guy is pretty romantic. . . when he is not burying himself in sand and living off of carobs in a cave.)

Gittin 90

Mazal tov! We made it to the last daf on Gittin. This last daf finally gets down to the heart of the matter – when is it okay to divorce? When do you call it quits? As the daf reminds us, As Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to anyone who divorces his first wife, even the altar sheds tears over him. So, what does it take? The Torah says, ““Because he has found some unseemly matter [ervat davar] in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:1).” But what qualifies?

Beit Shammai say: A man may not divorce his wife unless he finds out about her having engaged in a matter of forbidden sexual intercourse [devar erva], i.e., she committed adultery or is suspected of doing so. . . And Beit Hillel say: He may divorce her even due to a minor issue, e.g., because she burned or over-salted his dish. . .Rabbi Akiva says: He may divorce her even if he found another woman who is better looking than her and wishes to marry her . . .

So, what is it? What counts as unseemly? That’s where we get this little gem:

Rabbi Meir would say: Just as there are different attitudes with regard to food, so too, there are different attitudes with regard to women. With regard to food, you have a person who, when a fly falls into his cup, he throws out the wine with the fly and does not drink it. And this is comparable to the demeanor of Pappos ben Yehuda with regard to his wife, as he would lock the door before his wife and leave so that she would not see any other man. And you have a person who, when a fly falls into his cup, he throws out the fly and drinks the wine. And this is comparable to the demeanor of any common man, whose wife speaks with her siblings and relatives, and he lets her do so. And you have a man who, when a fly falls into his serving bowl, he sucks the fly and eats the food. This is the demeanor of a bad man, who sees his wife going out into the street with her head uncovered, and spinning in the marketplace immodestly, and with her garment open from both sides, and bathing with men, and ignores it. The Gemara asks: Can it enter your mind that the baraita is referring to a wife who bathes with men? Even a man of the lowest moral character would not allow his wife to act in this manner. Rather, the baraita means that she bathes in a place where men often bathe.

Wow. I kinda wish they didn’t give us examples and we just had that beautiful fly in the food metaphor. Some throw out the wine because a fly was in the cup. Some just remove the fly and drink – while others will go ahead and suck that fly down with their food. Each of us has a different tolerance level.

I do see this with couples. I have seen some able to stay together after infidelity and loss while I have seen couples break apart when nothing was actively wrong – they just felt the relationship had run its course. No matter what the cause, there is always loss, and it’s good to know that even the Alter, God, sheds tears when we are heartbroken.

!!!הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַמְגָרֵשׁ וּסְלִיקָא לַהּ מַסֶּכֶת גִּיטִּין

Gittin 89

If a woman ate in the marketplace, walked with her neck stretched forward in the marketplace, or nursed in the marketplace, with regard to all of these cases Rabbi Meir says that she must leave her husband, since all of these behaviors are considered licentious behavior.

What is vulgar behavior? In some cultures it’s showing a little ankle when you walk up the stairs. I was just at sleep away camp where girls wore tops that were basically bandages that only covered a strip of skin across the breast line. . . for Shabbat. Go to the beach and you will see people very covered up in muumuus as well as people who you only know they are wearing bottoms by the “whale tail” poking out. Clearly, we all have different lines on what is appropriate to wear in public. But behavior . . . shouldn’t there be a societal norm?

For Rabbi Meir, it seems almost anything could be sexual. When I was nursing I remember sitting in the mall and feeding the baby. My husband was worried and said that I shouldn’t nurse in public. I then pointed out to him that I was nursing under a blanket and when people complain it’s usually because a mom is pulling out her exposed breast in public to feed the baby. But reading this I think maybe Rabbi Meir would object to modest feedings too – because he also can’t handle a woman eating (God forbid) in public or stretching out her neck – ugh Rabbi Meir. He thinks if she does any of these things she needs to leave her husband (I imagine him calling her a hussy under his breath).

But Akiva says, not so fast –

Rabbi Akiva says that she must leave him only once the women who spin [mozerot] by the moonlight converse about her.

So, Akiva says that a woman can eat in public, we should only worry once other women begin to gossip about her.

Are you thinking that we can’t control other people’s gossip? You’re not alone.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said to him: If so, you have not allowed any daughter of Abraham our forefather to remain with her husband, i.e., all wives will be forced to leave their husbands, as it is common for women to slander their peers.

A fine display of feminism on the daf (that’s sarcasm). But at least Rabbi Meir who seems to think very mundane acts are super sexual (to the point they warrant a divorce) and Rabbi Akiva who believes the rumor mill is proof something has happened, are shut down by Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, I am a fan.

Gittin 88

There are times I am convinced that my son cannot hear the frequency of my voice. Is it that he can’t her me? Or ignores me? Or just doesn’t want to her what I am saying. On today’s daf we read:

Why are the great scholars referred to as craftsmen [ḥarash] and smiths [masger]? Ḥarash, containing the same letters as ḥeresh, meaning deaf, is an allusion to the fact that when they would introduce a statement of Torah everyone would become like deaf persons.

What is it? Do they not hear the scholars? Not understand what they are saying? Or are they purposefully ignoring them? Were the Sages asking too much? Asking the people to do things they were incapable of doing? Or didn’t want to do?

The daf, being written by sages, makes the sages look good by implying that the sages had a level of intelligence and understanding that others could not comprehend. It continues: Masger, which stems from the root samekh, gimmel, reish, meaning to close, alludes to the fact that once they (the sages) would close a certain matter that they (the people) did not comprehend, no one would introduce it again, as no one was capable of solving such a problem. And how many scholars were there? There were one thousand.

I don’t love the condescension in the text, but I do think it asks us a good question. IS this person not hearing me because they can’t? Because they don’t understand? Or are they willfully choosing not to hear me?

Gittin 87

Remember when Prince changed his name to the symbol:

It was strange, but the strangest part was that there was no new pronunciation, so we all called him “the artist formerly known as Prince.” Well, it seems that he was not the first to use a symbol in place of his name.

As Rav would draw a fish instead of signing his name, Rabbi Ḥanina would draw a date palm, Rav Ḥisda would write a samekh, Rav Hoshaya would write an ayin, and Rabba bar Rav Huna would draw a sail.

(Poor Rav Huna!)

Seems we have been doing weird things with our names for a while now. Yesterday, I heard on the radio that Subway has announced that if someone changed their legal name to Subway that they would get free subs . . . and that 1,000 people had already done it. I wonder if they will go by “the Subway formerly known as so-and-so.”

Gittin 86

A very long daf today which included home remedies for boils, bird backwash, ten people all trying to use the same divorce document, two couples whee both men and both women have the same names both trying to get divorced simultaneously, and three non-kosher divorce documents where you still don’t count any subsequent children as being born from a forbidden relationship.

What to pick as the gem? Knowing that only men could initiate divorce and that, to this day, women get stuck being controlled by men who refuse to give a get/divorce, I picked the following:

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even though there are no signatures of witnesses on the document, but he handed it to her in the presence of two witnesses, it is a valid bill of divorce. And on the basis of this bill of divorce the woman can collect the amount written for her in her marriage contract even from liened property, as Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the witnesses sign the bill of divorce only for the betterment of the world. If no witnesses sign a bill of divorce the husband can contest its validity at any time by denying that he wrote it. Nevertheless, the witnesses’ signatures are not an essential part of a bill of divorce.

So, he can’t say one thing and then do another. No being crafty with the divorce document. So, why do we even need the signatures? Also, so he can’t try and pretend he didn’t give her the papers later.
It’s a horrible patriarchal system, and so they try and fix it. Why? “Only for the betterment of the world.” Let’s keep trying to change the system to make it better.

Gittin 85

When you read the Shema from a Torah scroll, the ayin at the end of the word shema, and the dalet at the end of echad, are extra large. Some prayer books emphasize this as well. (So do some individuals when they’re praying – you hear a hard “d” from them.)

Why? Well, Hebrew can be tricky and letters and even words can be confused. Our daf worries about this when writing a bill of divorce.

The Gemara relates several rulings concerning the precise terminology to be used in writing a bill of divorce. Abaye said: This person who writes a bill of divorce should not write the word meaning: And this, by spelling it vav, dalet, yod, nun, as that can be misread as having the vowel of a ḥirik under the letter dalet, not a tzeire. Read with a ḥirik, it indicates: And there is a law that we should get divorced. Rather, he should make sure to write the word meaning: And this, without a yod, so that it is clear that it should be read with a tzeire. And he should not write the word meaning: A letter, by spelling it alef, yod, gimmel, reish, tav, as that can be confused with another identically spelled word that indicates a roof. Rather, he should write the word meaning: A letter, without a yod. And he should not write: To go, by spelling it lamed, yod, mem, heh, khaf, as that could be read as a conjunction which indicates: For me from this. And he should be sure not to write limḥakh, i.e., he must be careful that the letter heh not look like a ḥet, as that indicates that it is like a joke. Abaye continues: In the clause: That you shall be permitted to go marry any man that you wish, the words ditihevyin and dititzviyin must include three instances of the letter yod in a row in each word, as with only two instances of the letter yod these words indicate: That they shall be [tehevyan], and: That they wish [titzviyan], referring to other women. And he should extend the vav of teirukhin and the vav of shevukin, as otherwise, the vav may be mistaken for a yod, and those words spelled with a yodindicate divorced [terikhin] and left [shevikin] women. In other words, it will change the meaning from describing the document as one that divorces or sends away to describing the women as divorced and sent away. And in the clause: And now [ukhedu] I have dismissed and ousted and divorced you, he should extend the vav of khedu, as other-wise, the vav may be mistaken for a yod, and spelled with a yod it indicates: And with nothing [ukhedi]. And in the expression: To go marry [lehitnasseva] he should not write le’itnasseva with an alef and a yod, as, if he leaves space between the letters it will indicate: Will not get married [la yitnasseva]. Rather, he should write lehitnasseva, with a heh and without a yod, so there will be no room for this error.

Wow!!! So many ways the wrong letter may completely change the meaning of the divorce document. The same goes for the Shema/

If the word shema שמע, would be read with an aleph instead of an ayin (both of which are silent letters with no pronunciation), the meaning of the word would change from “hear” to “maybe!” All the sudden, our declaration of faith becomes a declaration of doubt!

The dalet is even more dramatic. If the ד (dalet) of the word echad, אחד, would be mistaken for a ר (reish), which happens all the time as they look incredibly similar, then it would no loner day “God is one” but would say “other” – so it would seem as though we are saying we believe in two (or more) gods!

So, we learn why the rabbis over emphasized the length of some letters to make sure they would not be confused. (It’s also fun to see that even giants of Hebrew admit that a reish looks like a dalet, a yud looks like a vav, a hay looks like a chet and so on.) We learn why some say that dalet on echad a little louder than the other letters – and I get a reminder from my mom from beyond the grave that handwriting actually does matter.

Gittin 84

I have known many people over the years who could not find their person because their standards were so unrealistic. But, today’s daf shocked me with unrealistic conditions placed on a divorce:

The Sages taught (Tosefta 7:8) that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you ascend to the sky, or on the condition that you descend to the depths of the sea, or on the condition that you swallow a four-cubit reed, or on the condition that you bring me a hundred-cubit reed, or on the condition that you cross the Great Sea, i.e., the Mediterranean Sea, by foot, or on any other condition that it is impossible to fulfill, it is not a valid bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima says: A bill of divorce like this is a valid bill of divorce, as the condition is void. Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima said the following principle: With regard to any condition that cannot be fulfilled in the end, yet even so the husband stipulated it initially, he is only hyperbolizing. It is assumed that he did not really intend to attach a condition to the divorce, but rather, to cause her distress, and therefore the divorce is valid without her fulfilling the condition. Rav Naḥman says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima.

I am very happy to hear that the law follows that the husband (or, in this case, the jerk) cannot ask her to do anything unrealistic (as we read more, he also cannot ask her to do anything sexual or that violates Torah law) but that she still gets to take that document and use it as her divorce paper. Sounds like divorcing him is a good idea.

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