2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

The daf turns to situations where adults claim different things when it comes to marriage. Normally, if an adult says they are married and no one disagrees, you believe them. However, if there is a question as to if they are telling the truth, then you need 2 witnesses. As Rav Ashi so beautifully puts it on today’s daf: Witnesses were created only for liars, and they are not needed to establish the matter.

So, the gem is a particularly sticky situation where THREE adults give differing testimony on the status of themselves and their marriage.

Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raises an objection from the following baraita: There were two men who came from overseas and a woman was with them, and they had a bundle with them. This man says: This is my wife, and this other man is my slave, and this is my bundle. And this second man says: This is my wife, and this other man is my slave, and this is my bundle.

Okay! So, two men come on a ship with a woman and some package worth $$$. This seems to be a new place where they and their status in not know. So, what do they do? They both claim that the most ideal situation is reality – that the other guy is their slave, they own the package, and the woman is their wife!

You may be thinking. This is easy, just ask the woman! But that’s what makes this situation so memorable.

And the woman says: These are my two slaves and this is my bundle.

Ha! So, now what do we do? Do we believe her? One of the men? Everyone has incentive to lie. This is a case where you would need two witnesses to corroborate your story. But, if you don’t have that, or only have 1 witness then:

In this case she requires two bills of divorce, as with each of them there is uncertainty concerning whether she is married to him, and she collects payment of her marriage contract from the bundle. Even according to their claims that she is married to one of them, now that they have each divorced her she is at least entitled to payment of her marriage contract from the bundle.

Again, the daf leaves us with fodder for a fabulous story. I imagine that she is married to one of the men, but that she hates him. He is cruel and she was promised by her father – it was never a union she wanted. The other man is this man’s slave. He has seen how horrible his master is and has compassion for the wife. As they travel to a new land, they make a pact – to both testify that they are married and the master/husband is a slave. Their two testimonies will outweigh his. They take a bundle that contains precious stones as cargo. Then, when they dock, the husband testified to who they are. But the slave comes up and contradicts him! All eyes are on the woman who throws back her head and declares that they are both her slaves, and this her bundle. And so she walks away from the situation divorced, single, and with enough money to support herself without either of them.

Today’s daf, besides this pretty fabulous line, “Rabbi Yeshevav, who says: Come, let us shout at Akiva ben Yosef,” has a pretty encouraging gem.

If a father says: I betrothed my minor daughter to someone, or: I betrothed her to someone and accepted her divorce when she was a minor girl, and she is still a minor girl at the time of this statement, he is deemed credible to render her forbidden to all other men as a married woman, or to a priest as a divorced woman. But if he says: I betrothed her to someone and accepted her divorce when she was a minor, and she is an adult woman at the time of his declaration, his statement is not deemed credible.

Why is this encouraging? 1) Once a woman is an adult, her father can no longer marry her off or divorce her from her betrothed. Once she is an adult, she is the only person who can commit to her relationships or testify to her past. And 2) While the daf reminds us that we should not believe people when they tell us they’ve done things that are impossible – we should also believe in people when they say they’ve done what is in their power to do.

Right now there is a lot most of us would like to do that’s impossible. But there is also a lot we CAN do that is possible. So, we ask ourselves? Am I speaking up? Am I using my power? Am I doing what’s in my power to do?

Unforgetable, that’s what you are . . .That’s why, darling, it’s incredible
That someone so unforgettable
Thinks that I am unforgettable too . . .

Love is a powerful thing. But, oddly, on our daf, we discuss a situation where a woman gets betrothed and then forgets who she got betrothed to! A woman who said: I became betrothed but I do not know to whom I became betrothed, and one man came and said: I betrothed her, he is not deemed credible to marry her. Very strange. But the daf thinks that, perhaps, the woman and this man just want to get engaged so they’re creating a strange situation where he can jump forward and claim that they’re together without having to go through the regular channels.

However, just prior to this the daf discusses what to do when a father says:

I betrothed my minor daughter to someone but I do not know to whom I betrothed her.

Really Dad? You don’t remember? That’s sounds like a pretty hands-off dad. Not only is this strange, it creates a nightmare for the poor daughter. Why? The daughter, now married but unaware of who her husband is, is effectively an agunah, a chained woman since she is legally married but living without a husband. The only way out is to somehow discover who the mysterious husband might be. And one man came forward and said: I betrothed her, his claim is deemed credible.

Why not believe him? We beleived Dad who says he betrothed her even though he can’t bother to remember who he selected – so why not believe this guy who jumps up to claim her? But then the daf wonders, what if two men say they are her husband?

If two men stepped forward and this one said: I betrothed her, and that one said: I betrothed her, they must both give her a bill of divorce to render it permitted for her to marry anyone else. And if they so desire, one of them gives her a bill of divorce and the other one may marry her.

Now two rabbis disagree about if this man who jumps up is allowed to marry her or has to divorce her.

Rav says: When the mishna states that the claim of one who says that he betrothed this girl is deemed credible, it means that he is deemed credible to the extent that he may give her a bill of divorce, but he is not deemed credible to marry her. He is deemed credible to give her a bill of divorce, as there is a presumption that a person sins only for his own benefit. No one is suspected of sinning when he does not stand to gain from it. Since he is not allowed to marry her himself, we do not say that he lied without purpose. But he is not deemed credible to marry her, as we say that his inclination might have overcome him, leading him to falsely claim that he is the one who betrothed her.

So, Rav thinks he can claim she is his bride, only to divorce her and prevent her from being an aguna. However, if he can’t marry her because then any man who finds her attractive might jump at the opportunity.

Rav Ashi disagrees and allows the suitor to marry the woman despite no evidence that kiddushin had taken place. Strangely, unlike with Rav, the Gemara does not explain his reasoning.

My thought? Rav Ashi doesn’t want to punish the couple just because the father/father-in-law is a jackass.

So the gem is to all who think they have bad in-laws. If they know your name, then things could be worse.

Our Mishna teaches a couple powerful lessons today. First:

With regard to one who betroths a woman and later says: When I betrothed her I thought that she was the daughter of a priest, and it turned out that she is the daughter of a Levite, or if he claims that he thought she was the daughter of a Levite and she is actually the daughter of a priest, or if he claims that he thought she was poor and she is wealthy; or wealthy and she is poor, in all of these cases she is betrothed, because she did not mislead him, and no explicit condition was stated with regard to these matters.

Sometimes we think that someone mislead us in a relationship, but it was really our own assumptions. We need to get to know our partner, ask and not assume. It’s not fair to them if we don’t take the time to get to know who they really are.

Also this: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert, or: After you convert, or if he was a Canaanite slave and says: After I am emancipated, or if she was a Canaanite maidservant and he says: After you are emancipated, or if he says to a married woman: After your husband dies, or to his wife’s sister: After your sister dies, or if he says to a woman awaiting levirate marriage or ḥalitza from a brother-in-law [yavam], who in the opinion of this tanna cannot be betrothed by another man: After your yavam performs ḥalitza for you, in all these cases she is not betrothed. Since he cannot betroth her at the present time, his attempt at betrothal is ineffective.

How many stories are there of women who “gave up their virtue” for men who made promises of the future? Here we learn a very important lesson, and one that applies outside of a marriage situation- not to make promises on things that are not currently the reality. Don’t let people pay you with money they don’t have. Don’t let men say they will marry you only when certain conditions apply.

Both tell us to be honest and transparent. To base our decisions in reality, not in fantasy.

There is discussion on today’s daf about inheritance, what son will inherit what parcel of land. It reminded me of a text I learned before the High Holidays this year. According to the Midrash, in the time of King Solomon there was an inheritance case that involved conjoined twins. There were six sons in addition to the conjoined twins. When the father died, the sons came before King Solomon, the twins felt they should receive a double share of the inheritance. King Solomon covered one head and poured hot water on the other. Why? He wanted to see if he hurt one if the other would cry out. It they were one heart and therefore one person. From this King Solomon meant to show that genetically they are one, and should be judged as one for inheritance purposes.

I have been thinking of this in terms of what is happening in Israel. There are 7 million Jews in Israel, 7 million here in America, 1 million everywhere else. The US and Israel are two heads. Right now, boiling water is being poured on our other half, and we are screaming in pain.

Our daf is discussing conditional proposals. We see men who propose on the condition that they own land or have a certain amount of money and then they have to prove it. Bu there is also time conditions. These men propose that they get engaged after a certain amount of time. The rabbis say that, in the meantime, another man can come and swoop her off her feet. (So, if you know, don’t wait guys.) You would think that, if a man proposes getting engaged at some later point, that he’s not that into her. Maybe that’s what I like about today’s gem. Maybe the issue is that she is TOO desirable . . .

Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if one hundred betrothed her in this manner, their betrothal is effective with regard to her. And similarly, Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even the betrothal of one hundred is effective with regard to her. Rav Mesharshiyya, son of Rav Ami, said to Rabbi Asi: I will explain to you the reason of Rabbi Yoḥanan: These one hundred men have rendered themselves like a row [sheraga] of bricks, each and every one of whom leaves a gap for the other. Since there is a period of time before the betrothal of each man takes effect, another betrothal can intervene in the meantime.

100 men line up and propose to this woman. . . but, they’re all conditional, they’re all after some time period. So, in the meantime, the next guy can come and propose! Now, he has effectively cancelled the previous guys proposal.

A hilarious loop in the law.

The message is not to be the last in line of 100 men – the message is that if you know, you shouldn’t put it off. Love unconditionally.

On the bottom of daf 58, we are introduced to a new Mishna that is SO scandelous:

MISHNA: With regard to one man who says to another: Go and betroth so-and-so to me, and the latter went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the second man.

DRAMA!! A man is hired to propose to a woman on behalf of a man . . . and proposes on his own behalf instead! (I think this is the plot of at least 3 movies from the 90s.) But today’s daf takes it even further.

Ravin the Pious was appointed an agent and went to betroth a woman to his son, but in the end he betrothed her to himself.

STOP! Done dirty by his own father! (Now I don’t think I saw that in a movie.)

I love that this guy is called Ravin the Pious – the irony is overwhelming. Who does this to their own son?

He does give an excuse:

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in the aforementioned baraita: What he did is done, but he has treated him in a deceitful manner? His excuse is that the woman’s family would not give her to the son, and agreed only to let her marry the father.

Sorry son, you’re just not good enough for her. . . so I will marry her… But it’s actually worse than that because his dad doesn’t tell his son. the son finds out when dad brings home the woman as the dad’s new bride. (Meet your new step mom!)

The Gemara further asks: Even so, before betrothing her he should have first informed his son that they refuse to let her marry him. The Gemara explains that Ravin thought: In the meantime, while I am busy reporting back to my son, someone else will come and betroth her.

Nice to have a fun daf on such a terrible day. hope it makes you smile too… and grateful that this “pious” guy is not your dad.

So much pain could be avoided if we were better at communication. How many times do couples fight because of perceived slights? Today’s daf reminds us that, even when we think we’ve been slighted, that it may be a misunderstanding.

Rav Huna said to him: You are out [hotza’a]. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin was embarrassed, as he thought Rav Huna told him he was out, i.e., wrong, due to the halakha he stated. Sensing Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin’s embarrassment, Rav Huna said to him: This is what I said: You are a Hutzla’a, as Rav Asi, from the town of Huzal, stands in accordance with your opinion.

Rav Huna calls Rabbi Hiyya b. Abin “hutza’ah” which he experiences as an insult. He is embarrassed. But then Rav Huna reassures him that it was not meant to be an insult, he merely misheard. He only meant to say that someone from Huzal agreed with him. He heard “hutza’ah” but what was meant was “Hutzla’a.”

May we strive to be better in our communications, and make sure we have truly heard what is said before reacting.

In 1750, a female donkey was acquitted of charges of bestiality due to witnesses to the animal’s virtue and good behavior. However, her human co-defendants were sentenced to death.

That’s right. While it seems totally weird for us, the courts of Europe from 1300-1800’s saw quite a bit of animals go on trial. Some were accused of witchcraft, some as being ware-wolves. Some were accused of murder, some of seduction and being possessed by demons.

Today, we may see a dangerous animal put to sleep every now and then, but in general, society considers animals innocent of sin. Unaware and therefore, unblameworthy. But it wasn’t always that way.

While Judaism did not have the same kind of legal set up as the church when it comes to animals, today’s daf made me think of this strange chapter in the history of mankind.

Our daf is discussing animals that we cannot derive benefit from (remember when we were hypothetically proposing with holy animals? Now it’s the opposite). We zoom in on a conversaiton about birds that were broght to be slaughtered for a leper. The question is which bird might be kosher to be used (if it was not used for it’s original intention), the slaughtered bird of the live bird?

Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: The reason to expound the verse as the baraita does is that we have not found kosher living creatures that are permanently forbidden with regard to eating. Therefore, it stands to reason that the slaughtered bird is forbidden, not the living one. Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak objects to this explanation: But haven’t we found kosher living animals that are permanently forbidden? But there are the cases of an animal set aside as an offering to an idol, and an animal that was itself worshipped as an idol, which are living creatures and yet are permanently forbidden. The Gemara answers: There is a difference, as when they are forbidden, they are forbidden only to be used for the Most High, i.e., to be used as offerings in the Temple service, but it is permitted for a common Jew to derive benefit from them. Rabbi Yirmeya objects to the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan: But an animal that copulated with a woman, and an animal that copulated with a man, in the presence of witnesses, they are living creatures and yet they are permanently forbidden, as the halakha is that these animals are killed, and one is prohibited from deriving benefit from them once they have been sentenced. Rather, the above explanation should be emended to say: Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: We have not found most kosher living creatures that are permanently forbidden while they are still alive, and it can be assumed that the inclusion of the verse is referring to that which is generally forbidden, even if there are exceptions.

Oy, vey. So, most animals are not worshipped as gods. Most are not having sex with people. But those that do – don’t eat them. It’s not kosher.

Who is to blame when an illegal exchange happens? If a product just “fell off the back of the truck,” is it the buyer or the seller that is to blame that stolen property is exchanging hands?

On our daf we get an interesting situation (and it’s layers on layers because it’s talking about second tithe money but is trying to answer the question of wandering animals around Jerusalem which is trying to answer the question of if a woman can become engaged with gifts like these). In it, a purchaser buys a shady object and then the seller runs away with the money before the purchaser can do anything about the fact that what was given isn’t kosher.

The case here is where the seller fled with the money, and there is no way of voiding the sale and returning the money to the purchaser. The Gemara comments: And the reason is that he fled, but had he not fled, we would penalize the seller by requiring him to return the money. The Gemara asks: And let us penalize the buyer and require him to take an equivalent sum of money to Jerusalem.

So, there is a debate, do we penalize the purchaser or the seller? Now the gem of an answer:

The Gemara answers: It is not the mouse that steals, but the hole that steals. In other words, a mouse cannot steal an item unless he has a hole in which to hide it. Here too, the money would not have been desacralized without the help of the seller. The Gemara questions this logic: But if not for the mouse, what has the hole done? Since they both are integral to the prohibited act, each of them is deserving of a penalty.

Love! So, which is to blame? The seller? Well, the seller couldn’t have done anything without a buyer, you shoudl really blame the buyer.

Blame the buyer? They couldn’t have done anythign wrong without the seller. So blame the seller!

Or, blame them both. That’s my preference, although, I am thinking I probably have clothes in my closet right now that were made by slave labor. I don’t know that, or which, but it’s very probable. So, maybe I am happy with where the Gemara lands in the end:

The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that anywhere that the forbidden item is, i.e., anywhere that the money is, and in this case it is with the seller, there we should penalize.

So, the sellers shouldn’t sell these things.

amen.