2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

Two short passages from today’s daf. The first reminds us that being ostracized from the community is a terrible thing. We are taught al tifros min hatzibbur – don’t separate yourself from the community. Here, someone has continuously ignored a court summons. The punishment is for them to be ostracized – but only to encourage them to come to court.

Rava said: With regard to one who had a document of ostracism written about him due to the fact that he did not come to court, we do not tear up the document for him until he actually comes to court, and it is not enough for him to simply commit to appearing. Similarly, if the document of ostracism was written due to the fact that he did not obey the ruling of the court, we do not tear it up for him until he actually obeys the ruling. The Gemara comments: This second statement is not so. Rather, once he has acquiesced and said: I will obey, we immediately tear up the document for him.

The last thing we want is for someone to not be part of the community. Here, we see that just saying you will obey is enough to invite you back into community.

Our second is another person trying to avoid their day in court – this time by going to a kallah! What’s a kallah? It’s a dedicated time of focused study. It’s saying, I can’t come to court because I’m going to study Torah and don’t want to interrupt my study.

Rav Naḥman says: We do not set a court date for participants in the kalla, the gatherings for Torah study during Elul and Adar, during the months of the kalla, nor for participants in the public discourses prior to the Festival during the period leading up to the Festival. The Gemara relates: When people would come before Rav Naḥman during the kalla period in order to make legal claims against others, he would say to them: Did I gather you here for your own needs? No, I gathered you to participate in Torah study. The Gemara adds: But now that there are scoundrels, who do not come to study Torah but rather to avoid trial, we are concerned that they will continue to evade prosecution, and therefore we summon them to court even during these time periods.

So, they wanted to not make people come to court on holidays, Shabbat, and if they were attending a kallah – but then people started to abuse it! they signed up for study only to avoid their duties.

(Sounds like some Haredi Jews avoiding military service . . .but that’s another topic.)

Drama on the daf! It really gives us a glimpse of who Rabbi Yirmeya is to read this passage and compare it with others we have read in the past.

The Gemara recounts a related incident: The son of Rabbi Yirmeya’s father-in-law, i.e., his wife’s brother, who was a minor, shut the doors of his father’s house before Rabbi Yirmeya in order to prevent Rabbi Yirmeya from establishing legal possession of the house or a chamber that he claimed belonged to him.

What happened? Rabbi Yirmeya’s father-in-law died. His brother-in-law was just a kid, Yirmeya is married to his older sister, so, he goes to take possession of the house but the kid won’t let him in! So, he goes to get help . . .

Rabbi Yirmeya came before Rabbi Avin to file a legal claim against his brother-in-law. Rabbi Avin said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Your brother-in-law is claiming ownership of that which is his, since he retains the presumptive ownership of his father’s house upon his father’s death. Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: But I can bring witnesses who can testify that I took possession of it during his father’s lifetime.

Plot thickens! Apparently, Yirmeya was given the house during his father-in-laws lifetime! That’s another story. Now, he should have the house, however . . .

Rabbi Avin said to him: But does the court accept witnesses who testify in the absence of a litigant? Since the defendant is a minor his presence is not legally recognized, and the court does not accept testimony against him. Rabbi Yirmeya questioned this assertion: And is it so that the court does not accept such testimony? But isn’t it taught that if a robber leaves stolen goods to his children, whether they are adults or minors, they are obligated to pay the owner? If the court obligates minors to pay, it must accept testimony about them. Rabbi Avin said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Sumakhos’s dispute is at your side, i.e., Sumakhos disagrees with this ruling and holds that the minors are exempt from paying.

So, Avin argues that they can’t have a minor be a defendant and Yirmeya brings an example of when the law says a minor can. But, Avin says sumakhos disagreed with that ruling. I love Yirmeya’s response:

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: Did the whole world go to the effort to hold in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos in order to seize what is mine?

Ha! Now you listen to that guy? Just to spite me? Just to rob me of what’s mine?

In the meantime, the matter circulated and eventually came before Rabbi Abbahu, who said: Did you not hear that which Rav Yosef bar Ḥama says that Rabbi Oshaya says? As Rav Yosef bar Ḥama says that Rabbi Oshaya says: With regard to a child who took his slaves and descended into the field of another and said: It is mine, the court does not say: Let us wait until he matures before we assess his claims. Rather, the court removes it from his possession immediately, and when he matures he may bring witnesses to attest to his claim and we will see how to judge the case. Similarly, Rabbi Yirmeya should be awarded the disputed property until his minor brother-in-law may litigate in court.

so, an argument in favor of Yirmeya . . . but . . .

The Gemara rejects Rabbi Abbahu’s assertion: Is the case that Rav Yosef bar Ḥama discusses comparable to the case of Rabbi Yirmeya? It is there, in Rav Yosef bar Ḥama’s case, that we seize the property from him, because there is no presumption of ownership from his father; but where he does have a presumption of ownership from his father, no, we do not seize his property. Since Rabbi Yirmeya’s brother-in-law has a presumption of ownership due to the fact that the property belonged to his father, he retains control of the property.

What kind of. picture does this paint of Yirmeya? Here is another scene of this Rabbi that I think is similar enough to cement his personality:

The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yirmeya insulted Rabbi Abba, causing the latter to have a complaint against him. Rabbi Yirmeya went and sat at the threshold of Rabbi Abba’s house to beg him for forgiveness. When Rabbi Abba’s maid poured out the dirty water from the house, the stream of water landed on Rabbi Yirmeya’s head. He said about himself: They have made me into a trash heap, as they are pouring dirty water on me. He recited this verse about himself: “Who lifts up the needy out of the trash heap” (Psalms 113:7).

Both give us the image of a guy who is a bit of a jerk who also can’t seem to catch a break.

He’s like the Wiley Coyote of the Talmud (with less attempted murder).

What responsibility do we have to make up for the sins of our fathers?

On today’s daf, we get the last Mishnah in Bava Kamma (yay! and then we talk about it for a week):

MISHNA: In the case of one who robs another of food and feeds it to his children, or who left a stolen item to them and then died, the children are exempt from paying the victim of the robbery after their father’s death. But if the stolen item was something that serves as a legal guarantee of a loan, the heirs are obligated to pay.

This seems to teach that, if the stolen item that was given to us has been consumed and we cannot give it back, then we don’t have to give it (or money) back. But later on the daf we learn:

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi teach Rabbi Shimon, his son, that this mishna is not referring only to something that may actually serve as a legal guarantee, i.e., land? Rather, it is referring even to a cow that he plows with, or a donkey that he drives by directing it from behind, which the heirs are obligated to return because of the honor of their father. This indicates that the mishna is referring to stolen property that is extant, and not to land.

Here, the daf says that, if we know something was stolen, we should return it or pay it’s equivalent. Why? To honor his father.

How powerful is that? Maybe not double down by saying what our father did was right. Maybe not saying we have no responsibility. But understanding that our paying it back honors our parents and helps their memories to be for a blessing.

Do we have to pay it back? That’s up to debate on the daf (not in the codes which do require pay-back). But should we? Clearly, yes.

Guilt is good. (Shame, not so much, but that’s another topic.) Guilt is our conscience telling us what we’ve done is wrong. That there is something we need to do. In the Torah, there are 5 types of sacrifices we can bring. One is guilt. Once you give the sacrifice, it’s as though the guilt has gone up in smoke like that sacrifice on the alter. Don’t we all want something to assuage our guilt? The daf tells us a bit about offering that guilt sacrifice (the one offering it here has stolen from a convert and then the convert died so now he needs to give what he owed to the priests plus the guilt sacrifice):

If the robber gave the money to the priestly watch of Joiarib and then gave the guilt-offering to the priestly watch of Jedaiah, the following priestly watch, to sacrifice on his behalf, he has fulfilled his obligation. By contrast, if he first gave the guilt-offering to the priestly watch of Joiarib and then gave the money to the priestly watch of Jedaiah, if the animal designated for the guilt-offering is extant, then members of the priestly watch of Jedaiah, who received the money, should sacrifice it. But if it is no longer extant because the priestly watch of Joiarib had already sacrificed it, he should return and bring another guilt-offering; for one who brings his stolen item to the priests before he brings his guilt-offering has fulfilled his obligation, but one who brings his guilt-offering before he brings his stolen item has not fulfilled his obligation. Although he cannot sacrifice the offering before paying the principal, if he gave the principal but did not yet give the additional one-fifth payment, the lack of having given the additional one-fifth payment does not preclude sacrificing the offering.

Confused? The point is that if the robber pays what he owes and THEN offers the guilt sacrifice. It doesn’t count if he offers the sacrifice before he pays back what he owes. You can’t skip the step. You can’t let go of guilt if you haven’t done the work of repaying what you owe, healing what you broke.

A gem indeed.

Can you steal from yourself? Today’s daf says yes (and not in a “I procrastinate and steal my own time” kind of way).

In a Mishnah that began on the bottom of 108b, we read: In the case of one who robs his father and the father demands that he return the stolen item, and he takes an oath to his father that he did not rob him; and then the father dies; and then the son admits that he robbed him and took a false oath, necessitating the return of the principal and the giving of the additional one-fifth payment to his father’s heirs, of which he is either one of several or the only one; what should he do? This son pays the principal and the additional one-fifth payment to his father’s sons or brothers, and brings a guilt-offering and does not keep his own share. And if he does not want to forfeit his share or where he does not have sufficient funds to pay the other heirs while forfeiting his share, he borrows money in the amount of the value of the stolen item and the creditors come and are repaid in part from his share in the stolen item.

Here, he stole from his dad, but then his dad dies and he and his brothers would inherit the item/money. However, you can’t reward someone who stole, so he has to pay his fellow inheritors. However, if he is the only son – well, then he is the only one who inherits the stolen item! So, he has effectively stolen from himself. So, what does he do?

GEMARA: Rav Yosef says: One may even put this money in a charity purse if he so chooses. Rav Pappa says: And when giving the money he must say: This is what was robbed from my father.

So, donate the money and admit his guilt. However the Germara then ask, Why must he do this? Let him forgive the debt to himself. If he now owns it, can’t he forgive himself for stealing? Give it to himself?

The problem here is that you can’t benefit from robbery AND you still have the right to inherit. The rabbis argue back and forth, eventually suggesting he do something that looks akin to money laundering (he can’t keep it but he can take out a loan and then the money he inherits pays off the loan – so technically it’s not his but he ends up getting the equivalent amount in the loan).

The point of the Mishna is that the money that was stolen cannot remain in his possession and must be transferred to someone else. You don’t get to keep what you stole, even if it turns out you were really stealing from yourself.

The Rambam makes this clearer in his code of law (Hilkhot Gezelah 8:2-3):

If the robber does not have any brothers, and he is thus the only heir, he must still remove the object obtained by robbery from his possession by giving it to his children.
If this son who robbed his father does not have children, he may give it to his creditor, give it as a loan or give it to charity. In such instances, since he has removed the object itself from his possession, he is no longer under obligation, even though he gave it as a present or repaid his debt with it. He must, however, tell the recipient: “This article was obtained by robbery from my father.”

My gem in all this is that we have to undergo teshuva whenever we sin/mess up. Here, it seems as though the person the son has stolen from died and now he has effectively stolen from himself and there should be nothing he can do. But the rabbis say no – you have to do teshuva. And I love that image, of doing teshuva for the sins we commit against ourselves. We shouldn’t just forgive ourselves, but do the hard work of confessing our crime, making up for any losses, apologizing, and then making a plan for next time so we don’t commit that sin again.

The daf can be funny, profound, deep, and, like today, very confusing. Today’s daf is discussing two types of “bailees” or (I think better in Hebrew) Shomrim. Shomrim are guards and, personally, bailee is not a work I would use for guarding. So, there are two types of guards, the shomer hinam, the unpaid guard who is watching something as a favor, and the shomer sakhar, the guard who is paid for his time/effort. We need to know the difference as the unpaid guard will not have to pay for an object if it was stolen as long as he was not completely negligent and he swears an oath that the item was stolen, whereas the paid guard is liable to pay for an item stolen on his watch.

Now is when the daf gets really tricky. It asks what happens if an item was stolen from an unpaid guard. That guard is not obligated to pay the owner, but they descide to take an oath the item was stolen AND they pay the owner anyway. Then, the thief is found! Who does the thief pay? The owner? The guard? And how much?

Had the guard just made the payment and not sworn, the money would have gone to the guard. But if he swore and did not make the payment, the money would go to the owner. In our case today – he did both! So . . . . the Gemara says the question stands unesolved.

BOO!!!

It’s so hard to follow and we followed it all the way to a dead end.

But, I still love it. Too much in life presents as black and white with clear answers. And guess what? That is rarely how life is. Life is grey. So grey. And I wouldn’t trust any rabbi, or book, that claimed to always have all the answers.

A strange idea on today’s daf. If one is accused of owing someone money and the person denies owing any money, the rule is that we believe them (unless or until witnesses testify otherwise). However, if they admit that they owe some money, just not as much as the person is claiming – then we don’t believe them until they make an oath that they don’t owe more than they are admitting to.

This leads to the question of why believe one and not the other? Why not make both take an oath?

And what is different about a loan that this halakha would apply only there? The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with the statement of Rabba, as Rabba says: For what reason did the Torah say that one who admits to a part of the claim must take an oath? It is because there is a presumption that a person does not exhibit insolence by lying in the presence of his creditor, who had done him a favor by lending money to him. And this person who denies part of the claim actually wants to deny all of the debt, so as to be exempt, and this fact that he does not deny all of it is because a person does not exhibit insolence.

Rabba says someone might admit to a partial truth because he can’t imagine someone having the audacity to lie the the face of a person who did them a favor.

I like that, in his mind, even liars have moral code.

Weird bit of kosher trivia on today’s daf! Is it possible to eat an animal that has not had ritual slaughter and it be considered kosher meat?

The obvious answer is no. We are not allowed to eat limbs of a living animal. If an animal dies of natural causes, it’s meat isn’t kosher. So, it seems like the answer is no – there is no way to eat meat that is not from a ritually slaughtered animal and it be considered kosher.

Enter the strange case of the ben pekuda!

The Gemara further asks: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan answer Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba by saying that the ruling of the baraita is stated with regard to an animal removed from its mother’s womb after the mother was ritually slaughtered [ben pekua], which is permitted for consumption without slaughter, so that there is a possibility that the thief ate it without first slaughtering it. The Gemara responds that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a ben pekua requires slaughter.

A ben pekuda is an animal that was in the mother’s womb at the time of her slaughter. It was not slaughtered itself, yet it comes from a ritually slaughtered animal. Rabbi Shimon considers such an animal’s meat to be kosher!

Don’t worry, Rabbi Meir says it’s not kosher . . . until it too it ritually slaughtered.

Is this enough to make you want to become a vegetarian?

Maybe not, but it’s certainly gross. And a very interesting little piece of kosher trivia.

Can I have partial credit?

I am amazed that kids get so much partial credit on the work they do for school. You can dd wrong but set up the equation right and get partial credit. You can return your test/homework with your wrong answers corrected and get partial credit. This certainly helps pad their grades – but is this really a good lesson for life?

Today’s daf gives us three situations where someone does something halfway, but wants full credit. 1) Someone who stole 2 bundles and returns just one. 2) A nazir who shaves most, but not all, of his hair. And 3) someone who sealed half of a hole in a container.

Rava raises a dilemma: If one robbed another of two bundles of goods that were worth one peruta in total, and he returned one of them to the robbery victim, what is the halakha? Do we say that now there is no longer a stolen item in the possession of the robber, as the remaining bundle is worth less than one peruta, and he has therefore fulfilled his obligation to return the stolen item; or perhaps we say that since the robber did not return the stolen item that was in his possession in its entirety, he is obligated to return the second bundle? Rava himself then resolves the dilemma: There is no stolen item here, as the remaining bundle is worth less than one peruta; there is no returning of a stolen item here. The Gemara expresses surprise at this expression: If there is no stolen item here, as what remains is insignificant, it follows that there is fulfillment of the mitzva of returning the stolen item here, and the robber ought to be exempt, as he is no longer considered to be in possession of a stolen item. The Gemara explains that this is what Rava is saying: Even though the robber is exempt from returning the second bundle, as there is no stolen item here, there is nevertheless no fulfillment of the mitzva of returning a stolen item here, since the returned bundle was worth less than one peruta as well. § Following Rava’s previous dilemma, the Gemara cites a similar dilemma raised by Rava. And Rava says: The Sages said that a nazirite who shaved his head as required but left two hairs uncut has done nothing, and his obligation to shave his head has not been fulfilled. . . Rava raises a dilemma: If one sealed half of the hole, what is the halakha?

Guess what? In all these cases, you don’t get partial credit. Some things you do, you have be all in or you get no credit. The lesson? If you’re going to do something, do it. Go all in.

We learned yesterday that someone who owes a debt should go to any lengths to repay what they owe (even as far as Medea!). But today’s daf recognizes that not everyone will be eager to travel to pay off their debts (even when they’ve been found to be thefts). So:

The Sages say: According to Shmuel, what is the rectification, i.e., what recourse is available to one who wishes to collect a debt without traveling to the debtor’s location?

The thief may not want to travel to repay his debt, but that’s also not fair to the victim – they shouldn’t have to travel to get their item/money back! So, while the thief cannot appoint an agent, the victim can . . . but it’s not easy.

The Gemara notes: And this is like that course of action of Rav Pappa, who was owed twelve thousand dinars by a resident of Bei Ḥozai, and he transferred his claim to the money to Rav Shmuel bar Abba by means of the acquisition of the threshold of his house. When Rav Shmuel bar Abba came from Bei Ḥozai with the money in hand, Rav Pappa went out as far as Tavakh toward him in his excitement to receive the money.

Love this both because justice is done and an agent is appointed AND because of Rav Pappa’s absolute glee in getting paid! Makes sense, he was a very rich man who clearly loved money (but a good man too).