2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

In the past few days the daf has taught us that a borrower has a higher level of responsibility towards the borrowed animal or object than does a renter or a watchman.

Todays dad asks when does the borrower’s responsibility begin?

Clearly it happens when the borrower has the items d the owner is no longer there. But today’s dad asks what the ruling is when there is time between the animal or item leaving the owner and getting to the borrower.

The gem? It reminds me of when you get a package and the shipped item has been damaged. Whose fault is it?

Much like on the daf – the rabbis rule that if the owner sends it then the owner is liable until it gets to the borrower. However, if the borrower says the owner should let the borrower’s son or slave take it – then the borrower is liable.

So? Maybe insure your shipping method.

Oy, the daf. Apparently men think about sex 19 times a day. That seems to be accurate on the daf. In a conversation discussing if you are liable to pay fro something that broke while you borrow it – the rabbis compare it to – you got it – sex. (https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20140617-how-often-do-men-think-about-sex)

The Gemara relates: A certain man borrowed a cat from another to hunt and kill mice for him. The mice banded together against it and killed it. Rav Ashi sat and raised a dilemma: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Is this case comparable to a case where a borrowed animal died due to ordinary labor, or not? Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: Avimi of Hagronya said this in the name of Rava: With regard to a man who women killed, there is a need for neither judgment nor a judge, i.e., it is obvious that they are liable. In this case as well, it is obvious that the borrower may bring the cat to hunt mice, and he is therefore exempt from liability.

Okay, if you are thinking of women ganging up on a man like in Handmaids tale, just keep reading.

There are those who say that the incident actually occurred as follows: The cat ate many mice, and was harmed by doing so and died. Rav Ashi sat and deliberated: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: Avimi of Hagronya said this: With regard to a man who overindulged in sexual intercourse to the extent that women killed him by exhausting him, there is neither judgment nor judge, i.e., there is no redress since it is his own fault.

Oh good Lord. We just want to know if they’re liable for the death of a cat! (Do you think “cat” had the same sexual connotations then that it has now?)

Today’s gem is so Miami I couldn’t help but pick it:

If one borrowed an item, not to use it but to be seen with it, so that people will assume that he is wealthy, what is the halakha?

The daf is discussing liability if you use an item not how it’s meant to be used (don’t drive the car – just pose with it). In this case they’re wondering if the benefit they are deriving isn’t worth any monetary value (but isn’t it?) then are they liable if something happens.

We have so much of this! Renting clothes and jewelry, purses and cars – all to look wealthy. But today we certainly pay just to “be seen with” those items. I guess it struck me because I thought it was a new thing – but clearly this has been happening since way back.

The Daf today discusses under what circumstances someone is libel for the loss or death of an animal that they borrowed if the owner of the animal is with them and has been hired by them. the short answer is that as long as the owner was hired before or at the same time as the animal, the borrower is not libel. but it was hard for me to spot the gym right away, and so I searched and did a lot of research and came upon this gem from dafyomi.co.il:

RAV MOSHE KAZIS (in SEFER KIN’AS SOFRIM, and as cited by the YAD MALACHI #11) who asks why the Gemara there (Nedarim and Yevamos) says that “since [a Halachah] is derived through a Derashah, it is beloved?” It would have seemed more logical for the Gemara to say that such a Halachah is “more important.” Rav Moshe Kazis explains that when one derives a Halachah through his own toil in applying the methods of Halachic derivation, that Halachah is more cherished and beloved to him because of the effort he exerted to learn it. Based on this, the Maharatz Chayos explains that in Nedarim and Yevamos, where the Tana teaches both Halachos, he prefers to write the one that is “beloved to him” first. That Halachah, though, is not more important than a Halachah written explicitly in the Torah, but is merely more beloved. Here, where the Mishnah mentions only one Halachah, it chooses the Halachah which is written explicitly in the Torah, for that indeed is the “more important” one to teach

I love so much of this. we do learn better when we figure things out for ourselves. We also value things more when we work for them. It doesn’t mean that other things are not important or valuable, but it does mean that there is something special about those subjects that we dedicate to... like the daf!

Most agreements in life are conditional in some way. You get your allowance only if you do your chores, you do your homework you get to go to the party … but what happens when two consenting adults make a conditional agreement where one of the conditions includes violating an aspect of the Torah?

It is that of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that if the condition that runs counter to that which is written in the Torah is referring to monetary matters, his condition is valid. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you have no claim against me to give you food, clothing, and conjugal rights, she is betrothed but his condition is void; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Yehuda said: With regard to monetary matters, i.e., her food and clothing, his condition is valid.

So here we learn the only time an agreement can have a condition that is contrary to the teaching of the Torah. It is when somebody willingly gives up something of monetary worth.

So, what is the gem? Everything in life has conditions. What is so vital is figuring out what they are.

You know the serenity prayer: “God grant me the serenity to accept the things I can not change, the courage to change the things I can and the wisdom to know the difference.” The daf reminds me of it today. What do we have control over? What don’t we? In a tractate all about liability, this is an important line to draw.

One wolf that approaches a flock and attacks is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control, as the shepherd can drive it away, but an attack by two wolves is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. Rabbi Yehuda says: At a time of wolf attacks, when many wolves come out of hiding and pounce on animals at every corner, even an attack by one wolf is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. An attack by two dogs is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. Yadua the Babylonian says in the name of Rabbi Meir: If the two dogs came and attacked from one direction it is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control, but if they attacked from two directions, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control, as the shepherd cannot protect his flock from both of them at once. If bandits came, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. Likewise, with regard to an attack by a lion, a bear, a leopard, a cheetah, and a snake, these are each considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. When is an attack by one of the above considered beyond his control, which means that a paid bailee is exempt? It is when the dangerous beasts or bandits came of their own accord to the usual grazing spot. But if the shepherd ledhis flock to a place of groups of beasts or bandits, this is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control, as he is at fault. If the animal died in its normal manner, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control; if he afflicted it by overworking it or by negligent treatment and it died, this is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. If the animal ascended to the top of a cliff and fell down and died, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. If the shepherd himself brought it up to the top of a cliff and it fell down and died, this is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control.

We can only control so much. We cannot control what others do to us (or our property). However, we can often control putting ourselves in situations where others have access to those things we don’t want abused.

If only it were so easy to know what we can control and what we can’t and how to protect ourselves from our own vulnerabilities.

A debate is happening on the daf when this little gem pops up:

As Rav says: I found a concealed scroll, a document that lists halakhot in shortened form so that they will not be forgotten. Rav discovered this document in Rabbi Ḥiyya’s house, and it was written in it: Isi ben Yehuda says that with regard to the verse: “When you come into your neighbor’s vineyard then you may eat grapes until you have enough at your own pleasure” (Deuteronomy 23:25), the verse is speaking of the entry of any person who passes alongside a vineyard, not only a laborer.

It’s a cheat-sheet!! There is a secret scroll with easy to access halakhah! How cool is this?

Later, Moses Maimonides writes a code of Jewish law so that we can all more easily wade through the conversations and just know what the rules are. I guess his was not the first.

The Sages taught: One who muzzles a cow and threshes with it is flogged, and in addition he must pay the owner of the cow four kav for a cow, the usual amount it consumes while threshing, and three kav for a donkey. 

This person has now violated two laws: 1) not muzzling an animal while it’s threshing and 2) not feeding the animal (or allowing it to eat) . So, the safes say he gets flogged for the muzzling AND has to pay for the food the animal did not get to eat. But there is a problem:

The Gemara asks: But isn’t there a principle that an offender is not flogged and also punished by death, and likewise he is not flogged and rendered liable to pay? 

We have learned a rule that someone who transgresses a prohibition is liable to receive only one punishment for a single offense – the more severe punishment.

Abaye said: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is that of Rabbi Meir, who says in general that one can be flogged and be liable to pay. Rava said that there is a difference between the transgression itself, which is between the offender and God, for which he is liable to be flogged, and the loss he caused the owner of the cow, for which he must pay restitution.

I love that line! We have sinned both against God AND the animal and must pay for both.

Rav Pappa stated a different answer: From the time of his pulling of the cow to rent it for threshing he was rendered obligated to provide its sustenance when it threshes, but as for flogging, he is not liable to be flogged until the actual time of muzzling.

(Here the issue is resolved by saying the sins happened at different times so he gets punished for both separately. )

The gem is the consciousness that we commit sins both against God and God’s creation and neither are okay. How often do we do things thinking no one will know or care? God will. But how many times do we do things that hurt God’s creation thinking we are not violating God’s will? Impossible.

I didn’t know what a Shabbat Goy was until I was in college. Apparently, religious Jews would (some still do) hire non-Jews to do things for them on Shabbat. In this way, whatever they needed to happen happened without the Jewish person breaking the halakhah (Jewish law). We have discussed this idea before – and that it’s not so kosher . . . but today’s daf asks if we can hire non-Jews to do things Jews are prohibited from doing EVER, not just on Shabbat.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as they sent to Shmuel’s father a halakhic inquiry with regard to these oxen which gentiles steal and castrate. Since it is prohibited for Jews to castrate animals, they would sometimes arrange for a gentile to pretend to steal the animal and subsequently return it after castrating it, as it is easier to handle a castrated animal. What is the halakha with regard to a case of this kind? Shmuel’s father sent to him: They used artifice; therefore, you should use artifice with them and make them sell it as a punishment. This shows that it is prohibited to instruct a gentile to perform a prohibition on one’s behalf.

So, no. We cannot hire a non-Jew to do something for us that is prohibited for us to do.

The punishment is interesting too – since they were sneaky in their breaking to the rule, be sneaky in the consequences.

The Torah teaches us that we cannot muzzle an ox (or other working animal) while it is working the land. We need to let it eat. This is a firm lesson against animal cruelty.

Today’s daf extends this idea – if we cannot be cruel to animals must let them eat while they work. What is our responsibility to people who work for us? How much are they allowed to eat on the job? Are they allowed to cook the food? What if eating the food takes away from the time they’re supposed to be working?

Again, a valuable lesson about how we are supposed to treat other people and laborers.