2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

A few days go, I wanted to make pancakes. I measured the flour and then went to pour the sugar only to find I didn’t have any. I put the flour back in the bag and will try again when I go grocery shopping.

After reading today’s daf, I am disappointed in myself for not asking my neighbor!

The mishna further teaches: And Hillel would similarly say: A woman may not lend even a loaf of bread due to concern that she will violate the prohibition of interest. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: This is the statement of Hillel, but the Rabbis say that one may borrow various types of foods without specification and repay them without specification. If neighbors are not particular with one another about these items, there is no concern about interest, in contrast to Hillel’s opinion.

And when you go out with friends, do you split the check or all pay for only what you ate?

And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: With regard to the members of a group of people that eat together who are particular with each other and insist that each pay for precisely what he ate, if they dine together on Shabbat, they transgress a prohibition with regard to the strictures of measure, and with regard to the strictures of weight, and with regard to the strictures of counting, all of which are calculations that are forbidden on Shabbat. And they transgress a prohibition with regard to lending and repaying on a Festival, and according to the statement of Hillel, they also transgress the prohibition with regard to interest.

So, borrow sugar from your neighbors, as long as that’s still the culture. And pay for your own food . . .

Next time I am asked to split a crazy bill I may quote Talmud . . .

Best line to sum up this entire section! The mishna teaches that one may set a price with him for manure on any of the days of the year, and that Rabbi Yosei permitted this only if he already had a pile of manure in his dunghill, whereas the Rabbis permitted it in all cases.

Hahahah – the entire page is debating if you can sell an item or produce before it is completed. So, basically can I sell this sh*t before it’s been pooped?

Let’s debate.

The daf continues to discuss methods through which people can engage in business transactions where payment or goods are exchanged upfront, with the agreement set at a fixed or reduced price. But this ends up looking sketchy! So, todays gem is a confrontation that some bring against Rava who appears to be doing something shady – only for his to flip and and explain that he is right and what they are doing is taking advantage of sharecroppers.

The Rabbis said to Rava: The Master, meaning Rava, consumes interest. They explained: Everyone else who leases his field to a sharecropper receives four kor of grain as payment, and the owners accept this payment and remove the sharecropper from the field in the month of Nisan. But the Master waits until the month of Iyar and then takes six korfrom them. Consequently, they accused Rava of accepting an additional payment for waiting an extra month to take back his field. Rava said to them: On the contrary, you are the ones who are acting unlawfully, as in truth all of the land is liened to the sharecropper until he finishes working it and harvests all that he can from it. If you remove sharecroppers from the field in Nisan you cause them to lose a great deal, as they do not have enough time to harvest all the produce from the field. I wait for them until Iyyar, and in this way I enable them to profit a great deal. Consequently, I act in accordance with halakha and receive a suitable payment for leasing the field for the proper length of time, whereas you deprive the sharecroppers of what is due to them, even though you receive less direct remuneration.

What’s the gem? Well, it does remind me of that old expression that when you point a finger at someone you have three fingers pointing back at you. It also feels very pertinent right now in that this group came feeling so high and mighty and thinking that they were the right ones, but they really didn’t know the full story nor had they taken into consideration all of the facts… that is certainly something we can relate to right now. 

I have heard of a lot of strange reasons to convert, but this one is pretty out there . . .

Rabbi Yosei says: If a gentile borrowed money with interest from a Jew and converted, whether in this circumstance or whether in that circumstance, i.e., regardless of when the lender consolidated the interest and principal into a single debt, the Jewish lender may collect the principal and he may also collect the interest. Rava says that Rav Ḥisda says that Rav Huna says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rava says: What is the reasoning behind the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? What is the justification for collecting interest from a Jew? It is in order that people will not say: This individual converted due to concern for his money. People will suspect that he converted in order to avoid paying the interest.

That’s right! Converting to not pay interest. Hard to imagine the rabbis on the Bet Din allowing that.

It reminds me of a Family Guy episode called “When You Wish Upon a Weinstein,” where all of Peter’s stereotypes about Jews including such ideas as “all Jews are rich” and “all Jews are smart” inspires him to throw Chris (his son) a Bar Mitzvah.

By the way – I googled the episode to make sure I remembered the title correctly and apparently they pulled the episode (after airing it) because it’s very antisemitic.

yep

and so is converting just to avoid paying interest

There are so many worthy causes to give to. How do we determine the best was to help others? While not a perfect recipe, today’s daf gives Rav Huna’s take on the matter.

There are those who teach that which Rav Huna said in connection with that which Rav Yosef taught: The verse states: “If you lend money to any of My people, even to the poor person who is with you” (Exodus 22:24). The term “My people” teaches that if one of My people, i.e., a Jew, and a gentile both come to borrow money from you, My people take precedence. The term “the poor person” teaches that if a poor person and a rich person come to borrow money, the poor person takes precedence. And from the term: “Who is with you,” it is derived: If your poor person, meaning one of your relatives, and one of the poor of your city come to borrow money, your poor person takes precedence. If it is between one of the poor of your city and one of the poor of another city, the one of the poor of your city takes precedence.

Your family comes first, then your community, then your city – and always the poor before the rich. Not a bad formula.

Today’s gem is finding who is trustworthy to be trusted with an orphans estate – but it tells us who is trustworthy in general.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: We look for a man whose properties are quiet, meaning that there is no claim disputing his ownership of them, and who is a trustworthy individual who listens to and obeys the laws of the Torah and is not subject to excommunication by the Sages, meaning that he is known as one who obeys the court’s instructions willingly without having to be coerced, and we give him this money in court as a joint business venture with terms that are close to profit and far from loss, and in this way the orphans’ money can be invested in a safe and profitable manner.

I remember trying to split food with my sister as a child and trying my best to get it exactly even because we had a rule that one of us would split it and then the other one got to choose which was theirs. Later, I remember reading in a book about siblings who were so exact when splitting food that they actually took out a ruler in order to measure their french fries. On our today, two Samaritans are going to split their profits. And it looks as though the judge that they go to favors one, but in fact, he just favors fairness. 

The Gemara relates: There were these two Samaritans who entered into a joint venture with each other. One of them went and divided the money without the knowledge of the other. They came for judgment before Rav Pappa. Rav Pappa said to the plaintiff: What difference is there, meaning: What did you lose? This is what Rav Naḥman said: Money is considered as though it were already divided. It is not viewed as a single sum. The next year these same two purchased wine together, and the other one arose and divided the wine without the knowledge of the other. And again, they came for judgment before Rav Pappa. Rav Pappa said to the defendant: Who divided it for you? You did not act properly since you did not get your partner’s permission to divide the wine. The Samaritan said to him: I see that the Master pursues me in order to harass me, since last year, when we came with what appears to be essentially the same case, you gave a different ruling in favor of the other. Rav Pappa said:

In a case like this it is certainly necessary to inform the litigant of the reasons for the decision. Although a judge is not always obligated to explain the reasons for his decision to the litigants, in a case like this, where there is room for suspicion, he must. Rav Pappa explained: Last year, when the other individual divided money, did he take the good coins and leave the deficient ones? The Samaritan said to him: No, he simply divided the money without any particular consideration, and that was acceptable, as there is no difference between one coin and another. Rav Pappa said to him:With regard to wine, everyone knows that there is wine that is sweet and there is wine that is not sweet, so it is not equitable to simply divide the barrels evenly. Therefore, I ruled that you were not entitled to divide the wine without your partner’s knowledge.

I love this little jam because it reminds us of how difficult it is to truly share with another person and also how important it is to explain decisions that you’re making as a leader and as a judge. 

You know that expression, “don’t count your chickens until they’ve hatched”? Well, this might be the origin.

One may not give eggs to another to place chickens on them in exchange for half the profits…

The Gemara continues. The Sages taught: A woman may rent out to another woman a chicken to sit on the eggs belonging to the renter in exchange for two of the chicks hatched from the eggs. But with regard to a woman who said to another: The chicken is mine and the eggs are yours, and you and I shall share the chicks, i.e., my chicken will sit on your eggs until they hatch, Rabbi Yehuda permits this practice, and Rabbi Shimon prohibits it. He holds that since the owner of the chicken is responsible for half of the loss to the eggs, therefore part of this venture is a loan. As she is not being paid for her efforts, it is considered interest.

We can’t charge interest- and when it comes to eggs, you don’t know how many are fertilized and will hatch.

If you really know the law, you sometimes know how to manipulate it. But the Talmud teaches us:

And a Torah scholar [tzurva miderabbanan], who must be especially careful with regard to his conduct, may not consume the produce even with a deduction in the amount of the loan.

Those who know the law have to be role models for the rest of us and stay so far within the laws they don’t lead the rest of us astray.

(If only we held politicians to this standard.)

What do you do when you don’t want to divorce your wife but you also hate the thought of her having sex with your brother after you die? These are questions that the weird world of ḥalitza law puts us into.

The Talmud has been discussing making promises for certain negotiations and what is allowed and what is not allowed and today we get an interesting negotiation with a woman who is making promises at her husband’s deathbed…

The Gemara relates: There was a certain person on his deathbed who wrote a bill of divorce for his wife in order to exempt her from the obligation of ḥalitza in the event of his death, and he moaned and sighed at the time, in distress over having to divorce her. She said to him: Why do you sigh? If you recover from this illness, I am yours, as I will marry you again. The Gemara discusses the legal validity of this promise. Rav Zevid said: These are merely words of enticement designed to encourage him to grant the divorce, but they do not actually obligate the wife to remarry him if he lives. Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: And even if they were not merely words of enticement, but she had made an actual condition upheld by an oath or an act of acquisition, what of it? Is it her prerogative to stipulate a conditionconcerning her bill of divorce? It is not in her power to do so, as it is his right to establish such a condition, and since he failed to do so explicitly, any condition she accepts upon herself is of no consequence. The Gemara answers: This statement of Rav Zevid is necessary, lest you say that he himself relied upon her condition when he decided to give her the bill of divorce, and therefore it is as though he stipulated the condition. Rav Zevid therefore teaches us that this is not the case. 

So we learned that if she means it or not, a woman cannot promise to marry a man after they divorce. It makes one wonder what’s going on in her head at this moment. Does she really love him? Or does she just want to be free?