Shevuot 42

Today’s gem is that, no matter your age, when you lose your parent, you’re an orphan.

The halakha that one takes an oath to a minor in order to collect from a minor’s property is one that we learn in the mishna (45a): A woman who comes to collect the payment for her marriage contract from the property of orphans collects only by means of an oath. Why do I need two mishnayot to teach this halakha? The Gemara answers: By mentioning this halakha twice, the Mishna teaches us this: The halakha applies with regard to both minor and adult orphans, in accordance with the statement of Abaye the Elder; as Abaye the Elder taught: The orphans of which the Sages spoke are adult orphans, and needless to say, the same halakha also applies to minor orphans.

Now, being a child with no one to take care of you is much harder than when you’re an adult with a job and maybe even a family of your own. No question. But, we all want our mom and/or dad sometimes.

Shevuot 40- 41

Today’s gem is the “oath of inducement.” Before your eyes glaze over, the rabbis say the oath of inducement is like: grabbing him by his testicles [bekhuveseih] until he surrenders his cloak. So, not as boring as one might think.

So, what is an oath of inducement?

We have learned that, according to Torah law, if a claimant says that someone owes them 100 dinars, and the accused says they owe them only 50 dinars, they pay the 50 dinars but have to take an oath about the other 50 (because they have validated that what the accuser says is partially true). However, the mishna teaches that if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, he is exempt.

But we learn on Shevuot 40 that Rav Naḥman says: And the court administers an oath of inducement [heisset], an oath instituted by the Sages, to him.

So, not an oath required by the Torah, but one required by the sages.

What is the reason? There is a presumption that one does not make a claim unless he has a valid case against the other party. Therefore, even though there is no admission to part of the claim, the defendant’s denial should be examined through an oath.

Why would this person make a baseless claim? Aren’t we encouraging people to just dismiss any accusation of owing money? And another great question: The Gemara asks: Practically speaking, what difference is there between an oath administered by Torah law and an oath administered by rabbinic law, i.e., an oath of inducement?

Option #1) The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to a case where the one opposing the claimant, the defendant, is suspected with regard to oaths. With regard to an oath administered by Torah law, if the one opposing the claimant is suspected with regard to oaths, we transfer the obligation to take an oath and impose it on the other litigant, i.e., the claimant, who may take an oath and collect that which he claims he is owed. With regard to an oath administered by rabbinic law, the court does not transfer the oath, as transference of an oath is by rabbinic ordinance, and we do not institute one rabbinic ordinance upon another rabbinic ordinance.

Opinion #2) The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yosei, as they say that with regard to an item that is owed by rabbinic law, we do not enter his property to collect the item, what do we do to one who refuses to take an oath of inducement? The Gemara answers: We excommunicate him until he takes an oath. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This sanction is no less severe than entering his property and collecting the debt; it is like grabbing him by his testicles [bekhuveseih] until he surrenders his cloak. Rather, what do we do to him? Rav Ashi said to him: We excommunicate him until the time to flog him comes, i.e., for thirty days, and if he still refuses to take an oath or reach a settlement with the claimant, we flog him and then leave him alone.

And there we have it! So, we have learned what an “oath of inducement” is, how it’s different from an oath from Torah law, and what it can be compared to!

Gives new insight into the expression “I’ve got him by the balls!”

Shevuot 39

Today’s gem: Kol Yisrael arevim zeh bazeh כל ישראל ערבים זה בזה – all of Israel are responsible for each other.

This idea forms the foundation of communal responsibility in Jewish tradition. When a Jew sees another on the brink of wrongdoing, there is a duty to intervene and offer guidance. Beyond that, it suggests a broader responsibility: every Jew is expected to help ensure that fellow Jews have access to essentials like food, clothing, and shelter. Being part of the Jewish people inherently means taking responsibility for one another’s well-being.

The origin of this phrase is on our daf today! But isn’t it written: “And they shall stumble one upon another” (Leviticus 26:37)? This verse is homiletically interpreted to mean that they shall stumble spiritually, one due to the iniquity of another, which teaches that the entire Jewish people are considered guarantors for one another.

It’s a kind of domino effect of sin, I stumble so I make you stumble and so on. But if you don’t let me stumble, you don’t either. We hold ourselves as a community, each of us responsible for ourselves AND the others in our community. Each of us helping to stay the path. It’s a beautiful law, that we must be there for one another, spiritually and materially.

Shevuot 38

Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

On our daf today we get the instruction that when one makes an oath in court, they should hold a Torah scroll! It’s just like TV. Only the origin comes from Abraham making Eliezer, his servant swear . . . and he aint holding a Torah! Get ready for it . . .

And the practical ramification of Rav’s statement is that just as in the aforementioned verse, Abraham said: “Please put your hand under my thigh, and I will make you swear” (Genesis 24:2–3), instructing his servant to grasp his circumcised penis, which is considered sacred to some degree, so too, in oaths administered by the court, one must grasp a sacred item in his hand while taking the oath. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rava; as Rava said: This judge who administers an oath “by the Lord, the God of heaven,” without instructing the litigant to grasp a sacred item, is considered like one who made a mistake with regard to a matter that appears in the Mishna; in which case his ruling is revoked, and the litigant must repeat the oath. And Rav Pappa said: This judge who administers an oath in which the litigant grasps phylacteries, not a Torah scroll, is considered like one who made a mistake with regard to a matter that appears in the Mishna; in which case his ruling is revoked, and the litigant must repeat the oath.

Oh my. Well, the origins of holding a sacred item are laid out for us. . . as is men believing penises are sacred items.

Shevuot 37

Does someone who is about to die still have the same rights as someone for whom death is not imminent?

On our daf today, there is a set of witnesses who are related as they are married to two sisters. The issue is that witnesses cannot be related if they testify as they might conspire or one might convince the other to “back him up.” However, the sisters are about to die. When they die the witnesses will no longer be related. If the sisters’ deaths are imminent, can they serve as witnesses? Do they count as alive?

Ravina said: Here we are dealing with a case where at the time of the denial by the first set, the second set of witnesses were related to one another through their wives, so that the second set was unfit to provide testimony; and their wives were moribund. Lest you say: Most moribund people actually die soon thereafter, and the witnesses are considered fit to provide testimony, the baraita teaches us that in any event they are currently alive and have not died. The second set was therefore unfit to provide testimony.

So, if you’re alive, you’re still alive, you still count and have value. The Hebrew term is “goseis” or the plural in aramaic: גּוֹסְסִין. Once someone is categorized as “goseis” we no longer pray a mi sheberach (the prayer for healing) and, instead, we do vidui (the bedside confessional). But until your soul leaves you, you are still alive.

Shevuot 36

Can I get an amen?

But what exactly are we saying when we say amen? Today’s daf tells us:

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says with regard to the term amen: There is an element of oath within it, there is an element of acceptance of the statement and agreement within it, and there is an element of confirmation of the statement, i.e., that he believes and prays that the statement will be fulfilled, within it.

Oath:The Gemara elaborates: There is an element of oath within it, as it is written: “And the priest shall administer an oath to the woman…and the woman shall say: Amen, amen” (Numbers 5:21–22). “Amen” is the oath that the woman takes.

So, when we say amen we may be swearing.

There is an element of acceptance of the statement within it, as it is written: “Cursed is he who shall not confirm the matters of this Torah to perform them; and all the people shall say: Amen” (Deuteronomy 27:26), expressing their agreement to fulfill all the matters of the Torah.

So, when we say amen we might be saying: that’s the truth of the matter.

There is an element of confirmation of the statement within it, as it is written: “And Jeremiah the prophet said: Amen, may the Lord do so; may the Lord uphold your statement” (Jeremiah 28:6).

So, when we say amen, we might be saying: I agree.

It’s a powerful word that amen.

Now, can I get an amen?

Shevuot 35

Diffusion of responsibility is a psychological phenomenon where individuals in a group feel less personally responsible for taking action or helping in a situation compared to when they are alone. This happens because they assume others will step up and take responsibility, leading to a collective feeling of lessened individual obligation.

And here is why I thought of it reading the daf:

The Gemara notes: This is also taught in a baraita: If one saw a group of people standing, and his witnesses were among them, and he said to the entire group: I administer an oath to you that if you know testimony relevant to me you will come and testify on my behalf, in such a case one might have thought that they would be liable. The verse states: “And he is a witness” (Leviticus 5:1), and in this case he did not specify his witnesses; therefore, they are not liable.

The best way to combat the diffusion of responsibility effect is to call out an individual person. Then they feel personally responsible! If you don’t do that, no individual holds responsibility and so none are liable.

So, if you were drowning and there was a group of people and you yelled help – it’s likely that no one would feel responsible. The best way to combat this effect is to say “you, in the red shirt, help me!”

The daf continues:

One might have thought that the halakha is the same even if he said: I administer an oath to everyone who is standing here that you will come and testify on my behalf. The verse states: “And he is a witness” (Leviticus 5:1), and in this case, although he spoke to a group, he specified his witnesses; therefore, they are liable.

So, when he specifies the witness (and doesn’t leave it ambiguous) then they are liable! It’s totally the diffusion of responsibility effect! I love how this ancient document has so much modern psychology.

Shevuot 34

When you need to have two witnesses, can justice really prevail? What happens when there is only one? Do murderers get to go free?

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ said in the form of an oath: I will not see the consolation of Israel (meaning he swears) if I did not see one who was running after another into a ruin, and I ran after him and found a sword in his hand and blood dripping from the sword, and the slain person convulsing. I said to him: Wicked one, who killed this person? It was either me or you, as there is no one else here. But what can I do, as your blood is not given to my control and I have no jurisdiction to execute you, as the Torah says: “On the basis of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he that is to die be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6), and there are no witnesses here.

Wow! Murderer holding the weapon with the dead body right there. But there is only one witness! There is nothing he can do! So, no justice?

Rather, the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you.

Okay, so God will punish him. But does that really happen? in this case: yes.

The Sages said: They did not move from there until a snake came and bit the pursuer and he died.

I don’t know if we can always rely on God (some would say karma) to even things out, we need to pursue justice in our world, but I have to say – a satisfying story.

Shevuot 33

How do you know something for sure? On our daf, we learn that witnesses both have to see AND know in order to testify. What does that mean?

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili cites a different proof and says: The verse states with regard to an oath of testimony: “And he is a witness or he saw or he knew” (Leviticus 5:1). It is with regard to testimony that is founded on sight, i.e., direct observation, without knowledge of the matter, or by means of indirect knowledge of the matter without sight that the verse is speaking.

Don’t worry, we are about to get the explanation via example.

Sight without knowledge, how so? It is a case where the creditor claims: I counted one hundred dinars for you before so-and-so and so-and-so, and the debtor responds: Let so-and-so and so-and-so come and testify. This is a case of sight without knowledge, as the witnesses do not know whether the money was counted as a loan, a deposit, or repayment of a loan.

So, they saw them count out the money – but the witnesses don’t know why he was doing that! (seeing without knowing that it’s a loan)

Knowledge without sight, how so? It is a case where the creditor claims: You admitted to owing me one hundred dinars before so-and-so and so-and-so, and the debtor replied: Let so-and-so and so-and-so come and testify. This is a case of knowledge of the debt without sight of the loan taking place. Testimony based on sight without knowledge or based on knowledge without sight is possible only in cases involving a monetary claim.

So, you may have heard someone say they would give a loan, but you didn’t see money changing hands – so how do you know it happened?

We learn from our daf that we don’t always know what’s happening when we see something.

This reminds me of Madonna’s book, “Mr. Peabody’s Apples.” In it, a kid sees his teacher take an apple without paying. He spreads rumors that the teacher stole, it turns out the teacher pre-paid so they could quickly grab an apple on the way to baseball practice.

The moral? Don’t speak against someone if you really don’t know. (And maybe talk to them before saying anything to someone else?)

Shevuot 32

A hairy situation on the daf today. If you need two witnesses to a crime, what happens when the second witness is the criminal himself . . . only he says he only took back what was rightfully his?

As there was a certain man who snatched a silver ingot from another. The one from whom it was taken came before Rabbi Ami while Rabbi Abba was sitting before him, and he went and brought one witness who testified that the defendant indeed snatched it from him. The one who snatched it said to him: Yes, it is true that I snatched it, but I merely snatched that which was mine.

What do we do? We need two witnesses to a crime, but, if we believe the man who snatched the ingot that he took it, then we should also believe him that it is his – or, if he is not trustworthy, why believe him as a witness? It’s a catch 22 . . .

Rabbi Ami said: How shall judges rule in this case? Let the judges require him to pay. But there are not two witnesses who witnessed the robbery. Let the judges rule to exempt him from payment. But there is one witness that he snatched the ingot. Based on the testimony of that witness, let the alleged robber take an oath that he did not snatch the ingot. But once he said: Yes, I snatched it, but I merely snatched that which was mine, his halakhic status is like that of a robber, who is disqualified from taking an oath.

What will they rule? Here comes Rabbi Abba to save the day:

Rabbi Abba said to him: He is one who is obligated to take an oath but is unable to take an oath, and anyone who is obligated to take an oath but is unable to take an oath is liable to pay. In that case, were that witness to take a false oath and deny knowledge of the matter, he would be liable.

So, the robber is liable . . . I think.

this reminds me of this scene from Labyrinth:

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