2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

I have heard of a lot of strange reasons to convert, but this one is pretty out there . . .

Rabbi Yosei says: If a gentile borrowed money with interest from a Jew and converted, whether in this circumstance or whether in that circumstance, i.e., regardless of when the lender consolidated the interest and principal into a single debt, the Jewish lender may collect the principal and he may also collect the interest. Rava says that Rav Ḥisda says that Rav Huna says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rava says: What is the reasoning behind the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? What is the justification for collecting interest from a Jew? It is in order that people will not say: This individual converted due to concern for his money. People will suspect that he converted in order to avoid paying the interest.

That’s right! Converting to not pay interest. Hard to imagine the rabbis on the Bet Din allowing that.

It reminds me of a Family Guy episode called “When You Wish Upon a Weinstein,” where all of Peter’s stereotypes about Jews including such ideas as “all Jews are rich” and “all Jews are smart” inspires him to throw Chris (his son) a Bar Mitzvah.

By the way – I googled the episode to make sure I remembered the title correctly and apparently they pulled the episode (after airing it) because it’s very antisemitic.

yep

and so is converting just to avoid paying interest

There are so many worthy causes to give to. How do we determine the best was to help others? While not a perfect recipe, today’s daf gives Rav Huna’s take on the matter.

There are those who teach that which Rav Huna said in connection with that which Rav Yosef taught: The verse states: “If you lend money to any of My people, even to the poor person who is with you” (Exodus 22:24). The term “My people” teaches that if one of My people, i.e., a Jew, and a gentile both come to borrow money from you, My people take precedence. The term “the poor person” teaches that if a poor person and a rich person come to borrow money, the poor person takes precedence. And from the term: “Who is with you,” it is derived: If your poor person, meaning one of your relatives, and one of the poor of your city come to borrow money, your poor person takes precedence. If it is between one of the poor of your city and one of the poor of another city, the one of the poor of your city takes precedence.

Your family comes first, then your community, then your city – and always the poor before the rich. Not a bad formula.

Today’s gem is finding who is trustworthy to be trusted with an orphans estate – but it tells us who is trustworthy in general.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: We look for a man whose properties are quiet, meaning that there is no claim disputing his ownership of them, and who is a trustworthy individual who listens to and obeys the laws of the Torah and is not subject to excommunication by the Sages, meaning that he is known as one who obeys the court’s instructions willingly without having to be coerced, and we give him this money in court as a joint business venture with terms that are close to profit and far from loss, and in this way the orphans’ money can be invested in a safe and profitable manner.

I remember trying to split food with my sister as a child and trying my best to get it exactly even because we had a rule that one of us would split it and then the other one got to choose which was theirs. Later, I remember reading in a book about siblings who were so exact when splitting food that they actually took out a ruler in order to measure their french fries. On our today, two Samaritans are going to split their profits. And it looks as though the judge that they go to favors one, but in fact, he just favors fairness. 

The Gemara relates: There were these two Samaritans who entered into a joint venture with each other. One of them went and divided the money without the knowledge of the other. They came for judgment before Rav Pappa. Rav Pappa said to the plaintiff: What difference is there, meaning: What did you lose? This is what Rav Naḥman said: Money is considered as though it were already divided. It is not viewed as a single sum. The next year these same two purchased wine together, and the other one arose and divided the wine without the knowledge of the other. And again, they came for judgment before Rav Pappa. Rav Pappa said to the defendant: Who divided it for you? You did not act properly since you did not get your partner’s permission to divide the wine. The Samaritan said to him: I see that the Master pursues me in order to harass me, since last year, when we came with what appears to be essentially the same case, you gave a different ruling in favor of the other. Rav Pappa said:

In a case like this it is certainly necessary to inform the litigant of the reasons for the decision. Although a judge is not always obligated to explain the reasons for his decision to the litigants, in a case like this, where there is room for suspicion, he must. Rav Pappa explained: Last year, when the other individual divided money, did he take the good coins and leave the deficient ones? The Samaritan said to him: No, he simply divided the money without any particular consideration, and that was acceptable, as there is no difference between one coin and another. Rav Pappa said to him:With regard to wine, everyone knows that there is wine that is sweet and there is wine that is not sweet, so it is not equitable to simply divide the barrels evenly. Therefore, I ruled that you were not entitled to divide the wine without your partner’s knowledge.

I love this little jam because it reminds us of how difficult it is to truly share with another person and also how important it is to explain decisions that you’re making as a leader and as a judge. 

You know that expression, “don’t count your chickens until they’ve hatched”? Well, this might be the origin.

One may not give eggs to another to place chickens on them in exchange for half the profits…

The Gemara continues. The Sages taught: A woman may rent out to another woman a chicken to sit on the eggs belonging to the renter in exchange for two of the chicks hatched from the eggs. But with regard to a woman who said to another: The chicken is mine and the eggs are yours, and you and I shall share the chicks, i.e., my chicken will sit on your eggs until they hatch, Rabbi Yehuda permits this practice, and Rabbi Shimon prohibits it. He holds that since the owner of the chicken is responsible for half of the loss to the eggs, therefore part of this venture is a loan. As she is not being paid for her efforts, it is considered interest.

We can’t charge interest- and when it comes to eggs, you don’t know how many are fertilized and will hatch.

If you really know the law, you sometimes know how to manipulate it. But the Talmud teaches us:

And a Torah scholar [tzurva miderabbanan], who must be especially careful with regard to his conduct, may not consume the produce even with a deduction in the amount of the loan.

Those who know the law have to be role models for the rest of us and stay so far within the laws they don’t lead the rest of us astray.

(If only we held politicians to this standard.)

What do you do when you don’t want to divorce your wife but you also hate the thought of her having sex with your brother after you die? These are questions that the weird world of ḥalitza law puts us into.

The Talmud has been discussing making promises for certain negotiations and what is allowed and what is not allowed and today we get an interesting negotiation with a woman who is making promises at her husband’s deathbed…

The Gemara relates: There was a certain person on his deathbed who wrote a bill of divorce for his wife in order to exempt her from the obligation of ḥalitza in the event of his death, and he moaned and sighed at the time, in distress over having to divorce her. She said to him: Why do you sigh? If you recover from this illness, I am yours, as I will marry you again. The Gemara discusses the legal validity of this promise. Rav Zevid said: These are merely words of enticement designed to encourage him to grant the divorce, but they do not actually obligate the wife to remarry him if he lives. Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: And even if they were not merely words of enticement, but she had made an actual condition upheld by an oath or an act of acquisition, what of it? Is it her prerogative to stipulate a conditionconcerning her bill of divorce? It is not in her power to do so, as it is his right to establish such a condition, and since he failed to do so explicitly, any condition she accepts upon herself is of no consequence. The Gemara answers: This statement of Rav Zevid is necessary, lest you say that he himself relied upon her condition when he decided to give her the bill of divorce, and therefore it is as though he stipulated the condition. Rav Zevid therefore teaches us that this is not the case. 

So we learned that if she means it or not, a woman cannot promise to marry a man after they divorce. It makes one wonder what’s going on in her head at this moment. Does she really love him? Or does she just want to be free?

We are still skating around what is and is not interest. Loved this little ruling:

And Abaye said: In the case of this one, who was owed four dinars of interest by another, and the borrower gave him a cloak as payment for it, when we take the interest from the lender we take four dinars from him, but we do not take the actual cloak from him, as the giving of the cloak is considered a sale. Rava said: We take the cloak from him. What is the reason for this? So that people should not say that the cloak so-and-so is wearing is a cloak procured as interest.

It’s one thing to sin, and another thing to “wear it” proudly. This normalizes the sin and we all see what normalizing bad behavior does to the world.

If you lend someone money, you can’t charge interest. Today we learn you can’t even accept a gift! Not even letting the lender stay the night.

One who lends another money may not reside in the borrower’s courtyard free of charge, nor may he rent living quarters from him at less than the going rate, because this is interest.

I think so much about predatory lenders reading these pages and how far our rabbis go to make sure no one is taken advantage of just because they need a loan. If only we could learn from them. (Think of all the student debt that would actually be paid off instead of endlessly paying interest!)

When we were trying to sell our house, many buyers came offering WAY below asking price but offering to pay cash for the house. I didn’t get it. Why would we be willing to take 20% less for cash? We get the same amount of money from bank as if we took cash without that huge cut.

Our daf deals with the same phenomenon.

And Rav Naḥman also said: In the case of this one who gives money to a wax seller to purchase loaves of wax from him, and loaves of wax go at the current rate of one dinar for four loaves, and the seller said to him: I will give you wax in the future at the rate of five loaves for each dinar if you pay me now in advance, if the seller has wax with him at the time of the transaction, it is permitted to sell at a discounted rate because he is in need of cash. But if the seller does not have wax with him, it is forbidden, as the extra loaf given is interest

Adin Steinsaltz explains, “If the wax merchant has the merchandise in his possession at the time of the agreed upon sale, the agreement is valid, since the merchant is simply giving a discount in exchange for pre-payment. If, however, the wax merchant did not have an inventory of wax, he is effectively borrowing money from the purchaser, and in exchange is repaying him with more wax than was paid for – which is considered a case of paying interest on the loan.”

The idea here is that you can’t charge someone interest, and you can’t rip them off. Yet – they know that sometimes we need cash now and can’t wait.

And yes, if we would have taken a cash deal we would have sold quicker. But it was worth the wait!