Sanhedrin 5

Hahaha! Today’s daf has a brag in it that cracks me up. It’s like a boy responding to someone saying he’s ugly by saying “Oh yeah? My mom thinks I’m handsome! So there!”

At first you don’t know that’s what’s happening, it sounds like he is saying he got permission to judge cases from his father who got permission from these other fabulous rabbis . . .

When Rabba bar Rav Huna was involved in a dispute with the members of the house of the Exilarch he said: It is not from you that I received permission to judge cases. I received permission from my father, my master, i.e., Rav Huna, and my father, my master, received permission from Rav, and Rav from Rabbi Ḥiyya, and Rabbi Ḥiyya from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, it seems that permission received in Eretz Yisrael is in fact effective in Babylonia.

But guess what? It’s not true. You can’t get permission to judge that way.

The Gemara rejects this proof and says, He was merely standing up to them with words alone, but there was no halakhic validity to his statement.

It’s like he’s saying, “Oh yeah, you think you’re so special? I don’t need you, my daddy is big and powerful and he says I can be a judge if I want to be!”

Sanhedrin 4

Today’s daf gets into a very long conversation about if the vocalization of the Torah is definitive and therefore, can’t be debated. This is interesting stuff as the Torah text used to be written in a slightly different lettering system with no spaces and no punctuation. The Masoretic scholars, in the 9th century, added the vowels, spacing, cantillation marks and breaks to create the definitive version of the bible that we have today. (The picture above is one of those ancient proto-masoretic versions of Leviticus.) Within this conversation/debate, we get a gem of a line:

We have not found atonement can be achieved with no offering.

I love this. You can’t atone without doing anything. Something has to be given, something has to change.

Not related to the masoretic evolution per se – but a great lesson found within the discussion of what might the Torah be saying if it’s not saying what we think it’s saying. (You understand what I’m saying?)

Sanhedrin 3

Much to learn on today’s daf, from rabbis worrying about judges being lazy bums sitting at the gates judging others to today’s gem – don’t make the laws so bad that they end up having negative unintentional consequences.

And what is the reason that the Sages said that in cases of monetary law we do not require inquiry and interrogation of witnesses? The Gemara answers: The Sages established this exemption so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. If inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses would be required in order to have the court rule that the lender can collect payment of a loan, lenders would be deterred by the difficulty of proving the matter and might cease to lend money to the poor. For the same reason, the Sages also waived the need for expert judges in these cases.

People need to be able to borrow money. Today, we need it for school, to buy homes, to start businesses. Can you imagine if lenders just stopped? There would be no possibility of upward mobility. This just shows that the law, even when it’s simple, has to factor in so many complex and sometimes contradictory issues.

It’s easy for one (including myself) to be a bum judging the issues in the gates, saying that’s the wrong thing to do. But it’s another entirely if you really have to figure out what is fair.

Sanhedrin 2

Welcome to a new tractate! The Sanhedrin was a legislative and judicial assembly of either 23 (lesser) or 71 judges (greater). They were both local (23) and central in Israel (the great Sanhedrin). The great Sanhedrin was kind of the supreme court taking on appeals.

So, it may come as no surprise that this tractate kicks off with a list of how many judges are required for various kinds of court cases. Most require 3 judges:

Cases concerning monetary law are adjudicated by three judges, robbery and personal injury are adjudicated by three, damage, half the damage, cases concerning payment of double the principal by a thief who was caught stealing (see Exodus 22:3); and cases concerning payment of four or five times the principal by a thief who slaughtered or sold a stolen ox or a lamb (see Exodus 21:37) are all adjudicated by three judges.

So, where do the courts of 23 and 71come in? Cases of capital law are judged by twenty-three judges.

Where’s the 71? The court judges cases involving an entire tribe that sinned, or a false prophet (see Deuteronomy 18:20–22), or a High Priest who transgressed a prohibition that carries a possible death sentence, only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges, i.e., the Great Sanhedrin. And the king may bring the nation out to an optional war, i.e., a war that was not mandated by the Torah and is not a war of defense, only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges. They may extend the city of Jerusalem or the courtyards of the Temple only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges. And they may appoint a lesser Sanhedrin of twenty-three judges for the tribes only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges. A city may be designated as an idolatrous city, i.e., a city whose residents all practice idolatry, and therefore according to Torah law all the residents must be killed and the city must be destroyed (see Deuteronomy 13:13–19), only in accordance with the ruling of a court of seventy-one judges.

So, if it’s money and civil things, we need only 3 judges. If it’s a capital case, 23. And to get that court of 23, wage war, destroy a city or expand borders? Then you need 71.

That’s a lot of cooks in the kitchen. But that, as see shall see, is the point.

Bava Batra 176

We made it to the end of Bava Batra!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! And then end of the Bavas: Bava Kama which adresses damages, Bava Metzia which addresses the marketplace and the lost and found, and now Bava Batra – the longest of all the tractates (and boy did it feel long at times!).

What is Bava Batra about? Dovid Bashevkin writes in his reflection of the Bava’s called Sea of Love, “On its surface, this tractate is about how to get along with your neighbors—build good fences, create a solid charitable system, invest in infrastructure. It’s like reading the minutes from your town’s most recent zoning hearing. But that, of course, is just the surface of this ocean. On a deeper level, Bava Batra addresses coexistence, not just in a neighborhood but also the harmony between body and soul, the material and physical worlds, our personal identity and our global humanity.”

Beautiful stuff.

Well, mazal tov. Enjoy it. Tomorrow we start Sanhedrin!

Bava Batra 175

In law, “under duress” means acting as a result of an immediate threat of harm or death from another party. It’s a legal defense that can be used to justify a crime committed under these circumstances. But what if the “immediate threat of harm” is against another person?

Ben Nannas said to him: If one was strangling someone in the marketplace, demanding repayment of a loan, and another person found him doing so and said to the attacker: Leave him alone and I will give you the money he owes, the person who intervened is exempt from paying, as the creditor did not loan the money in the first place based on his trust of the one who intervened. Rather, who is a guarantor who is obligated to repay the loan he has guaranteed? One who tells the creditor before the loan takes place: Lend money to him, and I will give you the repayment, as in that case the creditor did loan the money based on his trust of the guarantor.

So, it appears that “under duress” can apply to needing to step in for others. Again, we are reminded of the biblical law to not “stand idly by while your neighbor bleeds.” We need to remove as many obstacles as possible for people to be encouraged to step in and step up and do the right thing, even if it’s not in their self-interest. Ben Nannas gets a nice compliment for this one:

And Rabbi Yishmael thereupon said: One who wants to become wise should engage in the study of monetary law, as there is no greater discipline in the Torah, and it is like a flowing spring. And, he added, one who wants to engage in the study of monetary law should attend to, i.e., become a disciple of, Shimon ben Nannas.

Bava Batra 174

The daf is discussing when a guarantor should be sought after to pay off a debt. The gem is a very sketchy related story that makes you wonder if some rabbis take advantage of the law, or even think that their kind (meaning other rabbis) are above the law.

Someone named Moshe bar Atzari was a guarantor for the marriage contract of his daughter-in-law, guaranteeing the money promised by his son in the event of death or divorce. His son, named Rav Huna, was a young Torah scholar, and was in financial straits. Abaye said: Is there no one who will go advise Rav Huna that he should divorce his wife, and she will go and collect her marriage contract from Rav Huna’s father, and then Rav Huna should remarry her?

Okay, if the son, Huna, and the daughter in law get divorced, Huna’s dad pays her ketubah. Huna is broke! So, Abaye suggests he should divorce his wife and she can then collect the ketubah price from his dad. They can re-marry and have the money too!

Rava said to Abaye: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that when a husband divorces his wife in such circumstances he must take a vow prohibiting himself from deriving any benefit from her, thereby precluding the possibility of remarriage?

Rava points out – this is against the law . . .

Abaye said to him: Is that to say that everyone who divorces his wife divorces her in a court?

Okay, so now, Abaye is being even sketchier. He suggests a private divorce so he won’t need to promise not to derive benefit from his wife/ex-wife. Then, when he remarries her, he hasn’t broken his vow.

Ultimately, it was revealed that this Rav Huna was a priest.

Just to remind you, priests are not allowed to marry widows or divorcees – even their own ex-wife. So, at the end of the day .Huna could not do what Abaye suggested.

Upon hearing this, Abaye said: This is in accordance with the adage that people say: Poverty follows the poor.

Okay, this is a great (and terrible) adage. We could do some sociology on that. But you may be wondering what the daf wonders – how could a great sage like Abaye suggest such a thing?

The Gemara asks: But did Abaye really say this? Would he really encourage giving such advice? But doesn’t Abaye himself say: Who is a cunning, wicked person? This is one who provides advice to sell property in accordance with the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Abaye said that giving advice to someone to pursue such action, though it is legally sound, is considered wicked.

So, what is different here? We get a two answers

The Gemara answers: When dealing with one’s son it is different. It is not considered wickedness to force a father to give money to his own son.
Moreover, when dealing with a Torah scholar it is different. It is not considered wickedness to procure money for a Torah scholar, because the money enables him to pursue his studies.

I have to say, I don’t know about these answers. Certainly, I hope that Abaye was thinking of #1 more than #2. Getting a dad to do the right thing and support his struggling son is a lot more noble then the rabbis using their knowledge of the law to twist it for their (or other rabbi’s) needs.

It does make you wonder – why didn’t he just ask his dad for some money?

Bava Batra 173

We get a beautiful, and rare, bit of drashing on our daf today! While the rabbis are certainly good story tellers, their methods of interpretation can feel a bit outdated. On today’s daf, they are discussing paying back debts and who needs to pay (the person who took out the loan or the guarentor) when we get a little lesson from Proverbs that we can all learn from.

And it is stated: “My son, if you have become surety for your neighbor, if you have shaken your hands for a stranger, you have become ensnared by the words of your mouth, you have been caught by the words of your mouth. Do this now, my son, and save yourself, seeing that you have come into the hand of your neighbor: Go, humble yourself [hitrappes], and assemble your neighbors” (Proverbs 6:1–3).

By the way, this entire proverb is beautiful, it’s the famous “lazy bones” warning (many a cartoon has been based on it as well – go watch the ants work!). But to return to the daf:

This last part of the passage means: If your neighbor’s money is in your possession, as you owe it as a guarantor, open up [hatter] the palm [pissat] of your hand and repay him. And if it is not money that you owe him, but rather “you have become ensnared by the words of your mouth” and owe him an apology for a personal slight, gather together many neighbors through which to seek his forgiveness.

Boom! This is where the Rambam gets this rule for his laws of teshuvah (repentance). When we insult someone or hurt them, we need to gather others to witness our apology. If I call you dumb (pick your insult) in front of another person, I need that other person to hear my apology so that the damage I did is somewhat mitigated. It’s not enough just to say sorry, our words spread and we have to reach all those who heard what we said for our “sorry” to mean anything.

Bava Batra 172

How do you really know a person?

If there are two people who were living in one city, one named Yosef ben Shimon and the other also named Yosef ben Shimon, one cannot present a promissory note against the other, as the purported debtor can claim: On the contrary, it is you who owed me money; you repaid me and I returned this note to you upon payment. Nor can another, third person, present a promissory note against either of them, as each one can claim: It is not I but the other Yosef ben Shimon who owes you money. If a document is found among one’s documents stating: The promissory note against Yosef ben Shimon is repaid, and both men named Yosef ben Shimon owed this man money, the promissory notes of both of them are considered repaid, as it cannot be determined which debt was repaid and which is outstanding.

So, two guys in the same town with the same name. It seems you can’t do business with either of them because the other can claim THEY are the Shimon on that document. So, what do you do?

What should two people with the same name in a single city do in order to conduct their business? They should triple their names by writing three generations: Yosef ben Shimon ben so-and-so. And if they have identical triple names, i.e., not only their fathers but their grandfathers had identical names, they should write an indication as to which one is referred to, such as: The short Yosef ben Shimon or the dark Yosef ben Shimon. And if they have identical indications, they should write: Yosef ben Shimon the priest, if one of them is a priest.

I love this. How do you know who you are talking to? Well, who is their family? Where do they come from? How would you describe them? What is their manner? How do they spend their time?

It reminds me of the Zelda poem (Ukrainian poet originally written in Hebrew):

EACH OF US HAS A NAME

Each of us has a name
given by God
and given by our parents

Each of us has a name
given by our stature and our smile
and given by what we wear

Each of us has a name
given by the mountains
and given by our walls

Each of us has a name
given by the stars
and given by our neighbors

Each of us has a name
given by our sins
and given by our longing

Each of us has a name
given by our enemies
and given by our love

Each of us has a name
given by our celebrations
and given by our work

Each of us has a name
given by the seasons
and given by our blindness

Each of us has a name
given by the sea
and given by
our death.

Bava Batra 171

Today’s gem: We can greatly admire someone, think they are smarter than us, more important than us, and totally disagree with them

This is like that case where Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef was owed money by Rabbi Abba. Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came before Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappi, and said to Rabbi Abba: Give me my money. Rabbi Abba said to him: First give me my promissory note, and then take your money. Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef said to him: I lost your promissory note; instead, I will write a receipt for you. Rabbi Abba said to him: Isn’t there the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, who both say that the halakha is that one does not write a receipt? Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappi, the judge, thereupon said: Who will give us some of the dust of Rav and Shmuel, and I will place it on my eyes, so highly do I regard them. Nevertheless, isn’t there the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, who both say that one writes a receipt?

Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappi looks up to Rav and Shmuel, thinks he is so beneath them . . . yet, he disagrees with their ruling and goes his own way.

It’s lovely really.