2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

Sanhedrin 86

Today’s daf shows the predecessor to our American court system, as well as the difference between an invested Rabbi ruling against the law and a student. It defines a “rebellious elder.”

MISHNA: A rebellious elder according to the court, who does not observe the ruling of the court, is executed by strangulation, as it is stated: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment…and you shall arise and ascend unto the place that the Lord your God shall choose…and you shall do according to the matter that they shall declare unto you…and the man that shall do so intentionally, not to listen…and that man shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:8–12).

Now the three levels of the court:

There were three courts there in Jerusalem. One convenes at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and one convenes at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, and one convenes in the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

What’s the difference? Hierarchy.

An elder who issues a ruling contrary to the ruling of his colleagues and his colleagues come to that court that is at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and the elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling in that case, the court says it to them. So, case closed, all agree. And if not, they come to those judges who are convened at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, which is a more significant tribunal. They appeal!!! And the elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling in that case, the court says it to them. And if not, these judges and those judges come to the High Court, the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges (rabbi Supreme court!) that is in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, from which Torah emerges to the entire Jewish people, as it is stated: “And you shall do according to the matter that they shall declare unto you from that place that the Lord shall choose and you shall observe to perform according to all that they shall teach you” (Deuteronomy 17:10). They are the ultimate arbiters who establish the halakha that is binding. If they ruled contrary to the ruling of the elder and the elder then returned to his city, and nevertheless, he taught in the manner that he was teaching previously, he is exempt from punishment. But if he instructed others to act on the basis of his ruling that stands contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is liable to be executed, as it is stated: “And the man that shall do so intentionally not to listen” (Deuteronomy 17:12), meaning that one is not liable unless he instructs others to act.

So! A rebellious elder is one whose ruling was shot down by the Supreme Court (i.e. the Sanhedrin) and yet he still acts upon his differing ruling. For this, he is subject to death by strangulation. But it’s different for a student.

A student who is not yet an elder, i.e., he has not been ordained, who instructs others to act contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, is exempt, as a ruling given prior to ordination is not a valid ruling. It follows that his stringency is his leniency. The stringency imposed upon the student that he is not sanctioned to issue rulings results in the leniency that if he instructs others to act on the basis of his ruling that is contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is exempt.

This text speaks to me. As I have previously mentioned, I never want to be on a jury. It’s so hard to uphold the law if you don’t think the law is just. (I personally know there needs to be a balance between justice and mercy, but feel our current justice system does not incline towards repentance and restitution and therefor does not make society more just, nor more merciful.) But that’s the law. We all have to play in the same sandbox or there will be no society. So, here is to the just elders! Thanks for doing so much for the rest of us.

Sanhedrin 85

I have this vivid memory from my early childhood (it’s from my first house which we moved out of when I was 4, so 4 or younger). I wanted my dad to tuck me into bed, but he was talking. I kept trying to get him to take me upstairs but he kept ignoring me. So, I hit him as hard as I could (smacking his leg as I was only that tall). The impact hurt my hand and I realized what I had done. I ran for my life up the stairs.

On our daf today, we read that if a person hits and wounds a parent (it’s specified on our daf that they have to actually be injured), they are liable for the death penalty.

Yikes!

The daf then discusses when the child might be required to injure the parent. When might this happen? What is the halakha with regard to whether a son may be designated an agent of the court in order to flog his father or to curse him if the court sentenced him to ostracism?

To make a long daf short – the child would never be asked to give a parent lashes or corporal punishment . . . except for one instance: With regard to all cases a son is not designated as an agent to strike his father or to curse him, except in a case where his father incites others to worship idols.

Sorry Dad. Please don’t turn me into the courts . . .

Sanhedrin 84

We learn that one who kills or wounds their parent may be liable for the death penalty. So, what if you wound them while trying to heal them?

The Gemara explains: As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to whether a son may let blood for his father? Is he liable for wounding his father? (Remember, blood letting was advanced medicine then.) Rav Mattana says that it is written: “And you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18); just as one would want others to heal him when the need arises, one must heal others when the need arises. It is prohibited for one to do to others only those actions that he would not want done to him. Therefore, it is permitted for one to heal his father even if the procedure entails wounding him. Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana says: This is derived from the juxtaposition between one who strikes a person and one who strikes an animal. Just as one who strikes an animal for medical purposes is exempt from paying restitution, so too, one who strikes a person for medical purposes is exempt from liability.

So we learned a few things. We learned that we are supposed to try and help people because if we were sick, we would want to be helped and that’s part of what it means to love your neighbor as yourself. We also learn that doctors can do their jobs And as long as they do their best, they should not worry about malpractice. And we learned that we may help our love to us to heal, even if we accidentally ruined back in the process. However…

The Gemara relates: Rav did not allow his son to extract a thorn from him, due to the concern that his son would unwittingly wound him. Mar, son of Ravina, did not allow his son to pierce his blister, lest he wound him, which would be an unwitting violation of a prohibition.

So while it may be kosher to let your child help you, it’s definitely not preferred.

Sanhedrin 83

What we wear can tell a lot about us. It might say what our job is, what school we go to, what team we root for, what issues we value. And so it’s weird when we see someone out of their “uniform.” Like when you see your doctor at the beach, or your rabbi in work out clothes (speaking from personal experiences here). Today we get this little gem, which reminds us that sometimes “the clothes make the man.”

At a time when their vestments are upon them, their priesthood is upon them; but when their vestments are not upon them, their priesthood is not upon them.

Now, here’s a beautiful teaching speaking of what we wear, identity, and Purim.

Rabbi Mishael Tzion:

Purim invites us to set aside a time in which we completely reverse our wardrobe, which in turn reverses our identity. It is an invitation to cross dress, but not only to cross genders (the classic Purim costume, mentioned in many collections of Rabbinic customs), but to cross and reverse all the other dichotomies and uniforms of our lives as well. On Purim we are using clothes against themselves, to deny their power to box us in, and simultaneously to redeem us from needing redemption. At its scariest hours, Purim, like the good carnival that it is, makes us wonder if there is an “authentic self” at all, or whether it is all just endless masks upon masks.

Who is the priest when not in the robe?

Who are you?

Sanhedrin 82

This scene is just amazing. Very Hamlet speaking to Yorick’s skull . . .

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avuya says: It was written on the skull of Jehoiakim king of Judea: This and yet another.

Okay, background. King Jehoiakim ruled over Judea from 609 to 598 BC. I will give you some insight into this man form the Jewish encyclopedia. “Rabbinical literature describes Jehoiakim as a godless tyrant who committed atrocious sins and crimes. He is portrayed as living in incestuous relations with his mother, daughter-in-law, and stepmother, and was in the habit of murdering men, whose wives he then violated and whose property he seized.” He also had tattooed his body, wore forbidden fabrics, and boasted of his godlessness. There is some debate over how he died, but one verison says, “after leading him through the whole land of Judah, Nebuchadnezzar killed him, and then threw his corpse piecemeal to the dogs.” But, that wasn’t bad enough for this terrible man. As we see above, his skull was etched with the words “this and yet another” meaning he gets two layers of humiliation after death.

The Gemara relates: The grandfather of Rabbi Perida, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avuya, found a skull that was cast at the gates of Jerusalem, and upon it was written: This and yet another. He buried it, and it then emerged [navug] from beneath the soil. He buried it and it then emerged from beneath the soil again. He said: This is the skull of Jehoiakim, as it is written in his regard: “With the burial of a donkey he shall be buried, drawn and cast beyond the gates of Jerusalem” (Jeremiah 22:19). He will find no rest in a grave. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avuya said: He is a king and it is not proper conduct to treat him contemptuously. He took the skull, wrapped it in silk [beshira’ei] and placed it in a chest [besifta].

So, this rabbi finds a skull that refuses to stay buried, and he figures it’s the king’s! He thinks that, even though he was terrible, having the king’s skull rolling in the streets is not good. So, he takes it home and puts it in a chest, but, he doesn’t tell his wife.

His wife came and saw the skull, went out and told her neighbors and asked them what it was. The neighbors said to her: This is the skull of the first wife to whom he was married, as he has not forgotten her and he keeps her skull in her memory. That angered his wife, and she kindled the oven and burned the skull.

So, the wife thinks it’s his first wife’s and gets jealous.

When Rabbi Ḥiyya son of Avuya came and learned what she had done, he said: That is the fulfillment of that which is written about him: This and yet another. Having his remains cast beyond the gates of Jerusalem did not complete the punishment of Jehoiakim. He suffered the additional indignity of having his remains burned.

King Jehoiakim was a horrible man who bragged that there would be no consequences to his terrible behavior. Well, his toasty skull that refuses to stay buried testifies to him being wrong (in so many ways).

Sanhedrin 81

What do we do when two values are in conflict? Most of the time, when we are making choices, they are easy, we don’t even have to stop and think because we know what we want/value/are supposed to do. When we have to think it might be because two values are in conflict. On today’s daf we get a little lesson about what to do when the value of showing respect for your parent comes into conflict with the value of keeping the laws of the Torah. How do we correct dar old dad without embarrassing him?

Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Long-toothed one: Do not speak to your father in that manner, where you tell him directly that he is mistaken. Rather, raise the matter in a circumspect manner, as it is taught in a baraita: In a case where one’s father was violating Torah matters he should not say to him: Father, you violated Torah matters. Rather, he should say to him: Father, it is written so in the Torah. The Gemara asks: Ultimately, isn’t this formulation identical to that previous formulation? In both cases he embarrasses his father. Rather, say to him: Father, there is a verse written in the Torah and this is what it says. Tell him the halakha or the verse in a way in which it is not obvious that it relates to the action that his father performed.

As a Reform Rabbi, I sometimes have congregants whose children become Ba’al Teshuvah (meaning they “convert” to Orthodox Judaism). Those kids don’t always find this balance. Too often they shame their parents and sometimes cut off communication. This text should really be their guide. Shaming your parents is breaking the commandments. Here we see the rabbis trying to thread that needle. We should try as well.

Sanhedrin 80

There is an old teacher trick to try to get students to tell on someone who did the wrong thing by punishing the whole class unless someone confesses. Instead of someone confessing what usually happens if someone gets told on. Today, the daf paints much different picture of what justice might look like. We get a situation. We’re one of two people committed a murder and it’s pretty obvious by the character of the two individuals who did it and yet…

Rather, Rava says: This is what the mishna is saying: In a case where two people were standing together and an arrow emerged from their midst and killed a person, since it is not known which of them shot the arrow, both of them are exempt. And Rabbi Yosei says: This is the halakha even if Abba Ḥalafta was among them. Even if one of the two people from among whom the arrow emerged was a righteous individual like Abba Ḥalafta, who presumably is not a murderer, since there is no conclusive testimony identifying the shooter, uncertainty remains and both are exempt.

So the students really would do best not to tell on anyone, at least if Rabbi Yossi is their teacher!

Sanhedrin 79

One of the most misunderstood section in the Torah is Exodus 21:22-25, “When [two or more] parties fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but no other damage ensues, the one responsible shall be fined according as the woman’s husband may exact, the payment to be based on reckoning. But if other damage ensues, the penalty shall be life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.” Today’s daf helps us to understand that it’s not to be taken literally. They are trying to determine whether someone is liable for the death penalty if they mean to kill one person and accidentally kill another. This verse is used as a proof text, so we end up learning more about what it really teaches.

And Rabbi Elazar says: It is with regard to a quarrel that involves the intent of each to cause the death of the other that the verse is speaking, as it is written: “But if there shall be a tragedy then you shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:23). This is proof that in a case where one intended to kill one individual and he killed a pregnant woman instead, he is liable to be executed, which is why he does not pay restitution. But according to Rabbi Shimon, this verse: “Then you shall give a life for a life,” what does he do with it? According to his opinion, the party to the quarrel is exempt from the punishment of execution in this case. The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Shimon, “a life for a life” is not referring to execution; rather, the reference is to monetary restitution. And this understanding is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the phrase “then you shall give a life for a life” does not mean execution, but rather monetary restitution for the life that he took. Do you say that it means monetary restitution, or does it mean only the taking of an actual life? Based on the language employed in the verse, it can be determined that the reference is to monetary payment. In these verses, a term of giving is stated below: “And you shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:23). And additionally, a term is stated of giving above: “He shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). Just as there, in the phrase: “Give as the judges determine,” the reference is to monetary restitution, so too here, in the phrase: “Give a life for a life,” the reference is to monetary restitution.

So, they rabbis rule that it does not mean “life for life” but that there should be monetary restitution. That goes for the loss of an eye, a tooth, a burn, etc. One of the many lessons drawn from this section of Torah, is that the punishment should fit the crime, and not be harsher (as was the case in other legal codes)! But there is no way to actually take an eye for an eye, or a wound for a wound – things can never be perfectly even. And, that’s not real justice. Real justice is being held responsible, learning, doing teshuvah and compensating for the loss, and then never doing anything like that again.

Sanhedrin 78

There are certain Jewish texts that we tend to use when we discuss euthanasia. But when I was reading today’s daf, I found this text which I had never seen used as an argument for the right to die before, but strikes me as perfect:

Rava says: All concede that in the case of one who kills one who has a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months [tereifa] he is exempt from liability, as in a certain sense the legal status of the victim is that of a dead person.

Should physician assisted suicide be a crime? Should somebody help someone to die who is only suffering before they die be considered a murderer? It seems that this page would argue: no.

Sanhedrin 77

In good news – we seem to have moved on from incest stories! In other good news – we have physics and ball games! In bad news – people are accidentally being killed by balls bouncing off walls and hitting unintended targets.

And the tanna taught a similar halakha in a baraita: In a case where those who were playing with a ball killed another by hitting him with the rebounding ball, if they did so intentionally, they are executed by beheading; if they did so unwittingly, they are exiled.

It makes me think of billiards and how you purposefully will carom a shot using all that geometry you thought you would never use in real life! (Also, a fun thing to google, seeing all the golfers and other athletes who accidentally ricochet the ball to bad consequences.)

I will leave you with this unintended ball hitting a player and changing the whole game.