2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

Swinging from what I find amusing to what I find disturbing. . .

On today’s daf, we continue the discussion of how meat, for the pascal sacrifice, is to be cooked. The rabbis spend most of the daf discussing a doubling of the term “roasted in fire.” They trae this term everywhere it is found, and of course, since there is a doubling, tell us what they think we can learn from the repetition of the term.

The reason is that the Merciful One includes these types of burns in the Torah through the words: A burn, a burn. But if the Merciful One had not included them through the repetitive expression a burn, a burn, one would have assumed that coals are not considered fire . . .

If you get disturbed thinking of animals getting flayed and fired up, well, this passage will be very upsetting. For the repetition of “fire” is also found in a place that has nothing to do with food, but had to do with a priest’s daughter who, according to Leviticus 21:9, “And the daughter of a priest, if she profanes herself through adultery, she profanes her father; in fire she shall be burned.” The Gemara uses this as a point of comparison to the lamb when someone says that metal is not considered “fire” even though it conducts heat . . .

And are red-hot pieces of metal not considered fire? But with regard to a daughter of a priest who committed adultery after betrothal, it is written: “And the daughter of a priest, if she profanes herself through adultery, she profanes her father; in fire she shall be burned” (Leviticus 21:9), and Rav Mattana said: They would not literally burn her in fire; rather, they would prepare for her a molten bar of lead. They would execute her by pouring molten lead down her throat. This proves that burning metal is considered fire. The Gemara responds: It is different there, as the verse states not simply fire, but “in fire she shall be burned.” The expression “she shall be burned” comes to include all burnings that come from fire.

Now, I am not one to pretend that our history is free of misogyny and inhumane acts (our present is also not for that matter). But I am still sick reading of this horrific punishment – especially with the cold non-shalance used by the rabbis here as they compare the life of a young woman who they only define by her father’s status to that of a piece of meat. they go on to make a parallel between her death and that of Aaron’s sons:

The Gemara suggests: If so, all the more so fire itself fulfills the requirement of burning. Let us surround her with bundles of branches and burn her with them. The Gemara responds: It comes from a verbal analogy between the word “burning” stated here and the word “burning” stated and in the context of the death of the sons of Aaron: Just as below, with regard to the sons of Aaron, the verse states that they were burned with fire (see Leviticus 10:2), and it was a burning of the soul and the body remained, as even their clothes were not burned, so too, here, with regard to the daughter of a priest, it means the burning of the soul and the body remains. The Gemara challenges: Let us execute her with boiling water heated by fire. The Gemara answers: It is due to the statement of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman said that the verse states: “And you shall love your fellow as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18). When executing someone, select for him a kind death. Even when someone must be executed, his dignity should be protected. He should be executed in the most comfortable way possible.

This is the “most comfortable way possible”!? Really!?

We still have so far to go, both as a Jewish community, as a society, and as global humanity towards human rights and women’s rights. Honor killings still happen every day in certain parts of the world. Yet, anytime I feel a bit of nostalgia, or regret that we have gone so far as a society from our values, I think of texts like this and I thank God that I was born in 1980 and not anytime in the past. We aren’t good enough, but, wow, are we better than we once were.

Let’s hope that in years from now, future generations will looking back with gladness that they were born into their world and not ours.

Living in Miami, it’s not uncommon to hear of a pig roast. Tons of people will gather for a pig roast as the entire animal will be ready for consumption.

Clearly I have never eaten from a pig roast – but I can’t help but think of it as we read today’s daf where we are roasting an entire pascal lamb MISHNA: How does one roast the Paschal lamb? One brings a spit [shappud] of pomegranate wood and thrusts it into the mouth of the lamb until it reaches its anus . . .

The Gemara discusses why a metal spit cannot be used (because metal conducts heat (yay science!) and so the meat is also being “cooked” by the metal and therefore it is not fully “roasted”) as well as why it should specifically be roasted on a spit made from pomegranate wood before turning to the question of if the limbs of the animal need to be attached, or can they be put inside the animal. This begins a discussion of blood and insuring the blood from the animal has the chance to entirely leave through the cooking method.

We get a lot of cooking advise on today’s daf! How can I prepare my meat to ensure that all of the meat is cooked through? That it’s not still “pink” with blood?

We also get a bit of a laugh as they discuss how to prepare testicles for consumption. (Forgive me, it’s on the daf . . . ) And, so too, with regard to testicles: If one cut them and salted them, they are permitted even to be cooked in a pot. If one hung them on a spit in order to roast them, they are permitted because the blood flows out. With regard to a case where one placed them on coals, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagreed about this; one prohibited it and one permitted it.

If I were more of a cook, I might have drawn other life lessons, like how to properly cook meat, especially if meat is breaded or within a casing of some sort, as this is on the daf. But alas, all I can think of is a very old SNL skit, “NPR’s Delicious Dish: Schweddy Balls.”

Enjoy

My blog entry is my writing for My Jewish Learning today! I would have titled it – finding the good in the bad – but theirs is nice: https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/pesachim-73/

Today’s daf continues to probe difficult and arcane laws about sacrificial errors. Recall that, in general, if you make an accidental ritual mistake, you need to bring a sin offering to atone — though in some cases you are exempt from bringing the sin offering.

On today’s page we consider the case of a paschal sacrifice made on Shabbat on behalf of someone who cannot eat (perhaps someone ill or elderly who cannot chew the meat). According to the Torah, eating the paschal offering is an obligation, as is finishing all the meat in a single night. Sacrificing on behalf of someone who will not eat the meat has the potential to disrupt these obligations. And if you make this mistake on Shabbat, you have now violated Shabbat for no reason. But is it a sin offering worthy offense?

The Mishnah says “yes.” But Rav Huna bar Hinnana tests the Mishnah’s position, pointing out that since slaughter on behalf of someone who cannot eat is invalid, it simply amounts to having wounded the animal in a way that brings no benefit:

Rav Huna bar Hinnana said to his son: When you go before Rabbi Zerika, ask him: According to the opinion that says that one who inflicts a destructive wound is exempt (from offering a sin offering), how are we to understand the Mishnah’s ruling that one who slaughtered the paschal lamb for those who cannot eat it is liable? What has he improved?ADVERTISING

Rav Huna bar Hinnana argues that sacrificing on behalf of people who cannot eat is equivalent to inflicting a “destructive wound” — one that creates no benefit. Since the rabbis have a principle that making a destructive wound on Shabbat does not incur the penalty of a sin offering, we might suppose that this hypothetical scenario of sacrificing on behalf of someone who cannot eat on Shabbat should not incur liability for a sin offering, contra the Mishnah.

But no, the Mishnah is in fact right, as the Gemara explains:

He has improved it in that if the sacrificial parts of the offering ascended to the top of the altar, they do not descend. 

If the paschal sacrifice made on behalf of non-eaters on Shabbat ascends to the altar before the mistake is discovered, the Gemara explains, then the meat is not taken off the altar — it is allowed to burn there. This effectively elevates the meat. Since meat incurred benefit, the sacrifice violated Shabbat and therefore requires atonement in the form of a sin offering. 

A similar argument further down the page shows that one is liable also for accidentally sacrificing an animal with a disqualifying blemish as a paschal offering on Shabbat. In doing so, this animal too finds its way onto the altar when it otherwise would not have — elevating the status of the meat. And this benefit means the sacrifice has violated Shabbat. The case is even clearer in the case of an animal that has a condition which means it will die within the year. Had it died on its own (explains Steinsaltz) it would have become a neveila (a carcass that imparts ritual impurity). But proper slaughter elevates this animal such that its remains do not impart impurity.

All of this is very complicated and specific. However, I believe this text has something to teach us about the skill of finding the good in the bad. These animals were sacrificed when they should not have been, and yet the rabbis discerned benefit in it, be it meat that makes it to the altar when it would not otherwise have, or a carcass that is prevented from becoming a source of impurity.

On today’s page, finding the benefit is unfortunate in that it means the sacrifice has violated Shabbat and the person responsible must bring a sin offering. But it is also a gift to be able to look for and find the good in a situation. I’m reminded of the Yiddish song “Hob Ich Mir a Mantl” (“I Had a Little Overcoat” — turned into the children’s book Joseph Had a Little Overcoat). In that Jewish folktale, a coat that becomes worn out is turned into a jacket. When the jacket wears out, it becomes a vest, and so on until all that is left is enough to cover a button. When that button too is lost, the story of the coat remains. Maybe today’s page will never be a riveting story, but it does teach us something about finding the benefit in a bad situation. And, of course, atoning for your mistake.

Today’s daf certainly follows an interesting thought process – it takes us from shish kabobs to having sex with your sister-in-law . . . while she is on her period.

I tell you, the Talmud has it all. Picture the scene:

Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak were sitting on the porch of Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak, and they sat and said: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: If one accidentally confused a spit of leftover sacrificial meat (shish kabob #1), which it is prohibited to eat and which makes one liable to receive the punishment of karet when one eats it intentionally, with a spit of roasted sacrificial meat (shish kabob #2), which is a mitzva to eat, and he ate it, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

Remember, we cannot eat the paschal offering after midnight but we can still eat the peace offering – so they are asking, what if you confuse the meat?

Now, the meat gets spicey when they bring up rules about having sex with a woman on her period as a point of comparison:

And they further reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one unwittingly engaged in sexual intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. But if he unwittingly engaged in sexual intercourse with his sister-in-law who was waiting to become his wife through levirate marriage while she was menstruating, he is exempt.

(Quick reminder, is a man died without giving his wife children, his brother is obliged by Torah law to marry her and “come to her” (Deuteronomy 25:5). Therefore, since he mistakenly transgressed while attempting to fulfill the mitzva, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering.)

The Gemara attempts to determine whether Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees or disagrees with Reish Lakish’s ruling (and therefore this is a good comparison): Some say that all the more so in the first case, where one unwittingly ate a spit of leftover sacrificial meat, Rabbi Yoḥanan would deem him liable to bring a sin-offering, for he did not actually perform a mitzva when he ate the meat, even though he intended to do so. This stands in contrast to the second case, where the person unwittingly engaged in sexual intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, where he at least performed a small mitzva, as will be explained shortly.

Others say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan in that case where one ate leftover sacrificial meat, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. What is the reason? There, where he had sexual intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, he is liable, for he should have asked her if she was menstruating, and because he failed to do so he is liable to bring a sin-offering. But here, where he ate a spit of leftover sacrificial meat, he did not have anyone to ask, and so he is not liable to bring a sin-offering.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is different about one who unwittingly engaged in sexual intercourse with his sister-in-law, in that he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering? Is it that he performed a mitzva, i.e., the mitzva of levirate marriage? If so, then also in the case where he unwittingly engaged in sexual intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, he performed a mitzva, for he occupied himself in the fulfillment of the mitzva of procreation. The Gemara answers that we are dealing here with a case where his wife is pregnant, such that intercourse cannot lead to procreation.

So she went from menstruating to being pregnant!!!!!! But, is sex only a mitzvah when you’re trying to make a baby?! No – sex is a mitzvah all the time . . .

The Gemara raises another question: Nevertheless, there is the mitzva of the enjoyment of conjugal rights. One of a husband’s marital obligations is to engage in sexual intercourse with his wife at regular intervals (see Exodus 21:10), and this is considered a mitzva. The Gemara answers that we are talking about a case where it is not the time of her conjugal rights.

The Gemara asks further: Even so, didn’t Rava say that a man is obligated to please his wife through a mitzva? That is to say, he must engage in sexual intercourse with her when she so desires, even if it is not the time of her conjugal rights.

Except when she is about to get her period.

The Gemara answers that we are dealing with a case where it was near her expected date of menstruation, when sexual relations are prohibited due to a concern that the woman may already be menstruating or that she may begin to menstruate during the sexual act.

So, why can’t he ask his wife, or his sister-in-law, if she is close to her time of the month? He is too embarrassed to ask:

The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if they engaged in sexual intercourse near the woman’s expected date of menstruation when he should have refrained from doing so, then even in the case where he had sexual intercourse with his sister-in-law and she turned out to be menstruating, he should also be liable, as the mitzva of levirate marriage does not apply at that time. The Gemara explains that with regard to his sister-in-law, he is still shy [bazeiz] in front of her and uncomfortable asking her whether she is close to her expected menstruation date, whereas with regard to his wife, he is not shy in front of her, and so he should have asked her.

Oh do I love this stuff. Lots to learn. Lots to love.

Today’s gem is a question of questionable leftovers. If you’ve ever wondered exactly how long leftovers have been in your fridge and if whatever is inside is still okay to eat, then maybe you can relate to the debate amongst Rav Kahana, Rav Yosef, Akiva and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya who wonder, when it comes to the pascal lamb, when we know we cannot eat leftovers, when is the food considered left over?

The Gemara uses the word “Linah” which means literally resting overnight – is the term used to describe part of a sacrifice left off of the altar beyond the time that the sacrifice may be consumed (either by people or “consumed” by burning completely on the altar).

I am pasting part of the debate below but, if we worried about eating leftovers, I do want to just mention that it goes on to discuss perhaps eating raw meat (in a case where you are to offer a sacrifice that is not the Passover sacrifice which overrides Shabbat and can be roasted, and therefore you would end up with meat that is uncooked) and we get another fabulous line from Rav Pappa where he says that if you don’t have the nice roasted meat then: one rejoices with clean clothes and old wine.

The moral? Some dishes are meant to be eaten at the first sitting. The pascal lamb is one of them.

Rav Kahana said: From where is it derived that the sacrificial parts of the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth of Nisan, i.e., those portions of the offering that are consumed on the altar, are disqualified when left overnight on the first night after the offering is slaughtered, despite the fact that the meat of the offering may be consumed for an additional day? As it is stated: “You shall not offer the blood of My offering with leaven; neither shall the fat of my Festival offering be left over until morning” (Exodus 23:18), and, juxtaposed with it is the word first, in the verse: “The first of the first fruits of your land you shall bring to the house of the Lord your God” (Exodus 23:19). This comes to say to us that the morning mentioned in the first verse is the first morning after the offering has been sacrificed.

Rav Yosef strongly objects to this proof: The reason is that it wrote the word first. But had it not written the word first, I would have said: What is the meaning of the term morning? The second morning after it was sacrificed. This raises a question: Is there anything like this where the meat of an offering that is to be eaten is disqualified already from the evening, as the meat of a Festival peace-offering may be eaten only for two days and the night between them, while the sacrificial parts to be consumed on the altar are permitted until the next morning?

Abaye said to him: Why not? For there is the Paschal offering according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who holds that the meat that is to be eaten is disqualified already from midnight and may no longer be eaten after that time, while the sacrificial parts to be consumed on the altar may be offered until morning.

Don’t walk away angry . . .

When people are upset with one another, they tend to either want to confront one another or walk away. In many a relationship, one partner is confrontational and the other likes to avoid – this annoys the both of them since they both are hurt by the actions of their partner, not realizing their partner just deals differently and they need to process feelings differently. So, this on top of the original upset makes for fireworks.

On Today’s daf, one of the rabbis, Yehudah ben Dursai, disagrees with his colleagues and, instead of trying to discusses it with them, he takes his son and and heads south so that he is no longer in Jerusalem for Pesach. He does this (which exempts him from bringing sacrifice because it’s no this issue that they disagree) to avoid continuing the argument with Shemayah and Avtalyon. But like a bitter girlfriend who walks away angry, he doesn’t drop it and has a one sided argument showing how justified he feels:

He said: If Elijah will come and say to the Jewish people: For what reason did you not sacrifice the Festival peace-offering on Shabbat, what will they say to him? I am astounded at the two most eminent scholars of the generation, Shemaya and Avtalyon, who are great sages and great expositors of the Torah, and yet they did not tell the Jewish people that even the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth overrides Shabbat.

It’s so easy to be right when no one is there to defend themselves.

I love this gem. It’s so reality TV – it’s so real. On a pilgrimage holiday this man deprived himself of being in Jerusalem, being with his friends and colleagues who he clearly admires, because he was angry. How many times do we deprive ourselves of moments to celebrate and have fun because we want to just fester in our own anger?

Today the gem is the art of disagreeing with your teacher using what your teacher taught you.

Akiva gives a law. Eliezer corrects him and says his thinking is faulty. Akiva points out that he is, in fact, only repeating what he (Eliezer) taught him!

The Gemara then tries to discover how it could be that Rabbi Eliezer, known for his brilliant mind and conservative approach, would not know his own teaching. Ulla tries to say that this is dealing with another circumstance, but in the end we learn that Eliezer simply forgot his own teaching.

This reminds me of every fight I had with my parents as a kid, and many a fight I had with my husband early in our relationship. There was nothing more frustrating then when they forgot what they said and either punished me or questioned me while I was just following what they had said to do. There was also nothing more satisfying then replaying the conversation, pointing out their hierocracy, and “winning.”

Luckily, with lots of work, I have largely grown out of this phase. I would like to think that I am closer to Akiva now, who tried to gently remind Eliezer of what he taught so as to remind him, without throwing it in the face of his teacher and embarrassing him.

Largely, but not completely.

Now, how to teach this to my kids so I don’t get things thrown back in my face . . .

The text of the daf that deals with the above follows:

We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Akiva responded and said to Rabbi Eliezer that the law governing the sprinkling of the purifying water of a red heifer proves that actions prohibited by a rabbinic decree, even when they are performed for the sake of a mitzva, do not override Shabbat. He then goes on to argue that we can reverse the order of the argument and conclude by way of an a fortiori inference that even slaughter does not override Shabbat. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer said to him about this: Akiva, you have lightheartedly responded to me with a faulty a fortiori inference with regard to slaughter. His death will be with slaughter; meaning, as punishment for this disrespect you will be slaughtered by other people. Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, do not deny my contention at the time we are discussing this inference, for this is the tradition I received from you: Sprinkling is forbidden by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat.

וְכִי מֵאַחַר דְּהוּא אַגְמְרֵיהּ, מַאי טַעְמָא קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ? אָמַר עוּלָּא: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר כִּי אַגְמְרֵיהּ, הַזָּאָה דִתְרוּמָה אַגְמְרֵיהּ — דִּתְרוּמָה גּוּפַהּ לָא דָּחֲיָא שַׁבָּת.

The Gemara asks: Seeing that Rabbi Eliezer taught Rabbi Akiva this halakha that sprinkling purifying water does not override Shabbat, what is the reason he retracted his opinion? Ulla said: When Rabbi Eliezer taught him this halakha, he taught it to him with respect to sprinkling that is performed in order to enable a ritually impure priest to partake of teruma. This sprinkling does not override Shabbat because even separating teruma itself does not override Shabbat. But he never taught Rabbi Akiva this halakha with respect to sprinkling that is performed in order enable someone to eat of the Paschal lamb.

The Gemara notes that Rabbi Akiva as well, when he challenged Rabbi Eliezer, challenged him with regard to the halakha of sprinkling for teruma, and his objection should be understood as follows: Eating teruma is a mitzva, and sprinkling purifying water on someone who is ritually impure is only prohibited due to a rabbinic decree; nevertheless, sprinkling purifying water on a ritually impure priest, in order to enable him to eat teruma, is prohibited on Shabbat. Thus it follows by a fortiori inference that slaughter, which is a biblically prohibited labor, should certainly be forbidden on Shabbat, even when performed for the sake of a mitzva. And Rabbi Eliezer thought Rabbi Akiva was challenging him with regard to the halakha of sprinkling that is performed in order to enable someone to eat of the Paschal lamb; that is why he said that he disagreed about sprinkling as well.

Rabba raised an objection to Ulla’s explanation, based on a different baraita which states: Rabbi Akiva responded and said: The sprinkling of purifying water on someone who is ritually impure due to contact with a corpse proves the matter when his seventh day of impurity occurs on Shabbat and it is also the eve of Passover, for it is done for the sake of a mitzva, in order to allow the person to eat of the Paschal lamb, and it is prohibited only due to a rabbinic decree, and nonetheless it does not override Shabbat. From this baraita it is clear that Rabbi Akiva challenged Rabbi Eliezer with regard to the halakha of sprinkling that is performed in order to enable someone to eat the Paschal lamb.

Rather, we must reject Ulla’s explanation and say instead that Rabbi Eliezer certainly taught Rabbi Akiva about sprinkling that is performed in order to enable someone to eat of the Paschal lamb. And with regard to the question that seeing that Rabbi Eliezer himself taught him this halakha, what is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer refutes it, the Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer forgot his own teaching and Rabbi Akiva came to remind him of his teaching by drawing an a fortiori inference that would cause Rabbi Eliezer to remember what he himself had taught. The Gemara asks: If so, then let Rabbi Akiva say explicitly that this is what Rabbi Eliezer himself had taught him. The Gemara answers: He thought that it would not be proper to tell his teacher that he had forgotten his teaching, and therefore his initial attempt was to remind him indirectly.

What happens when we die? Do we believe in heaven? The World to come? Or the Messiah? Resurrection of the dead?

The Talmud uses part of a verse from Isaiah as a proof text for the conversation about ritual impurity. Having explained the latter part of the verse in Isaiah, the Gemara turns to the beginning of that same verse. “Then shall the lambs feed as in their pasture [kedavram].” This opens up a discussion about life after death.

. . . Rather, Rava said: This verse should be understood in accordance with what Rav Ḥananel said that Rav said. For Rav Ḥananel said that Rav said: In the future, the righteous will resurrect the dead. It is written here: “Then shall the lambs feed [vera’u] as in their pasture,” the lambs serving as an allusion to the righteous, and it is written there: “Tend your people with your staff, the flock of your heritage, who dwell alone in the wood, in the midst of Carmel; let them feed [yiru] in Bashan and Gilad as in the days of old” (Micah 7:14).

It then teaches that this verse is packed with meaning: “Bashan” is an allusion to the prophet Elisha, who came from the Bashan. . . “Gilad” is an allusion to Elijah, as it is stated: “And Elijah the Tishbite, who was of the inhabitants of Gilad, said” (I Kings 17:1). The rabbi is arguing Rav taught that based on the similarity of the verses and the verbal analogy between the two instances of the word “feed,” that in the future the righteous will be like Elijah and Elisha, who resurrected the dead.

They bring the same idea from a different source. The story of the Shunamite woman whose son died that the prophet Elisha brought back to life when he laid his staff on the boy. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: In the future the righteous will resurrect the dead, as it is stated: “Old men and old women shall yet again dwell in the streets of Jerusalem, and every man with his staff in his hand for very age” (Zechariah 8:4). And it is written: “And you shall lay my staff on the face of the child” (II Kings 4:29).

In the future any righteous person could have this power! But the page is not done with this topic.

Ulla raised a contradiction between two verses: In one verse it is written: “He will destroy death forever, and the Lord God will wipe away tears from off all faces, and the insult of His people shall He take away from off all the earth; for the Lord has spoken” (Isaiah 25:8). And in another verse it is written: “There shall be no more there an infant who lives a few days, nor an old man who has not filled his days; for the youngest shall die a hundred years old” (Isaiah 65:20), implying that people will live long lives, but death will not be totally eradicated – so which is it? Ulla answers: This is not difficult: Here, in the first verse, it is referring to Jews, who will not die at all, while there, in the second verse, it is referring to gentiles, who will live exceedingly long lives but eventually die. Clearly Ulla is more of a fan to Jews then Gentiles, so The Gemara asks: What are gentiles doing there at all in the future world? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And strangers shall stand and feed your flocks, and the sons of the alien shall be your plowmen and your vineyard workers” (Isaiah 61:5).

OY. Next it talks about two more verses that contradict one another. One teaches the sun and moon will not give off light, and the other says they will be brighter.

The Gemara solves the contradiction by saying: This is not difficult: Here, where it says that the sun and the moon will be ashamed before the glow of the Divine Presence, it is referring to the World–to–Come, which is an entirely different world; while there, where it says that their light will increase, it is referring to the days of the Messiah.

One more contradiction in the verses that is very interesting is given by Rava:

Rava raised a contradiction between two parts of a verse. It is written: “I put to death and I make live” (Deuteronomy 32:39) and in that same verse it is written: “I wound and I heal.” His question is – why do we need both? If God can cause death and bring back to life – then certainly God can wound and heal.

Similarly, the Sages taught in a baraita: “I put to death and I make live”; one might have thought that this refers to death for one person and life, i.e., birth, for another person, in the customary manner of the world. Therefore, the verse states: “I wound and I heal”; just as the wounding and the healing mentioned here clearly refer to the same person, so too death and life refer to the same person. From this verse, there is a refutation to those who say that there is no Torah source for the resurrection of the dead, for it is explicitly mentioned in this verse. Alternatively, the verse can be explained as follows: At first, those whom I put to death I will bring to life, but they will be revived with the same injuries that they had when they died; and subsequently, those whom I wounded I will heal, meaning that their injuries will be healed after they are resurrected.

As Jews, there is no real dogma about what we have to believe happens when we die. But we see from this daf that we do believe that there is more after this world. The world-to-come is our would be heaven. The Messianic age is our would be heaven on earth.

What we imagine either of those heavens to be like is determined largely by what we have learned and what we want, and lack, in this life. I can’t help but read the rabbis’ desire to be able to resurrect the dead and wonder about who they have lost. Who is it that they would want to resurrect? Who is it that would make life on earth feel more like heaven? They look to Elisha and Elijah, who had the ability to bring people back . . . what child or loved one is looming over this discussion. What heartbreak? We often talk at funerals of loved ones meeting one another in the next world. Who is it that they can’t wait to see? That they want to pull back into this life?

May their memories be for a blessing.

I sprained my ankle when I was in college and when I went to the infirmary to get some crutches they asked me if they could test me for syphilis. Clearly this questions was out of left field and shocked me. When I pointed out that it was an ankle that I came in for, the nurse said, “Well, everyone who has come in lately has syphilis.”

How I felt that day is somewhat how I feel today reading this daf. I came to the page thinking I was going to learn about Passover and instead I find out that gonorrhea is running rampant. (This is what we think the text means when it says “zav” for a man or “zavah” for a female. We know from descriptions in the text that the person has a white pus-like discharge from their genitals.)

The entire daf (both sides!) discusses the groups of people who would need to miss the first Passover because of impurity and, instead, partake in the Passover shenei which would happen about a month later. In particular it talks about the differences in impurity between those who are impure at the time of Passover because of a seminal emission, lepracy, and gonorrhea.

These three categories of people, we learn, need to be isolated from the community into a special camp. However, we also learn on today’s daf that they need to be isolated from one another.

I am not sure what the gem of a lesson is from this daf – but it definitely kept my attention. I guess we should learn from this that the category of being “impure” is not one blanket category. Just like today, where “sick” can mean so many things, “impure” held many meanings as well. And just like today, when we are sick, we should isolate ourselves from, not just the regular community, but from people who don’t have what we have – so we don’t continue to pass on our affliction. And maybe we can also learn from this that having shame and taboo around having certain “afflictions” only serves to spread it to others. If the Talmud can spend so much time talking about seminal discharges and STDs then maybe we can be less ashamed when we need time to recover from our own illnesses.

Ever hear the expression, “The only stupid question is the one that you don’t ask”? Well, today’s gem is interesting. The people of Beteira forget if the offering of the Pascal lamb overrides Shabbat or not. The find Hillel who tells them that of course it overrides Shabbat because even the daily offerings override Shabbat and they have less severe punishments than the Passover offering. He them chastises them – but is quickly put into his place:

GEMARA: The Sages taught a baraita with regard to the basic halakha governing the eve of Passover that occurs on Shabbat: This law was forgotten by the sons of Beteira, who were the leaders of their generation. The fourteenth of Nisan once occurred on Shabbat, and they forgot and did not know whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not. They said: Is there any person who knows whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not? They said to them: There is a certain man in Jerusalem who came up from Babylonia, and Hillel the Babylonian is his name. At one point, he served the two most eminent scholars of the generation, Shemaya and Avtalyon, and he certainly knows whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not. The sons of Beteira sent messengers and called for him. They said to him: Do you know whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not? He said to them: Have we but one Paschal lamb during the year that overrides Shabbat? Do we not have many more than two hundred Paschal lambs, i.e., sacrifices, during the year that override Shabbat? They said to him: From where do you know this? He said to them: “Its appointed time” is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb and “its appointed time” is also stated with regard to the daily offering. Just as the expression “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the daily offering, indicates that it overrides Shabbat, so too “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb, indicates that it overrides Shabbat. And furthermore, it is an a fortiori inference: If the daily offering, the neglect of which is not punishable by karet, overrides Shabbat, is it not right that the Paschal lamb, the neglect of which is punishable by karet, should override Shabbat?

Hillel now becomes their rabbinic leader, their Nasi, but he rebukes them for asking stupid questions, calling them lazy for having not learned on their own:

After Hillel brought these proofs, they immediately seated him at the head and appointed him Nasi over them, and he expounded the laws of Passover that entire day. In the course of his teaching, he began rebuking them [mekanteran] them with words. He said to them: What caused this to happen to you, that I should come up from Babylonia and become Nasi over you? It was the laziness in you that you did not serve the two most eminent scholars of the generation living in Eretz Yisrael, Shemaya and Avtalyon.

Now the script flips:

They said to Hillel: Our teacher, if one forgot and did not bring a knife on the eve of Shabbat and cannot slaughter his Paschal lamb, what is the law? Since he could have brought the knife before Shabbat, he cannot bring it on Shabbat; but what should he do in this situation? He said to them: I once heard this halakha from my teachers but I have forgotten it. But leave it to the Jewish people; if they are not prophets to whom God has revealed His secrets, they are the sons of prophets, and will certainly do the right thing on their own.

He forgot! He learned it but he forgot. I love this. Immediately after rebuking the people for not learning well enough, the famed Hillel forgets something he himself learned. Hillel is known for his exceeding patience with others and being a teacher who will teach again and again – but here we saw him lose his patience and be harsh with others. Immediately he is put in his place as he forgets his learning. However, he does know the Talmudic rule, that if you don’t know – just go and see what the people are doing (and I love that he calls the people sons of prophets):

The next day, on Shabbat that was the eve of Passover, one whose Paschal offering was a lamb took the knife and stuck it in its wool; and one whose Paschal offering was a goat, which does not have wool, stuck it between its horns. Hillel saw the incident and remembered the halakha that he had once learned and said: This is the tradition I received from the mouths of Shemaya and Avtalyon, meaning that this is in fact the proper course of action.

Perhaps we live in a world where we could pay better attention when answers are given, but we should never fear asking. Even the greatest minds can forget, but if there are great minds around, take advantage of learning from them. And remember:

There are no stupid questions.