2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

A delicious gem for chicken parm fans! In the midst of explaining that different halakhic authorities ruled and practiced every so slightly differently from place to place we get:

In the locale of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they would eat poultry meat in milk, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili held that the prohibition of meat in milk does not include poultry.

Chickens don’t lactate! So here we see that, while in general one does not eat chicken with dairy, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili did – as did those who lived in his area.

Why do I like this so much? (Especially since I no longer eat poultry?) Because it gets back to the question of how do we define kosher eating. I believe that seeing that not everyone agreed on what’s kosher and what is not, then we can talk about what it means for food to be kosher (or not) today. Can food be kosher if the animal suffered? If the workers were not paid living wages? When it’s part of a factory farming system which exploits and is an atrocious polluter?

Today’s gem is the beautiful example of how we can disagree, even strongly, yet learn from one another, have meals together, and even marry.

Today’s daf explains that: Beit Shammai permit rival wives to the brothers, and Beit Hillel prohibit this practice.

The mishna comments: Although Beit Hillel prohibit the rival wives to the brothers and Beit Shammai permit them, and although these disqualify these women and those deem them fit, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. Furthermore, with regard to all of the disputes concerning the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity, where these rule that an article is ritually pure and those rule it ritually impure, they did not refrain from handling ritually pure objects each with the other, as Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel frequently used each other’s vessels.

Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai are quintessential rivals. Yet, they are also our examples of what it means to respectfully disagree. They disagree, even on matters of marriage – yet they will still marry!

Maybe there is hope for our divided country.

Today’s daf contains a key text for understanding Rabbinic approaches to birth control (what I wrote my Rabbinic Thesis about). We are introduced to a mokh, here translated as “resorbent.” It seems to be a cross between a diaphragm and a tampon that was used as a contraceptive device to prevent pregnancy.

Rav Beivai taught a baraita before Rav Naḥman: Three women may engage in relations with a contraceptive resorbent, a soft fabric placed at the entrance to their wombs to prevent conception, despite the fact that this practice is generally prohibited. They are as follows: A minor, a woman who is already pregnant, and a nursing woman. The baraita specifies the reason for each exception: A minor may do so lest she become pregnant and perhaps die; a pregnant woman, lest she be impregnated a second time and her previous fetus becomes deformed into the shape of a sandal fish by being squashed by the pressure of the second fetus (this actually can happen for women who have two uteri). As for a nursing woman, she does so lest she become pregnant and her milk dry up, in which case she will wean her son too early, thereby endangering him, and he will die.

We see here that pregnancy in any of these cases risks the health/life of either the mother or a child and therefore birth control either can be used or must be used, depending on how you read it.

In Rashi’s commentary to Yevomot 12b, he states: “Has intercourse with a sponge.” [They are] permitted to place a sponge in the place of intercourse (into the vaginal canal) when they have intercourse in order that they do not become pregnant.

This text is significant in that it answers the question of if these three women must use the sponge or if the verse should be read they may use a sponge but have the option not to do so. Rashi reads Rabbi Meir as stating that these three women may use a mokh to prevent conception. Therefore, Rashi concludes that these three categories of women are singled out by Rabbi Meir as the only woman who have this option. Since it is clear by the passage that the Sages, who hold the majority opinion, disagree with Rabbi Meir, this would imply that Rashi believes the Sages forbade these three women from the use of contraception and required them to rely solely on heaven to protect them from danger. (As we read later in the daf.) In addition, this text is significant in that Rashi is informing the reader how to properly use the sponge as a contraceptive devise. Rashi describes the use of the mokh as being in the vaginal canal during the act of intercourse.

The Tosafot to Yevamot 12b have a slightly different reading interpreting: “She has intercourse with a sponge” which we read here means, “are obligated to use a sponge.”

So, they think these three categories of women MUST use birth control and therefore it is permissible for other women.

You can already see that there is an understanding of this passage that leads to a very liberal reading of the use of birth control (and one less so liberal).

My favorite example is from sixteenth century, Solomon Luria, the Maharshal, who gave the most permissive ruling within the bounds of halakhic discussion:

“. . . However, the other point made by Rabbenu Tam is correct that the remaining women are permitted the mokh and three women ‘must’ . . . just as Asheri said . . . It may also be inferred from Asheri’s language that pre-coital mokh is assumed . . . Resh Niddah implies also that other women may, for it says, ‘what about women who are using the mokh?’ not ‘what about the three women?’ That any woman may use the mokh is the correct inference. The law follows the Sages that the three women ‘need not” but the others ‘may.'”

Today’s gem is a gorgeous teaching: As Rav Yosef said: Here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught a valuable moral lesson, that a person should not pour the water from his well when others are in need of it.

I will paste Steinsaltz’ connection of this lesson to the daf below – but the lesson in and of itself is quite beautiful and so true. How wasteful are we? While one might read this and imagine someone wiping their backside with hundred-dollar bills, we are often wasteful when there are so many who are in need. Up to 40% of the food in the United States is wasted. The average person unknowingly wastes up to 30 gallons of water every day. We waste electricity. We waste gas. We waste so many resources while others are in need.

I love this lesson. It’s one that we should take seriously and look for ways to cut down the amount of waste we produce and find channels to give our excess to those who are in need.

As promised, the Steinsaltz: That is, one should not cause loss in any situation, even when this relates to his own personal life, if he might thereby cause a future loss to others. The same reasoning applies here: If he intends to perform ḥalitza it does not matter to him which of the women he chooses, but if he does so with the one who is fit to others, he thereby disqualifies her from marrying a priest, as the legal status of a woman who underwent ḥalitza is like that of a divorcée. It is therefore preferable to perform ḥalitza with the one who in any case was disqualified from marrying a priest.

Today’s daf seems to be a reaction to yesterday’s insult when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Levi: It seems to me that he has no brain in his head. The daf comes up with so many scenarios to try and defend what Levi might have meant by suggesting there is a 16th category of woman who should have been on the list. In doing so, they keep suggesting “What if” scenarios where someone violated a law and married a forbidden woman, or raped a woman, and then asking about her status to the living brothers when her “husband” dies.

It’s quite disturbing.

Kind-of perfect to read on Purim where we have such a disturbing text with murder, genocide, exploitation of women, drunken debauchery and more.

But the gem, for me, comes from the idea put on the page that, if one brother performs halitzah (let’s the widow go and does not marry her) then his brothers are considered to have also done halitza and she does not have to go through this ordeal with each of them.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan claims: Is there anything of this kind in halakha? After all, at the outset, before the ḥalitza, if this brother wanted he could perform ḥalitza, and if that brother wanted he could perform ḥalitza, and if he wanted he could perform ḥalitza with this woman and if he wanted he could perform ḥalitza with that woman. All the deceased brother’s wives were included in the levirate obligation of marriage or ḥalitza, and therefore the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife was negated for all of them at that time. And now, after the ḥalitza, they stand to incur karet for having relations with her? How can the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife return after it was nullified by the death of the childless brother?

Rather, he who performs ḥalitza performs the agency of the other brothers, and therefore he also releases her from the levirate bond of his brothers. Similarly, she who performs ḥalitza performs the agency of the rival wife, as the ḥalitza of one wife serves to release the other one as well. Consequently, it is as though all of the brothers released all of the wives, and there is no longer any prohibition that incurs karet.

What is the gem in this? That we should step up and do things that benefit not only ourselves, but others as well. Here, the brother who steps us saves all his brothers (and his brother’s widow) the ordeal of having to go through this ceremony (so no being de-sandaled and no spitting).

Happy Purim!

Today’s gem is an insult, and thus a little bit of levity for me as a reader:

The Sage Levi said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Why does the tanna specifically teach the cases of fifteen women? Let him teach the cases of sixteen women, including the case of a rival wife of a forbidden relation. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Judging by his question, it seems to me that this Sage has no brain in his head.

The irony of saying that a sage has no brain in his head is pretty fabulous. When the rest of the daf is discussing what sacrifices we bring when we unintentionally sin or unintentionally practice idol worship AND still talking about if we can marry the daughter of the woman our brother raped – this moment of levity is highly needed.

Sorry to take a laugh at Levi’s expense, but isn’t the expression “If I didn’t laugh I would cry”?

Is our daf allowing for rape and robbery . . . of a childless widow?!

Rereading and interpreting a verse:

The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, who do not interpret the verse in this manner, what do they do with this emphasis on “have intercourse with her”? How do they interpret it?

The Gemara responds: They need this for that which Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said, as Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: “And have intercourse with her” means marriage, i.e., she is fully his wife from that moment onward. This teaches that he divorces her with a bill of divorce after levirate marriage, and she can no longer be released by ḥalitza, and he may subsequently remarry her if he so wishes.

And the verse “and consummate the levirate marriage with her,” this means against her will. Although betrothal in general does not take effect without the woman’s consent, levirate marriage can be effected against her will.

The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derive these widely accepted halakhot? The Gemara responds: That halakha cited by Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, that a woman taken in levirate marriage has the status of a regular wife who may be divorced and remarried, is derived from the verse “and take her to him to be his wife” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which means that she will be his wife for all purposes, like any other wife. And the halakha that levirate marriage can be effected against her will is derived from “her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her,” which indicates that it can be achieved without her consent.

Wow.

Okay, so we know that this is a dead law, but the Gemara/Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina is clearly saying that he can rape his sister-in-law if she does not want to marry him.

When something this horrific is on the page, I look to the commentators. Rashi does not make it better:

Rashi (DH Ba’al Korchah) explains that this means that even if the brother marries her against her will, the marriage takes effect “with regard to Yerushah (inheriting her possessions upon her death), Tum’ah (the allowance to bury her and become Tamei if he is a Kohen), and with regard to all matters, she is his wife.”

So Rashi adds that this verse proves that even with regard to Kinyanim – her inheritance, Yibum without the woman’s consent is effective.

So, the brother-in-law can rape her and by doing so steals the money she would inherit from her dead husband for himself. . . and then he can divorce her.

Where is the gem in this?

I spoke to a Talmud expert and he explained that rape is not permitted, it’s a question of if the brother-in-law went ahead and broke the law and raped her – then he needs to divorce her or stay married etc. So, not very comforting but takes away a bit of the sting as the Talmud is not permitting him to force himself on her.

The only gem I can think of is that this law is a dead law, one that is no longer in effect. Also, let’s face up to the ugly things within our texts – admit they are there and that we no longer do these things because we know better. If we can see that the law has changed because it was promised on the degradation of women, maybe we can change other things that still pervade our culture that maybe don’t add up to physical and monetary rape – but that harm women nonetheless.

Today’s daf paints an interesting scenario. . . if court-imposed capital punishment overrides Shabbat, but making offerings at the Temple overrides Shabbat . . . then do we kill a priest who has been found guilt of a capital punishment if he is offering a sacrifice on the alter?

However, it could be said that court-imposed capital punishment overrides Shabbat, by an a fortiori inference: If the Temple service, which includes the sacrifice of offerings, is so severe that it overrides Shabbat, as offerings were brought on Shabbat, and yet the halakha of murder overrides it, i.e., the obligation to execute a sentenced convict overrides the Temple service, as it is stated with regard to one sentenced to death: “You shall take him from My altar, that he may die” (Exodus 21:14), then in the case of Shabbat, which is overridden by the Temple service, is it not right that the halakhot of murder should likewise override it?

So, we are left imagining a murderous priest, found guilty and sentences to death, running into the holy Temple and going to offer sacrifices in order to protect himself from his fate.

What’s the ruling? According to Rashi’s reading of the daf, you still take him out and kill him unless he is actually standing on top of the Alter (then you wait).

The gem is how parallel this is to clergy people who do horrible thing, who abuse, verbally, physically, sexually, who exploit monetarily and emotionally – and use their pulpit, their connection to God, to protect and hide themselves.

The message? No one is above justice and how dare someone use God as an accomplise in their evil.

Once, I had some students from a local University who came and observed Shabbat services for a comparative religion course. I tried to add a few explanations within the service to help them and then afterward came to answer questions. One question was: why do we bow to the Torah, kiss it, and not turn our backs to it? Aren’t we against idolatry?

Today’s daf gives a similar answer to what I gave that day when it explains that the high respect and protection we show to Shabbat and the Temple are not because we revere Shabbat or the Temple, but because we revere God:

The Gemara responds: Yes, it is indeed so. And why do I need the verse: “You shall keep My Shabbatot, and revere My Sanctuary” (Leviticus 19:30)? After all, the halakha that the building of the Temple does not override the prohibition against driving an animal on Shabbat is derived from the case of honoring one’s parents. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to derive that which is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that a person should be in reverence of the Temple and turn the Temple itself into an object of worship. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall keep My Shabbatot, and revere My Sanctuary.” The term keeping is stated with regard to Shabbat, and the term reverence is stated with regard to the Temple. Just as in the case of keeping stated with regard to Shabbat, you do not revere Shabbat itself, as reverence is not mentioned in this context, but rather, one reveres He Who warned about the observance of Shabbat, so too, the same applies to the reverence stated with regard to the Temple: You do not revere the Temple itself but He Who warned about the Temple.

Here we see that keeping Shabbat, treating the Temple with the utmost respect and, today, how we treat the Torah, the conduit of God’s word, are not about worshipping that day or that place or that item – but about reverence for God. This lesson of remembering what is behind an observance, what relationship are we honoring, is key to acting in honorable ways.

This reminds us that Memorial Day is not just a party weekend or a time of sales at the mall – it’s a time to honor our fallen soldiers. It reminds us that graveyards are not just lovely gardens but places where people honor and continue to connect with their dead. And it reminds us that a ring may be just a ring but can symbolize a relationship.

The Gemara continues to explain what that respect looks like, and how it continues even after the destruction of the Temple.

The baraita explains: And what is the reverence of the Temple? In deference to the Temple, a person may not enter the Temple Mount with his staff, his shoes, his money belt [punda], or even the dust on his feet. One may not make the Temple a shortcut [kappendarya] to pass through it, and through an a fortiori inference, all the more so one may not spit on the Temple Mount, as no disrespect is meant by the other actions, whereas spitting is repulsive even in one’s own private home, and certainly on the Temple Mount.

And I have derived only that one is obligated to act in this manner when the Temple is standing. From where do I derive that the mitzva to revere the Temple is in force when the Temple is not standing, i.e., that it is prohibited to be disrespectful toward the place where the Temple stood? The verse states: “You shall keep My Shabbatot, and revere My Sanctuary” (Leviticus 19:30). Just as the keeping stated with regard to Shabbat applies forever, so too, the reverence stated with regard to the Temple is forever.

The relationship is there forever, even after the Temple is long gone. And even after the Messiah comes we will keep Shabbat. Because it’s not about the day, or the place, it’s about a relationship that can never die.

Most choices we make require little to no thought. Often, we don’t even realize we are making them. Before we leave the house in the morning, we have already made hundreds of decisions (about what to eat, what to wear, how to dress, if we brush and floss our teeth, what to say, where to walk, if and when we even get out of bed). The decisions we struggle with are ones that put two values at odds with one another (for example, wanting to spend time with family and wanting to exercise when your kids are up at 6 and that’s when you could hit the gym). This is true for us in personal affairs as well as global affairs (e.g. do we prioritize welcoming or safety).

Today’s daf tries to help us make those decisions in one area: when a positive mitzvah and a negative mitzvah come into conflict. The daf is focused in on the ruling that a positive mitzvah overrides a negative mitzvah. But not just any prohibition, even prohibitions that require karet – being ostracized.

We have found that a positive mitzva overrides a regular prohibition. However, where do we find that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition that includes karet, as the phrase “with her” is necessary to prohibit her? It was mentioned previously that the superfluous phrase “with her” teaches that the mitzva of levirate marriage does not override the prohibition against taking a wife’s sister. However, why is this necessary? Why would it have been assumed that a positive mitzva is so powerful that it overrides even a prohibition that is punishable by karet?

Among this discussion we get the gem of the day, a scenario so many Jews struggle with: What happens when your level of religious observance is different than your parents? In this case: What if you keep Shabbat and they don’t? What value do you prioritize honoring your parents or keeping Shabbat?

As it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that honoring one’s father and mother overrides Shabbat; therefore, the verse states: “You shall fear every man his mother and his father and you shall keep My Shabbatot, I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 19:3). The baraita explains the derivation from the verse: All of you, both parent and child, are obligated in My honor, and therefore honoring one’s parents does not override the honor of God, Who commanded the Jewish people to observe Shabbat.

The daf gives us an answer for this scenario. But it also opens up a world of questions about how to both honor our parents and our own beliefs when they differ. It opens up questions about how to prioritize values. It speaks to us today as we struggle both in our own lives and in the world to do the right thing when there is so much at stake and the answers aren’t obvious.

It’s a good struggle.

(I also love the intrinsic message to focus on the positive over the negative.)