Yevamot 34

A popular belief in my hometown was that a young woman could not become pregnant the first time she had intercourse. This idea did not originate in Fort Wayne, Indiana; in fact, this idea is found on our daf. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it known that a virgin woman does not become pregnant from her first sexual act?

This statement is repeated on Yevamot 34 a and b. The text, in its context, is discussing why the Mishnah insists that a woman must wait three months after the death of her husband or following a divorce before entering into a second marriage. The idea behind the law is that by waiting they will insure that, should the woman become pregnant, there is no confusion as to who is the father of the child. In the above discussion, the Gemara asks why a couple is required to wait three months to consummate a marriage through the act of intercourse when everyone knows that “no woman becomes pregnant in the first act of intercourse.”

Yet, the daf is aware that some women did seem to get pregnant upon the first act of intercourse, and so they sought to explain this.

Idea 1: Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: This is referring to a situation where they engaged in intercourse and then repeated the act, so that it is possible that the women were impregnated during the second act of intercourse.

Idea 2: But didn’t Tamar become pregnant from the first act of intercourse? Rav Naḥman said: Tamar broke her hymen with her finger prior to intercourse, and it is due to this that she became pregnant from the first act of intercourse, as Rabbi Yitzḥak said: All of those women from the household of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi who break their hymens are named Tamar by nickname. And why are they named Tamar? They are called this on account of Tamar, who broke her hymen with her finger.

Oy! Even the biblical examples of pregnancy upon first encounter cannot persuade our Rabbis that their logic may be faulty. Lot’s daughters are also used as an example, and then dismissed.

Is this ripped from the headlines? Is this where Todd Atkin’s gets his horrific assertion that a woman cannot get pregnant from rape?

No. But it does show a long line of tradition of men making statements about how a woman’s body works and being wrong. It shows that just because a man has authority in one area, does not mean that he should talk about things in areas he does not know as much about.

Yevamot 33

Our daf discusses how we can have violation on top of violation. It it ends with a very strange scenario:

MISHNA: In the case of two men who betrothed two women, and at the time that they entered the wedding canopy, after the betrothal, the men switched this wife with that wife and that one with this one, then these two men are liable for engaging in forbidden sexual relations with a married woman, since each of them had intercourse with his fellow’s wife. The act of betrothal is sufficient to prohibit a woman to all other men as a married woman. Therefore, when the women were switched, both men transgressed this violation. And if they were brothers, then they are also liable for forbidden sexual relations with a brother’s wife. And if these women were sisters, then they are liable for taking a wife and her sister as well. And if they were menstruating women, they would be liable for intercourse with a menstruating woman as well.

And following these forbidden sexual relations, we separate these women from their husbands for three months, lest they were impregnated by that forbidden act of intercourse. And if they were female minors and unable to bear children, then we immediately return them to their original husbands. And if they were daughters of priests, they are thereby disqualified from eating of teruma. By engaging in illicit sexual acts, they were rendered forbidden to priests and disqualified from eating teruma.

The Gemara goes on to explain that this was clearly an accident, or the women would never be allowed to go back to their intended husbands. The gem comes in one line of explanation: The seduction of a minor girl is considered rape, and after rape a woman is permitted to return to an Israelite husband.

One, we have the grounds for statutory rape, that a minor girl cannot be accused of adultery because she cannot consent. Good! And also that after a woman is raped, she is allowed to go back to her husband. One can imagine how hard it would be for a woman to want to be intimate with anyone for a while after rape. But this is a gem because it recognizes, again, that without consent, it is rape – and also, that the rape act may use the same body parts as sex, but that it’s not the same. Rape is an act of power, it is violence and not an act of love.

When sex is consensual and loving, it can be a mitzvah, on Shabbat – a double. Shabbat Shalom.

Yevamot 32

Equal in Death?

Our daf asks what to do in scenarios where a woman is forbidden to marry her brother-in-law for more than one cause. The Gemara asks – what practical difference does it make? If she is forbidden, she is forbidden! This leads us to our little gem:

Rather, Rava said that when Rabbi Yosei stated in the baraita that the man is liable due to both prohibitions, for a brother’s wife and for a wife’s sister, he meant to say: I ascribe to him liability as though he transgressed twice, since indeed he violated two prohibitions, yet he is liable to receive punishment in human courts on only one count. And likewise, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: I ascribe to him liability as though he transgressed twice, yet he is liable to receive punishment on only one count. The Gemara asks: What difference does it make if we consider it as though he transgressed twice? The Gemara answers: It affects the decision whether or not to bury him among the completely wicked.

Huh. So, it appears as though there are different areas in a graveyard, one for the completely righteous, one for the completely wicked, and then different areas depending on how righteous or wicked a person was. And if you’re only a little wicked, you certainly don’t want to be buried with the completely wicked.

It reminds me of today and choosing a plot. How close to the street? To other taken plots? To the man made lake? To the huge family plot that is not your family plot?

According to Jewish tradition, we are all equal in death, but apparently that only applies to the plain pine box, the burial shroud – not where we are buried or how righteous we are considered.

Yevamot 31

So, there is a lot to ponder on today’s daf which has us picturing men throwing bills of divorce at their wives and then if they are truly divorced or not depends on if the bill of divorce lands closer to her (divorced) or him (not divorced). Apparently, these men can also throw an item for betrothal at his sister-in-law and have it not quite reach her and then we don’t know if they are in a state of ma’amar (basically engaged) or not. Again, they rely on witnesses to see who the item is closer to him (single) or her (engaged).

(As it does not qualify what he is throwing at her, I can’t help think of Doby in Harry Potter who is set free when his master accidentally gives him a sock. What is he throwing at her and what might she count as terms of engagement?)

Now, the Gemara wants us to ponder if there are two sets of witnesses, one who says the item landed closer to him, and one who says it landed closer to her. Within this debate where arguments are made on all sides, we get our gem, which has nothing to do with throwing bills of divorce or items of betrothal, but has to do with if one is making a decision with a sound mind.

This is just as it is in the case concerning the property of a man named Bar Shatya, who was referred to by this name because he would occasionally go insane. The case is as follows: Bar Shatya sold property. Two witnesses came forward and said that he sold it when he was healthy and therefore the sale was valid. And two others came forward and said that he sold it when he was insane, and so the sale was void. Rav Ashi said with regard to this matter: Place two witnesses against two witnesses and let the testimonies cancel each other out. As there is no valid testimony to rely on, let the land remain in the possession of Bar Shatya. Since no substantiated proof was brought forth, the land remains in the hands of its current possessor.

I love this text.

One, I love that we have concern for people making big decisions being in their right mind. Two, I love that Bar Shatya is being held by society in a way where he is still financially independent and able to make his own choices. I love how he is pictured as being surrounded by community members (hey, at least 4 people witnessed the purchase) and most of all, I love the recognition that someone who suffers from psychotic episodes is still a human being worthy of dignity and still has large swaths of time where they are completely capable of making decisions for themselves and others.

I don’t love that he is called “Shatya” – stupid. But hey, I will take this as a good daf and a good lesson in a sea of throwing items at women and questioning how that changes their status.

Yevamot 30

I have to admit something, and I may be the only rabbi to whom this is true. I can’t stand Woody Allen movies. Why? I can’t stand him.

Often, I can separate the person from the roll, but not so with him, who constantly puts himself with women who are inappropriate in his movies, either because they are too young or just way out of his league – just like in real life. (I also really hate how he creates and reinforces this horrible stereotype about jewish men as nebbishy and, frankly, repulsive.)

If you don’t know Woody Allen married his step daughter Soon-Yi Previn, and was accused of sexual abuse by adopted daughter Dylan Farrow. You can hear his side of the story with his daughter-in-law, but our daf has my back in being repulsed and saying what he did was wrong, even if there is some twisted world where you can pretend that she could somehow consent to be with him without coercion. As the daf teaches: She is forbidden to him forever, since she was forbidden to him at one time.

Yep, you can’t be both a father to a woman and then later her spouse.

Ugh. I need to shower.

Another gem? This page has a Mishna that the Sages find to be unnecessary – but they don’t cut it. I love it that they can admit it’s unnecessary and I love that they don’t cut it. It’s rare to see examples like this and it reminds us that, when writing, we should be careful with what we include – especially if it’s unnecessary.

Yevamot 29

Oops! I forgot to post. Well, the gem for daf 29 was just emphasizing that there are two steps to marriage – both on the daf, and in modern Jewish wedding ceremonies!

You may notice next time you attend a wedding, that the bride and groom drink twice under the Chuppah. One is for their engagement, the other for their marriage. Now, most couples have already been engaged for a year, but we still celebrate the engagement, connecting us to the past in terms of all that came before in the couples relationship and the past in terms of post traditions.

On our daf we see the ceremony of Ma’amar. Here, the couple is basically married, however the marriage has not been consummated. This is referring to a levarite marriage where the brother has agreed to marry the woman but they have yet to lay together as husband and wife. The daf wonders what we do if, while in this state of Maamar, the woman’s sister comes before him in levarite marriage – suddenly his fiance is forbidden to him! One sage says they must divorce, one says they perform halitza. I say – I am glad this is not what we do anymore.

The gem? Maamar pretty much means “spoken for.” And something really does change when a couple get engaged, something big, and something to celebrate.

Yevamot 28

Rabbi Yoḥanan was not concerned over death.

Well, that makes one rabbi on our daf.

The daf is playing with a scenario where there are 3 brothers, two of which are married to two sisters. The two married brothers die childless. Now, what do we do? The living brother cannot perform yibum with both sisters since you cannot marry two sisters.

The first tanna says they both perform halitza. Rabbi Shimon says they don’t need to even perform halitza.

Then we discuss if the brothers die in different orders, then we discuss if they die simultaneously!

Then we get our gem: Rabbi Yoḥanan was not concerned over death.

Is he really not concerned over death? No. But he is saying – stop with these ridiculous “what if” scenarios! Amen Yohanan.

But I do like this as a gem. What’s the point in worrying about death? It comes for us all. Once a year it’s a good thing to focus on, but year round, we live with hope for tomorrow and improve ourselves today.

Yevamot 27

Oy, another page of hypotheticals that only remind me of how short the life expectancy was for people during this time period. In the early middle ages, life expectancy was about 30 years old. I keep this in mind as we continue to read about scenarios where multiple brothers are dying before they have any children.

Again, today, we are reading about four brothers, two of which have married two sisters. The two brothers both die without leaving children for their wives. The questions becomes – what do the remaining brothers do? On the one hand, they both now have a levirate bond with the sisters which would obligate them to marry; on the other hand, each of the sisters had become a sister of someone who had also fallen to each brother for yibbum and is therefor forbidden to marry . . . how’s that for mental gymnastics?

It seems the rule is that they do halitzah (although there is some minor descent) so that neither is taken as a wife by the surviving brother(s). That is, unless her sister dies too:

Rav Huna said that Rav said: In a case of two sisters who became yevamot, i.e., the two sisters were married to two brothers who died, who happened before one yavam for levirate marriage, if he performed ḥalitza with the first sister, then she is permitted to marry any man. If he performed ḥalitza with the second sister, then she is permitted to do so as well.

If the first sister died before the yavam was able to perform ḥalitza with her, then he is permitted to take the second sister in levirate marriage, for even if he had actually been married to the first sister, one is permitted to marry the sister of his wife after his wife dies. And needless to say, if the second sister died, then he is permitted to take the first sister in levirate marriage because she would be considered a yevama who was permitted.

Ugh.

What’s my gem from all this? That we should be grateful to live today when life expectancy is 72-73 years old for a world average. We essentially have a second lifetime to life as compared to these brothers and sisters on the daf. We also have amazing technologies that help us to reproduce even when we are struggling with fertility. And we are blessed to live now, where a woman inherits and works and earns and does not need to rely on a man for her survival.

Yevamot 26

In the old HBO series, Sex in the City, Charlotte falls in love with her divorce attorney, Harry Goldenblatt, and wants to marry him. She has to undergo conversion to Judaism, a big enough feat as she approaches an orthodox rabbi who follows the tradition of pushing away a conversion candidate three times. Little did she (or the writers) know that, according to yesterday’s daf, she may not have been permitted to marry Harry precisely because he was her divorce attorney! Today’s daf gives us some exceptions to the rule, but not good enough to help Charlotte . . .

And for all of these who were involved in permitting the wife to remarry, i.e., the judge, the agent who brought a bill of divorce, and the one who testified for a woman that her husband died, if they had wives at the time of the ruling or the testimony and their wives died thereafter, then those women they had set free are permitted to be married to them. There is no concern that while their wives were still alive these individuals set their eyes upon another woman.

So, if Harry had been married (well, happily married), at the time that he served as her divorce attorney, then they could marry according to Jewish law. Otherwise, we might suspect that he had some “skin in the game” in the divorce procedures.

Why is this my gem? Well, I love to watch Hollywood stoop into intricacies of Jewish law and to find the ways Hollywood falls short. When Grey’s Anatomy had a Baalat Teshuvah (a Jewish woman who took on Orthodoxy) refuse a porcine valve because pigs are not kosher (we are not allowed to eat pig, but we can use a pig valve to save a life) and then had her be blessed a female rabbi (at the time, not something you would see in the Orthodox world) I made a whole lesson plan out of the episode.

This is an example of another show trying and missing the mark. Was it funny? Yes. Was it realistic? No. Besides the fact that Charlotte never dressed in the modest way that would have been expected and that Harry wasn’t Orthodox in the first place, we see that Harry wouldn’t have been permitted to marry her as her divorce attorney. But the only people who would know that are people like us who slug through this seldom studied part of the Talmud. So, mazal tov!

Yevamot 25

When do we believe rumors and when do we let them go?

The end of yesterday’s daf discussed the sticky situation of a woman whose husband divorced her because he suspected of adultery, marrying the man to whom she was suspected of having an affair! (They are not permitted to marry and if they do, they are forced to divorce.) But what if it’s only a rumor?

We begin today’s daf with these scandalous scenarios:

With regard to a case where a husband saw a peddler leaving the house, and when he entered he found his wife retying her smock [sinar], i.e., putting her clothes back on, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Since this is a distasteful matter because it looks as though she committed adultery with the peddler, she must be divorced by her husband. Or, if the husband entered after the peddler had left and found saliva above the netting of the bed, implying that someone had lain on the bed, evidence of the deed although no actual act was witnessed, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Since this is a distasteful matter, she must be divorced.

The same applies if the husband found the shoes reversed under the bed, so that the toe of the shoe faced the bed; this is a sign that a stranger came in and placed them like that. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Since this is a distasteful matter, she must be divorced. The Gemara questions this: Shoes turned around? Let him see whose they are!! Rather, the case was that he found the place of the shoes, i.e., shoe prints, reversed under the bed and cannot recognize whose shoe prints they are. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Since this is a distasteful matter, she must be divorced.

Wow girl.

The Gemara concludes: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, that they must divorce only if there were witnesses, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that they must divorce if there is a matter that is distasteful.

So, which is it? Do they divorce only when there are witnesses? Or do they divorce based on rumor?

The Gemara answers: This contradiction is not difficult. This one relates to a case where the rumor ceases and the woman is sent away only if there are witnesses, but that one relates to a case where the rumor does not cease, in which case he divorces her even if there are no witnesses. The Gemara elucidates the cases: In cases of a rumor that does not cease, even if there are no witnesses the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and he divorces her.

So, do you believe the rumors? It sounds like, if they don’t go away – there is something to suspect. If they do go away, then it depends on if there were witnesses – either to the act or the suspicious behavior.

It reminds me of Bridgerton. In this TV series, polite society suspects a woman who has been alone with a man of doing something untoward, and he therefore, either marries her, or her reputation is sullied. This was the way back then, for Jews and gentiles alike.

What does it teach us for now? Well, a rumor is no longer a roomer when there is an eye witness, for one. Also, maybe we shouldn’t pay attention to rumors unless something happens for it to deserve our consideration – like seeing. a man leaving your house and catching your wife getting dressed . . .

Design a site like this with WordPress.com
Get started