2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

The first time I ever talked to my husband about halitza (don’t worry, we’re still together) was when we were in a history museum and he called me over to ask what was up with this 1300+ year old sandal that was on display as being a Jewish artifact. This sandal was a shoe used by the courts for halitza. In all the talk about what qualifies and does not qualify as an acceptable shoe to use for this strange ceremony, it does lead one to think – why doesn’t the court just have shoes that qualify that you can check out? Like renting bowling shoes?

Today, our daf mentions the courts “shoes” that people borrowed just for the ceremony of halitza:

The sandal of an Elder made in accordance with his dignity (meaning the shoes he will be buried in, special shoes not meant for walking), the yevama may not perform ḥalitza using any of these shoes. And if she did perform ḥalitza, her ḥalitza is invalid even after the fact, as these are not halakhically considered shoes.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: What is different about the sandal of an Elder that is made in accordance with his dignity because it was not made for walking, as opposed to the court’s sandal which also was not made for walking?

Here we finally learn that “the court kept a sandal that met all the other necessary qualifications for a sandal for ḥalitza and gave it to the yavam to be worn during the ḥalitza procedure.” Therefore, they had a sandal that fit all these specifications. However, since this sandal was only meant for the ceremony, but not meant to be worn, the Gemara is asking how this sandal is different than the slippers that the Elder is buried in that fit but are not meant to be walked in.

He said to him: If a messenger of the court had walked in the ḥalitza shoe used by the court, would the judge reprimand him?

Here, we get a retort that the shoe used by the court could still be walked in, that it’s still a real shoe in every other aspect. So, although the court’s sandal was designed for the express purpose of ḥalitza, it may also be used for walking. However, the shoe designed for the dead Elder is forbidden for any other use and is not made for walking at all.

So, now, add to the list of things that Jews like to claim we gave to the world – renting shoes.

Today’s gem is this wonderful moment on the daf where, amidst a hypothetical conversation about how those with disability perform halitza (as it requires removal of shoes and a person might be an amputee or have a club foot and require a special shoe) – Rav Ashi stops the conversation and reminds the rabbis that they are talking about real people! In fact, he lists two men who they all value to shake these rabbis out of the hypothetical and to think for a moment about the real world implications.

And Ameimar also said about this issue: Someone who walks on the backs of his feet, meaning he is clubfooted and his foot is twisted upside down, cannot perform ḥalitza. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Leg supports can be used for ḥalitza. Does this not mean that this lame individual performs ḥalitza using these supports on his knees? This would indicate that even one with twisted feet can perform ḥalitza. The Gemara answers: No, the intention is that if he gave these supports to another whose foot is shaped normally and he wore them while performing ḥalitza, it is valid. That other one is allowed to perform ḥalitza while wearing these supports because they are also considered shoes, but one whose foot is misshapen may not perform ḥalitza with them, as it functions for him as a foot, not a shoe.

Rav Ashi said: According to what Ameimar said, bar Uva cannot perform ḥalitza and bar Kipof cannot perform ḥalitza, as these two, who were famous eulogizers in Rav Ashi’s generation, had feet that became so crooked that they were unable to walk normally.

I am a big fan of Rav Ashi in this moment. So often, the law makers make laws without those the law affects sitting at the table. There is a great motto in justice work, “Nothing about us without us.” Today’s daf reminds us that these brain exercises the rabbis undergo where they question “what if” have real world implications.

Today’s daf really focuses in on the shoe that should be used during halitzah. Halitzah requires that the woman remove the shoe of her brother-in-law as part of the ceremony. But what does the shoe need to look like? Can it be cloth or only leather? Hard sole or soft sole? Lace ups or something else? Asking – when is a shoe a shoe and when is it something else – is a bit on the nose as I was just in a theme park where you had to wear shoes on water rides and you could not go barefoot. Also, no socks by themselves, but yes to those water shoes that look like socks but have rubber bottoms. But that’s not my gem. My gem is an aside raised by a heretic trying to quote bible verses agaist he rabbis to show that God has left us:

A certain heretic said to Rabban Gamliel: You, the children of Israel, are a nation whose Master removed [ḥalatz] Himself from them, for God has left you in much the same way in which a yavam would perform ḥalitza with his yevama, as it is written: “With their flocks and with their herds they shall go to seek the Lord, but they shall not find Him. He has removed [ḥalatz] Himself from them [meihem]” (Hoshea 5:6). The heretic tried to use this verse as scriptural support that God has performed ḥalitza with the Jewish people.

He, Rabban Gamliel, said to him: Imbecile, does it say: He performed ḥalitza to them [lahem]? Rather, it says “ḥalatz from them [meihem],” meaning it is as if they, the Jewish people, performed ḥalitza on Him. But if a yevama had her shoe removed by her yevamin, does this have any significance? Here too, the meaning of the verse is that the nation of Israel abandoned God by removing themselves from Him, and this abandonment has no significance.

Interesting. Rabban Gamliel does not try and argue that there is no separation between God and the Jewish people, just that this heretic read the verse wrong. God never left us. God performing halitza on us would be like a man removing the woman’s shoe which has no significance.

We left God.

That’s the deep part. That’s the gem. Rabban Gamliel does not argue that we are so pious, that we love God so much and God loves us. No. He argues that we have abandoned God.

This implies that we need to turn back. That the relationship repair is up to us. that God never left us, we just need to turn.

May we do so.

The chapter ends today with the discussion surrounding rules around a son who was conceived and born in such a way that the mother is unsure who the father of this child may be. After going into details about how such a thing might happen, we get a list of ways in which both potential fathers serve as fathers (for example, if they are priests he goes up to the Temple during their priestly watch, if he dies, both fathers are acute mourners and visa versa …), and ways in which neither does (he does not inherit along with the other offspring…).

One thing I found amusing was the question of – what if he strikes one of these potential fathers? Is he liable for capital punishment (as one is liable for capital punishment for hitting one’s priestly father but not for just hitting an unrelated man)?

It is stated in the mishna that if both uncertain fathers were priests, the son is exempt from punishment for striking and for cursing them.

Sounds pretty cut and dry until:

The Sages taught: If he struck this uncertain father, and then struck that one, or if he cursed this one and then cursed that one, or if he cursed both of them simultaneously or struck both of them simultaneously, in all these cases he is liable to receive capital punishment, as one of them is certainly his father.

Clearly, if he hits both potential fathers, he has hit his father. But not all agree that one after the other counts . . .

Rabbi Yehuda says: Although if he struck or cursed both of them simultaneously he is liable, if he stuck or cursed them one after the other, he is exempt.

So, does Yehuda think it needs to be a simultaneous smack?

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: He is exempt even if he struck or cursed them simultaneously? The Gemara answers: These are the opinions of two tanna’im, and they each expressed their opinion in accordance with that of Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara goes into how two different opinions are derived from the words of the same guy. But the gem, for me, is the question way the daf is trying to make both men still a part of this child’s life. How he grows up seeing both fathers and learning from both of them. So, he doesn’t get to inherit, (unless the potential father has no other children to inherit). But in a world where both men could deny the child and not be part of raising the child, I do find it a gem that the Talmud teaches us that both need to be part of the child’s life and upbringing.

Ohhhh, the ladies first. Today we get a gem of a gem! Perhaps, just perhaps, a woman’s time is just as important as a mans (shocking thought). And, perhaps, women in the ancient world didn’t love hanging around in the boys club.

In a case where the poor man’s tithe is distributed to the poor from the owner’s house, the woman is given teruma first. What is the reason? She is given the tithe first because it is demeaning for a woman to have to wait in the company of men for a lengthy period of time.

Rava said: Initially, when a man and a woman would come for judgment before me, each for a different case, I would resolve the man’s quarrel first. I would say that since he is obligated in many positive mitzvot I should not waste his time by causing him to wait. However, since I heard this baraita, I resolve the woman’s quarrel first. What is the reason? I resolve her quarrel first because it is demeaning for her to be waiting in the company of men.

So, I love that this is posing the possibility that a woman’s time might be just as important as mens. However, I see that it’s in the guise of it being demeaning for women to be around men. I can imagine the ancient world and with the amount of harassment that goes on today – it likely was very demeaning. However, as a feminist, I know that if women are not allowed in the room with the men, then women miss out on the power and equality (imagine that).

So, I love a little ladies first, however, we are clearly far from a world where ladies first means what i hope it will one day soon – ladies reaching heights in proportion to our role in the population. So, 51% women as CEOs, Representatives, Senators, and Presidents. that’s a lot of catching up to do.

A few years ago, in my work for immigration justice, I met a family where each child had a different immigration status. One child was undocumented (having been too old when they came to be considered a dreamer), one was here as a Dreamer (these students must have entered the U.S. at age 15 or younger and must have been living in the U.S. for at least the five years before the act’s passage), one child was born here and was, therefor, a US citizen. The parents also had a different immigration status as they were here under TSP, Temporary Protected Status and one had a work visa and one did not. I couldn’t help but think of them when the daf gave us this strange hypothetical where it explains how it is possible for one couple to have 5 children with different legal status:

It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: A man and a woman can sometimes bear children of five nations, i.e., of five separate categories of lineage.

How so? If a Jew bought a slave and a maidservant from the market, and the slave and maidservant had two children at the time, and one of these children converted, it is found that one child is a convert and the other one is a gentile. If the master immersed the slave and maidservant for the sake of giving them the status of slaves, and they engaged in intercourse with each other and had a child, here there are three children in the family who are a convert, and a gentile, and a slave. If he freed the maidservant, which renders her a Jewess, and her husband the slave engaged in intercourse with her, and they had another child, here there are a convert, a gentile, a slave, and a mamzer. The offspring of a slave and a Jewess, according to Rabbi Meir, have the same status as a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship. If the master subsequently freed both the maidservant and the slave and married them to each other and they had another child, here there are a convert, a gentile, a slave, a mamzer, and a regular Jew.

Bazaar. . . for both then and now. While the family on the daf was hypothetical, the one I met was very real. When you think about them, you can begin to imagine how incredibly hard it would be to navigate the immigration system. This family probably knows more about the immigration system than many lawyers as they are navigating so many different statuses at one time.

Just as the hypothetical family on the daf would have different options for their children based on whether they were considered a slave, a convert, a gentile, a mamzer, or a Jew – we have thousands of family in the United States who have children with different legal designations.

Just as the daf reminds us of how the legal system is set up in a way that can create bazaar outcomes that put a toll on a family. We should take time to reflect on our laws that continue to do this with very real effects to families today.

Do you ever stop and think about, just how statistically unlikely it is that you would exist? How if anything in the lives or your biological parents (or any biological ancestor for that matter) had gone differently, you wouldn’t be here? Some other sperm would have fertilized an egg . . . and no you.

Our daf gives this little line of biology today: from the case of two identical twin brothers, who were one drop that was divided into two . . .

Here, the daf is imagining that the drop of semen split into two – and that’s how twins are made. We know better today. We know that, either two sperm fertilize two different eggs (fraternal twins) or that one egg is fertilized by one sperm and that zygote splits into to (identical twins). But when I first read this – I thought they nailed it as the word “sperm” isn’t mentioned in the text itself, only in commentary. And I was blown away at how out ancient rabbis would know something that happened on a molecular level.

Turns out they didn’t.

But, I am still impressed. And I really am grateful for this stroke of brilliance on a daf that is otherwise quite offensive.

Get your barf-bag ready for this one. Today’s daf contains many riddles to figure out how people are related . . . all involving incest.

Why? Well, the Mishnah teaches: MISHNA: One may marry a relative, e.g., the sister or the mother, of the woman he raped and of the woman he seduced. However, one who rapes and one who seduces a relative of the woman who is married to him is liable to receive capital punishment or karet for engaging in prohibited sexual intercourse, depending on the particular family relationship. A man may marry a woman raped by his father, or a woman seduced by his father, or a woman raped by his son, or a woman seduced by his son. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits marriage in the case of a woman raped by his father or a woman seduced by his father.

Yep. Guess whose not coming to Shabbat dinner in these homes! So, incredibly upsetting. So, let’s take it farther in our offense by listing “riddles” where we try and figure our how these families came to be the way they are:

A woman says: I have a half brother from my father and not from my mother, and my half brother is the husband of my mother, and I am the daughter of his wife. Rami bar Ḥama said: This state of affairs is not legitimate according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna, who holds that a man may not marry a woman with whom his father engaged in intercourse, even if they were not married. However, according to the Rabbis, a woman whose father was not married to her mother can legitimately have a paternal half brother who is married to her mother.

The Gemara cites another riddle about a bizarre family relationship. A woman says: He is my brother and he is my son; I am the sister of this one, whom I carry on my shoulders. What is the solution? You find it in the case of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with his daughter, and she bore him a son, who is therefore both her brother and her son. The Gemara is referring to a gentile because it does not wish to entertain the idea that a Jew would act in such a manner.

HOLD ON! They don’t want to imagine a Jew would behave in this manner when they just expressed that a man who raped a woman can marry her mother, or sister, or other relative . . . (you can read the remaining riddles or skip to the end)

The Gemara cites another riddle: Peace upon you, my son; I am the daughter of your sister. You find the solution in the case of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with the daughter of his daughter, who bore him a son. This son’s mother is related to him from her mother’s side as well, as she is his sister’s daughter.

The Gemara cites another riddle: This boy whom I carry is my son, and I am the daughter of his brother. You find the solution in the case of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with the daughter of his son, as their son is also her uncle.

The Gemara cites another riddle: Woe, woe [baya, baya] for my brother, who is my father, and who is my husband, and who is the son of my husband, and who is the husband of my mother, and I am the daughter of his wife; and he does not provide bread for his brothers, who are orphans, the sons of me, his daughter. You find the solution in the case of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with his mother, and she bore him a daughter. This daughter is both his sister and his daughter. And he engaged in intercourse with that daughter. And then the old man, his father, engaged in intercourse with her, and she bore him sons. This woman is therefore the wife of her father-brother, and he is also the son of her husband, the old man. Her father’s brothers, i.e., the sons she had with the old man, are his daughter’s sons.

The Gemara cites another riddle: You and I are siblings; your father and I are siblings; your mother and I are siblings. You find the solution in the case of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with his mother, and she bore him two daughters, and he then engaged in intercourse with one of them, and she bore him a son. And the sister of the son’s mother calls him and says this statement to him, as she is his sister from his father’s side and his father’s sister from their mother’s side, and she is his mother’s sister from both sides.

The Gemara cites another riddle: You and I are cousins; your father and I are cousins; your mother and I are cousins. You find the solution to this riddle in a permitted manner as well. For example, Reuven, who has two daughters, and his brother Shimon came and married one of them, and the son of Levi, the third brother, came and married the other one of them. And the son of Shimon says this statement to the grandson of Levi. They are cousins from their mothers’ sides, Shimon’s son and Levi’s son are cousins from their fathers’ sides, and Shimon’s son and the mother of Levi’s grandson are cousins from their fathers’ sides.

Why is this my gem? Well, there is the hypocrisy of saying that inbreeding only happens with gentiles while permitting rapists to marry their victims family members. I mena, who is judging who here?

But the real gem to me is the implication that, just because it’s technically not a sin for which a man would be excommunicated or stoned through capital punishment, for him to marry the relative of someone he seduced or raped – it doesn’t make it at all okay. I t leads to situations like the ones listed below. The fact that the rabbis couldn’t bear to say that these things happen in the Jewish community, shows that they also don’t want rape to happen in the Jewish community. (Or, let’s be honest, seduction.) We already know from Torah law that men are not permitted to rape women. But we also know that extramarital sex for “licentiousness” is not the same as biah, sex, with the intent of marriage (according to the rabbis). So, we get a disgusting little brain exercise where we see that, on paper, a man can marry the female relative of his rape victim. But what is it like? All this nasty forbidden sexual relationships that we are so repulsed by we pretend it doesn’t happen in Jewish families. Because, really, it shouldn’t happen in any family.

We have a great gem today! It reminds us of two values: giving proper attribution and controlling your anger.

Rabbi Elazar went and said this halakha in the study hall, but he did not state it in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The stage is set for the drama! Here, Elazar, Rabbi Yohanan’s student, gives a teaching of his rabbi without attributing it.

Rabbi Yoḥanan heard and became angry with him. And we might say rightfully so! He should be giving credit where it is due. But, the Sages worry about what will happen as a result of Yohanan’s anger, so they come to him and share a warning story:

Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi visited Rabbi Yoḥanan. They said to him: Wasn’t there an incident in the synagogue of Tiberias involving a bolt that secures a door in place and that has a thick knob [gelustera] at its end? The question was whether it may be moved on Shabbat as a vessel, or whether it is considered muktze as raw material. And it was stated that Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei argued over this case until they became so upset with each other that they tore a Torah scroll in their anger.

Wow! They were fighting so much over this door bolt that they tore a Torah scroll?! The Gemara gives us more details: Tore? Can it enter your mind that such great Sages would intentionally tear a Torah scroll? Rather, you must say that a Torah scroll was torn through their anger. In the heat of their debate they pulled the scroll from one side to another until it tore. And Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma, who was there at the time, said: I would be surprised if this synagogue does not become a place of idolatrous worship. (Because of the bad karma of a place where the Torah was torn in an act of anger.) And indeed this eventually occurred.

So, Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi cited this baraita to hint to Rabbi Yoḥanan how careful one must be to avoid anger. But, does it work? We read: Rabbi Yoḥanan grew even angrier, saying: You are even making us colleagues now? Those two Sages were peers, whereas Rabbi Elazar was just Yohanan’s student.

So, now he is even more upset. So, Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi gives his best at trying to placate Yohanan.

Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi visited Rabbi Yoḥanan and said to him: The verse states: “As God commanded His servant Moses, so did Moses command Joshua, and so did Joshua, he left nothing undone of all that the Lord commanded Moses” (Joshua 11:15). Now did Joshua, with regard to every matter that he said, say to the Jews: Thus Moses said to me? Rather, Joshua would sit and teach Torah without attributing his statements, and everyone would know that it was from the Torah of Moses. So too, your disciple Rabbi Elazar sits and teaches without attribution, and everyone knows that his teaching is from your instruction.

Hearing this, Rabbi Yoḥanan was appeased. Later, after calming down, he said to Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi: Why don’t you know how to appease me like our colleague ben Idi?

Love, love, love. What is he really upset about? People not knowing that these rulings are his rulings. The Gemara continues to explain that, after we die, if a teaching is attributed to us, it’s as though it gives us eternal life.

I love this as well.

Those who have left us still teach us all the time. Every time we remember a lesson. Every time we say something in their name. Every time a kindness they did for us, we do for someone else.

As Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: With regard to any Torah scholar in whose name a matter of halakha is said in this world, his lips mouth the words in the grave, as though he is talking.

When others teach our lessons, when they speak our words after we have died, it’s like we’re continuing to teach even from the grave.

Now that is gorgeous.

So . . . we are in the weeds of what to do when a man thinks his wife has died and married her relative. There is a lot of brain bending around a situation where a man’s wife and her sister’s husband are both reported to have died so the man marries his sister-in-law and what happens when they both are found to be alive and the hypocrisy of how his intercourse doesn’t have the same weight as the sister’s and how his wife can be returned to him but maybe the sister can’t go back to her husband . . .

But that’s not my gem. My gem is when the man, so bereft from his wife’s untimely death, goes and (wait for it) . . . sleeps with his mother-in-law.

Rabbi Yehuda rules that he shoudl be forbidden to both his wife and his mother-in-law. But Shmuel wins the ruling and says he can return to his wife. This leads to a funny scene.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara relates: A certain individual performed a transgression by having relations with his mother-in-law. Rav Yehuda had him brought for judgment and ordered that he be flogged. He said to him: If it were not for the fact that Shmuel said the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, I would render your wife forbidden to you permanently.

I can just picture him flogging this guy and yelling at him that his wife deserves better. What will Seder be like after him sleeping with his mother-in-law? The poor wife. And does she want him back?! Some things should never be okay . . . even when you think your spouse is dead.