2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

The Talmud continues to discuss cases where the rule “The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted” might be used. We have seen this rule of thumb as it’s used in terms of field ownership, a woman secluded with a man, when witnesses testify, and today we hear about how it is used when women are taken captive. Today’s gem is this scene:

The Gemara relates: There were these captive women who came to Neharde’a with their captors so that the local residents would redeem them. Shmuel’s father posted guards with them to ensure that they would not enter into seclusion with gentiles. Shmuel said to him: Until now who guarded them? If there is concern about their status, it should be with regard to the possibility that they engaged in intercourse while in captivity before they were brought to Neharde’a. He said to Shmuel: If they were your daughters, would you treat them with contempt to that extent? They are no longer captives and deserve to be treated like any Jewish woman of unflawed lineage.

LOVE!!!!! Thank you Shmuel’s father. Shmuel seems to only be concerned over the status of these women as virgins while his father wants to protect them from their captors whether they had previously been violated or not. His father seems to understand more clearly that each act of rape is an act of violence that needs to be prevented. These women need protection from their captors. Period. Shmuel doesn’t seem to get it. Well, you know how the Talmud works; he is about to learn the lesson:

The statement by the father of Shmuel was “Like an error that emerges from before the ruler” (Ecclesiastes 10:5), and it was realized.

The daughters of Master Shmuel were taken captive, and their captors took them up to Eretz Yisrael and sought to sell them or ransom them. Shmuel’s daughters left their captors standing outside, so that they would not come before the court, and the women entered the study hall of Rabbi Ḥanina. This daughter said: I was taken captive, and I am pure, and that daughter said: I was taken captive, and I am pure, and the court permitted them to marry into the priesthood.

Ultimately, their captors came and entered, and it was clear that they were the captors of Shmuel’s daughters. However, since the daughters made their claim first and the court permitted them to marry into the priesthood, this remained permitted to them. This is based on the halakha that if witnesses subsequently arrive, her initial permitted status need not be revoked. Rabbi Ḥanina said: It is clear from their actions that they are the daughters of great halakhic authorities, as they knew how to conduct themselves in order to retain their presumptive status of purity.

Shmuel does not understand why his father orders guards to protect these women from their captors . . . and then his girls get captured. And what do the girls do? They know the law and conduct themselves perfectly to be able to get the presumptive status as pure. This passage seems to teach that Shmuel’s own daughters are doomed by his lack of compassion. However, being the daughters of a preeminent rabbi, they know how to act when they are captured and then ransomed. Before their captors are heard, they each state that they were taken captive but remain pure. This creates a situation of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits.” The rabbis rule accordingly and pronounce these girls allowed to marry a priest.

This teaches us many things, but the one I want to uplift is that tendency we all have to think that those terrible things that befall other people could not happen to us. That tendency we have to think the worst of others and presume the best intent for ourselves. This section teaches us to be compassionate and empathetic. It teaches us that, whenever we rule, we should imagine ourselves or our loved ones in the situation at hand.

My best friend and I both worked throughout college and saved up money to be able to travel abroad. We lived off very little money, $20 a day, including a place to stay (luckily we had friends who were still in their semester abroad in a couple of the most expensive places). We were told to say two things to people: 1) that we were Canadian (and not American) and 2) that we were engaged or married, to stave off unwanted advances. I think we both even had rings.

On today’s daf, we learn that it’s okay for a woman to lie and say that she is spoken for, even when she isn’t, when she just wants men to leave her alone:

The Sages taught with regard to the woman who said: I am a married woman, and then said: I am unmarried, that she is deemed credible. The Gemara asks: But didn’t she render herself an entity of prohibition? When she said that she was married she rendered herself forbidden to all men. How then can she abrogate the prohibition? The Gemara answers that Rava bar Rav Huna said: It is referring to a case where she provided a rationale [amatla] for her initial statement and explained why she said that she was a married woman. That was also taught in a baraita with regard to the woman who said: I am a married woman, and then said: I am unmarried, that she is not deemed credible. And if she provided a rationale for her initial statement, she is deemed credible.

Why would she do such a thing? What kind of excuse could she give for her lie?

And there was also an incident involving an important woman who was outstanding in beauty, and many men were clamoring to betroth her. And she said to them: I am already betrothed. Sometime later she arose and betrothed herself to a man. The Sages said to her: What did you see that led you to do so? She said to them: Initially, when unscrupulous people approached me seeking to marry me, I said: I am betrothed. Now that scrupulous people approached me, I arose and betrothed myself to one of them. And the Gemara notes: This halakha was raised by Rav Aḥa Sar HaBira before the Sages in Usha, the seat of the Sanhedrin, and the Sages said: If she provided a rationale for her statement, she is deemed credible.

So, pretending that you’re taken is a practice woman have used since at least the times of the mishna to keep away unwanted men. I guess we have come far in woman’s lib, but not that far.

If you have learned one thing reading Talmud, it should be that no one is right all the time. We see countless arguments and debates. Each point becomes a part of our “oral law” and yet, we, with few exceptions, follow the majority. However, if there were to be one exception, you would think that it would be for Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi who organization and compiled Jewish Law in the Mishnah. Surely, the guy who wrote the book at the center of the Talmud would only state winning opinions and rulings, right?

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna that each of the two signatories need testify only about his own signature to ratify the document. The Gemara asks: That is obvious, as the principle is: In a dispute between an individual Sage and multiple Sages, the halakha is ruled in accordance with the opinion of multiple Sages. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that just as there is a principle: The halakha is ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in disputes with his colleague, there is also a principle that the halakha is ruled in accordance with his opinion even when he disagrees with his multiple colleagues; therefore, Rav Yehuda teaches us that Shmuel said that the principle applies only to disputes with an individual colleague.

What are we learning? When Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi is in dispute with another sage – the rule is that the law goes with him. He is special in that way. However, when Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi is in dispute with multiple sages the rule STILL follows the majority.

This reminds us that, in a democracy, even those who are “special” are still just people (and therefore not that special). The law applies to us all and if we want to be part of a community (in this case, the Jewish community) sometimes we might disagree, put our opinions and arguments out there, and then have to live according to the majority. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi was a brilliant genius who helped to save Judaism by transforming it. But he was not the Messiah and he was not a dictator. Even he can be overruled. So, maybe we shouldn’t be so hurt when we don’t get our way.

There are three very real moments on today’s daf, each that leave us with questions about the inner world of a person.

1. The first is a question about the mental state of a person when they make a decision: As when bar Shatya, a man who suffered from periodic bouts of insanity, sold his property, two witnesses came and said: He sold it when he was insane; and two other witnesses came and said: He sold it when he was sane. – Here, we are left wondering about his motives, his mental state, and the question of what is the right thing to do in this case? When do we advocate for competence and when do we protect by arguing that one is not in the mental place to make big decisions?
2. The second reminds me of police dramas where the police keep asking if the person remembers x, y, and z happening again and again. Are they really jogging the memory? Or are they creating. anew memory? But this happens with friends and family as well. We forget an event or experience until someone starts reminding us of details . . . so, what’s the line between helping someone remember and coersion into a lie? And if the witness is a Torah scholar, then even if the litigant himself jogged the witness’s memory, the witness may testify. A Torah scholar would not testify if he did not actually remember the testimony himself, as in that case involving Rav Ashi, who knew testimony relating to Rav Kahana. Rav Kahanasaid to Rav Ashi: Does the Master remember this testimony? Rav Ashi said to him: No. Rav Kahana said to him: Didn’t the incident transpire in such and such a manner? Rav Ashi said to him: I don’t know. Ultimately, Rav Ashi remembered the testimony and testified for Rav Kahana. He saw that Rav Kahana was hesitant [meḥassem] with regard to accepting his testimony, concerned that he had influenced the content of Rav Ashi’s testimony. Rav Ashi said to him: Do you think that I am relying on you? I made an effort, and I remembered the incident.
3. The third in a sad scene. The Talmud is discussing how a mound of dirt outside of a city is likely impure because there may be a corpse in it. So, the question arises: Why would anyone bury a corpse in a mound adjacent to the city? Rabbi Ḥanina said: The mounds could be impure, since women bury their stillborn babies adjacent to the city, as there is no funeral in that case, and because those afflicted with boils bury their arms that withered and fell from their bodies. Until a distance of fifty cubits from the city, the woman goes alone and buries the stillborn in a mound. More than that distance, she takes a person with her, as she fears going alone, and she goes to the cemetery. Wow, what a heartbreaking scene to imagine. A woman walking alone to bury the remains of a miscarried fetus. No cemetery. No funeral.

Each of these scenes invites us to imagine what is happening inside of the heads of the subjects of the daf. Each is a brief scene where we see both relationship and loneliness. Each is a scene where it’s a struggle to see what exactly is the right thing for others to do. Each is a plot to an episode of a drama or a chapter in a book. Each is something that we deal with all the time – questioning the independence of loved ones who are not as sharp as they once were; forgetting things and the gift of friends to help us remember; and the sadness of miscarriage and the continued taboo around discussing reproductive issues.

When leaving our year in Israel to return to the states, one of my colleagues wrote me a check for over a million dollars and pre-dated it to 2030. At the time, it seemed far away. But, I kept it and put it with my few things at my parent’s house. My plan was to mail it back to him on the date and ask for him to follow through (obviously as a joke). Now, I could send a picture.

I know that he no longer uses that bank and that the whole thing was a joke. But today’s daf made me realize that, perhaps just having that check lying around is dangerous. What if my dad finds the check and tries to cash it? Or someone else?

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: It is prohibited for a person to keep a repaid document within his house, due to the fact that the verse states: “And let not injustice dwell in your tents” (Job 11:14). Even if he does not use the document to collect payment, the concern is that it might fall into the hands of one who will use it illegally to collect payment.

The Gemara is teaching that a creditor should not hold on to a paid debt document, because such a document might be used to collect a second time. While it’s highly unlikely that someone would try to collect using the document, especially if the owner/creditor does not intend to use the document in such a way, we are still taught that there is value for a person should do all she can to distance herself from such a possibility.

So, that check could cause some trouble for my friend . . . so even though I do not intend to “collect” payment, maybe I should get rid of it.

But, the real gem of this rule, I think, comes a few verses later:

On a similar note it is stated, with regard to keeping items with potential to lead to transgression: With regard to a Torah scroll that is not proofread and therefore contains errors, Rabbi Ami says: It is permitted to keep it without emending the mistakes for up to thirty days, and from that time onward it is prohibited to keep it, as it is stated: “And let not injustice dwell in your tents” (Job 11:14)

Now, remember that all Torah scrolls were written by hand and copied by hand. Torah scrolls were (and are) expensive and rare. Having a scroll that is incorrect could lead to a problem where people think that the errors on the scroll are correct (it being the world of God and all) and either learn and teach incorrectly, or even copy and spread this incorrect version.

This fear, of incorrect information spreading, is so pertinent to our lives today. Misinformation spreads so quickly. We may not think that saying something that is untrue or a misrepresentation of the truth is a big deal – but more than ever before, that untruth can spread like wildfire.

The gem of today’s daf is clearly to rid your home and lives of lies and misrepresentations. They cause damage even when that is not our intention.

We have had a few interesting comments on the past few dapim (pages) where we are told to believe someone’s claim when that claim is somehow not as positive as it would be if they were making it up. For example, this first came up when that woman was seen “talking” to a man. She admits that she had intercourse with him but says his name and that he is a priest. So, we believe her, because she could have said she didn’t have sex with him and that would have been even better for her than saying the guy was a priest.

Yesterday, we began to read about a man who – unprovoked – makes a claim that he bought land from another man’s deceased father. Here, again, we believe him as he could have not said that he bought it from the guys dad, as the guy had not asked him and everyone just assumed that the land had always belonged to the person currently in possession of it.

This is a rule called: the case of the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted. It’s called a “migdo” when the person could have kept his mouth shut and no one would have known any better.

Today, there is a question about what to do when one claims that they took out a loan and paid half of it back. Is it a migdo? Do we believe them because they could have denied the loan? Or said they borrowed less?

In this case the Gemara says we require an oath:

Your father has one hundred dinars in my possession, but I provided him with repayment of half that amount, he is required to take an oath that he repaid half, and that is the case of one who takes an oath on the basis of his own claim.

Why?

Here, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the statement of Rabba, as Rabba said: Why did the Torah say that one who makes a partial admission in response to the claim is required to take an oath? It is because there is a presumption that a person would not be so insolent in the presence of his creditor as to deny his debt. Presumably, this borrower who made a partial admission would have liked to deny the entire loan, and the fact that he did not deny the entire loan is due to the fact that a person would not be so insolent in the presence of his creditor. And, as a result, he would have liked to admit to him that he owes him the entire loan. And the reason that he did not admit to him that he owes him the entire loan is so that he may temporarily avoid paying him. And he rationalizes doing so, saying to himself: I am avoiding him only until the time that I have money, and then I will repay him. Due to the concern that the partial admission is motivated by that rationalization and the claim of the lender is true, the Merciful One says: Impose an oath upon him so that he will admit that he owes him the entire loan.

So, basically, they are saying that this person doesn’t feel like they can just deny, deny, deny in front of the person they borrowed money from. But, if they admit they took out a loan, they might be tempted to “fudge” the amount in order to get a “migdo” ruling and end up paying less. So, you make him take an oath.

What strikes me is the psychology behind trying to understand when people are telling the truth or lying. Just because someone could have told a better lie – doesn’t mean that what they say is the truth.

We still struggle today to read between the lines and struggle to trust.

“All brides are beautiful on their wedding day.” This famous line is a paraphrase of what Bet Hillel teaches on our daf today.

The Sages taught: How does one dance before the bride, i.e., what does one recite while dancing at her wedding? Beit Shammai say: One recites praise of the bride as she is, emphasizing her good qualities. And Beit Hillel say: One recites: A fair and attractive bride. Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: In a case where the bride was lame or blind, does one say with regard to her: A fair and attractive bride? But the Torah states: “Keep you from a false matter” (Exodus 23:7). Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: According to your statement, with regard to one who acquired an inferior acquisition from the market, should another praise it and enhance its value in his eyes or condemn it and diminish its value in his eyes? You must say that he should praise it and enhance its value in his eyes and refrain from causing him anguish. From here the Sages said: A person’s disposition should always be empathetic with mankind, and treat everyone courteously. In this case too, once the groom has married his bride, one praises her as being fair and attractive.

This is one of the famous debates between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel—should one be honest with a bride about her appearance or should every bride be called beautiful?

When you read the passage – you can see how awkward the Bet Shammai approach would be. Imagine, following the tradition, you are dancing in front of the bride. Everyone is taking turns in the circle around her to say things to her. One runs in and says she has never looked more magnificent. Another runs in and says how happy she appears. Then the rabbi runs in and says – I hear you are good at getting out stains. . . While that might be true – it is not what a bride wants to hear at their wedding.

Bet Hillel rules that whether a bride is conventionally beautiful or not you tel her she looks great! Why? Because of the greater value of always trying to make others feel good What good can come from telling a bride that she is not beautiful?

I can’t help but read this and also think that when you are telling a bride she is beautiful, you are actually always telling the truth. Brides try to look their best on the wedding days. So, they do look beautiful – for them. Also, what is attractive to one person is not necessarily what is attractive to another (thank God). That’s why, while I am repulsed on the one hand by Hillel’s comparison of the bride to a purchase in the marketplace, I agree with it on the other. We have different taste in many areas. Some like abstract art and others like still lifes. Some prefer antiques while others modern lines. In addition, personality makes someone more beautiful in the eyes of the beholder. Most of all, love makes someone beautiful.

Is she beautiful. Yes. Yes she is.

I think every couple, or at least every woman, has had a moment in a relationship where they wish their entire lives were recorded so that she could prove to her partner that her recollection is correct and theirs is wrong. Literally two days ago my husband accused me of saying something he had said to me three sentences before. We weren’t fighting but I still wondered if I could ask Alexa to repeat our conversation (electronics are always listening). So, I can only imagine how the couple on today’s daf must feel when both are “certain” of their positions and they don’t even like each other anymore as they are standing before a court trying to divorce.

We read in the Mishna on the bottom of 15: MISHNA: With regard to a woman who was widowed or divorced, and is now claiming payment of her marriage contract that is not before the court, and she says: You married me as a virgin, who is entitled to two hundred dinars, and he says: No; rather, I married you as a widow, who is entitled to one hundred dinars, then, if there are witnesses that she went out of her father’s house to her wedding with a hinnuma or with her hair uncovered, in a manner typical of virgins, payment of her marriage contract is two hundred dinars. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Even testimony that there was distribution of roasted grain, which was customary at weddings of virgins, constitutes proof that she is a virgin.

What’s happening? In this mishnah the husband and wife come before the court at the time of their divorce. The woman claims that she was a virgin when her husband married her, while he claims that she was a widow. They both remember it differently!

And, not only is their life not recorded – this is not a time of wedding photos or videos! There is little to no proof for either of their claims (but, since she will profit financially, the burden falls to the woman). So, what does she have to do? Bring evidence, meaning witnesses, that her wedding was a virgin’s wedding. What is a virgins wedding?
There are three pieces of evidence described in our mishnah.

1. “Hinuma” which is either a special song sung to virgins or a special veil worn by virgins.
2. Her hair was worn loose (so no up-do’s).
3. Parched corn was served! (As a Hoosier, I am digging this tradition I had never heard of.)

In the last chapter, Gamliel always believed the woman. The Gemara wonders why he needs proof here to substantiate her claim. The Gemara answers:

The Gemara answers: Even if you will say that the ruling in the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, Rabban Gamliel stated his opinion only there, in a case where the claim of the bride is certain and the claim of the groom is uncertain, as the groom does not know what actually happened. However, here, in a case where the claim of the bride is certain and the claim of the groom is also certain, as he is certain that he married her as a widow, Rabban Gamliel did not say that her claim is deemed credible.

So, we are given three types of proof that the woman could bring to support her claim. The Gemara gives even more evidence that she could bring witnesses to attest to. Her ketubah if it was written out, or:

In a case where a woman lost her marriage contract or concealed her marriage contract and she claims that she is unable to find it; or her marriage contract was burned, and there is no proof with regard to the sum to which she is entitled; or practices performed exclusively at the weddings of virgins were performed at her wedding, e.g., people danced before her, or played before her, or passed before her a cup of good tidings or a cloth of virginity; if she has witnesses with regard to any one of these practices, her marriage contract is two hundred dinars.

While we still don’t quite live in a time where we can prove our partners to be wrong when we have private conversations or moments – the Talmud is dealing with a wedding, which was (and typically is) a public affair. While they did not have videos or photos or live streams to refer to – they did have friends and family and neighbors at the chuppah baring witness to their marriage. And I bet that whoever those witnesses validate with their testimony feel SO GOOD, at least for a few minutes, to be proven that what they were so certain of, was right all along.

You deserve a hearty mazal tov! Congratulations! Today’s daf marks the end of the first chapter of Ketubot. And guess what? This is one of the most well-learned chapters in the entire Talmud. Why? Ketubot is called the “Shas Katan”—the little Talmud—by the rishonim because it contains such a broad spectrum of topics including so many principles that are necessary and useful in understanding the rest of the Talmud.

That today’s daf was primarily a debate about if we can assume that a woman’s rapist was a Jew (and therefore she could still marry a priest ) if it’s a market day (now we need to know if the majority of townspeople are Jews, and if the majority of those itinerant marketers are Jews) is made all the more shockingly disturbing when you realize that this is, perhaps, the most well-read chapter in the Talmud. But, this daf alone does show how such a broad variety of topics can be brought to bare by one question. . .

In the discussion of the victims status, we get tangents that cover such broad topics as the status of any child that may have resulted from the rape; what to do if you don’t know if you touched the corpse of a frog or a lizard; how to determine if an abandoned piece of meat is kosher; if meat is kosher if you can’t remember where you bought it from; how one is obligated to take care of a found infant and how to determine if that infant is considered “Jewish” or not; if one is guilty of murder if they plan to murder one person and accidentally kill someone else; and if one is guilty of murder if they indiscriminately throw a rock into a crowd of people and someone dies.

Pretty impressive that so many topics can make it into just one page – let alone one chapter. “Little Talmud” seems to be an apt name.

We are told that as this trial, Thomas More (1478–1535) was silent when asked if he acknowledged the king’s supremacy over the Church. When asked why, he is alleged to have said, “qui tacet consentire videtur [he who is silent seems to consent].” Silence is consent; its admitting guilt.

On the other hand, we have the line from William Shakespeare’s Hamlet “The lady doth protest too much, methinks.” Disagreeing vehemently means you’re probably guilty.

So, if you say nothing – you did it. If you say too much – you did it. It’s a lose-lose. Or so it seems on today’s daf when a man responds, or stays silent, when being accused of being a mamzer (a child of a forbidden sexual union).

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The case of one who when called mamzer screams and protests that he is being slandered, and when called ḥalal is silent, is the subject of the dispute between the tanna’im in the baraita. The first tanna holds: Anyone who when others call him unfit and he is silent, is unfit, as his silence confirms the allegation. . .

If you heard that Rabbi Meir deems her marriage to a priest fit, in a case of silence in response to allegations, it is not in a case where they called him ḥalal and he is silent; rather, it is in a case where they call him mamzer and he is silent. In that case, the reason he is silent is that he holds: The fact that one is a mamzer generates publicity, and since he is not reputed to be a mamzer, he is indifferent to the allegation. However, in a case where he is called mamzer and he screams in protest, or where he is called ḥalal and he is silent, he is unfit. And the fact that he is silent and does not protest is because he holds: It is sufficient for him that they do not expel him from the congregation of Israel.

So, here we see two conflicting baraitas. One says that if someone is called a mamzer and is silent, he is deemed not to be a mamzer. Why? He is silent because he figures the truth will come out. However, if he is silent when called a halal, he is unfit. Here, they believe he is only silent because he figures if he opens his mouth, he would only make matters worse.
The other baraita teaches the opposite! If he is silent on being called a halal, he is still fit. Why? He is silent because the consequences are not so bad, so he figures why bother responding. But if he is called a mamzer and is silent, he is giving tacit agreement and we can assume that he really is a mamzer.

So – he is damned if he does and damned if he doesn’t.

The moral? Don’t accuse people willy-nilly. And don’t assume you know why someone is reacting the way they do.