2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

In the 1987 movie, Disorderlies, Winslow Lowry tries to scheme his way into getting his uncle’s millions. Winslow is a gambler and generally horrible person. He is over drugging his uncle Albert and trying to speed up his death. Winslow hires three of the most inept orderlies he can possibly find (The Fat Boys!). The orderlies do mess up, they forget to give Albert his medicine and suddenly Albert is feeling better – they take him around town and help him to love life – and eventually discover what Winslow is trying to do and put a stop to it.

Disorderlies is not on anyone’s list of great movies to watch. But, today’s daf had me thinking of this old comedy as the daf questions what to do when gifts are made on someone’s death bed.

Having established that Rabbi Natan follows the principle of assessment, the Gemara asks: And does Rav not follow this principle of assessing intention? But it was stated that Rav and Shmuel disagreed about a specific case with regard to the gift of a person on his deathbed, in which it was also written that the gift was given with an act of acquisition. There is a rabbinic ordinance that one on his deathbed can effect the transfer of property without the ordinarily required act of acquisition, but in this case such an act was performed anyway. In the school of Rav, they say in the name of Rav: He had him ride on two horses, meaning that he gave him a gift with a document strengthened in two different ways. And Shmuel said: I do not know what to decide about it.

So, here we are dealing with a dying man who wants to give a gift to someone. Apparently, a dying man can gift property just through saying it. So, if on his deathbed he says, I want it all to go to Rachel, then I inherit (how lovely!).

Now, in the modern world, we would prefer for the wishes to be written down, signed, and notarized. But, since you don’t NEED to do that according to halakhah, Rav and Shmuel don’t agree on what to do if he signs the unnecessary papers.
According to Rav, the gift is as if it is riding on two horses – meaning doubly strong. On the one horse, it is written down like a gift from a perfectly healthy man. Therefore, if the dying man recovers – he cannot take back the gift. On the second horse, a healthy person cannot normally transfer debt in this manner but because he is on his death bed he can.

So, Rav reads both of these things as strengthening the argument that the transfer is valid, while Shmuel thinks that the certificate contradicts itself and is therefore invalid. According to daf shevuiy, “A document written by a dying man transfers property only after death, but when he wrote the kinyan in the document, he also gave the impression that the document is what affects the transfer, not his words. Since documents cannot begin their effectiveness after a person’s death, this document contradicts itself and is invalid.”

The lesson? Make a will. Make it now, while you’re healthy (and studying Talmud). Make it clear what you want and don’t wait until the deathbed. And – make sure that your loved ones are surrounded by people who love them and will not take advantage of them in their last days.

And? 1987 was a good year.

In the book, How to Talk to Strangers, Malcom Gladwell discusses (among many things) that a judge is vastly less accurate than a computer algorithm at predicting if a perpetrator will have a reoffence. Yet, the judge believes that they can tell things about a person just by looking at them. Gladwell goes on to show how we are able to predict if someone if being truthful or not, only when they behave in exactly the way we think a person should behave – and yet most of us don’t automatically behave how other “think” we should, we just react in our own anachronistic ways.

On today’s daf, there is a court scene. A man has died and his sons are arguing that their father’s wife should get less than think she thinks she is entitled to in terms of support. (The less she gets, the more they do).

It was stated that the amora’im also argued about the halakha of a widow. Rav said: When she receives the payment of her marriage contract, the court appraises the clothes that are upon her and deducts their value from the payment she receives. And Shmuel said that the court does not appraise the clothes that are upon her.

Okay, here is what we need to know to understand the following scene – Rav claims that his the clothes a woman is wearing is not taken into account when calculating her portion, whereas Shmuel believes that they are.

The Gemara relates: The daughter-in-law of the house of the son of Elyashiv was claiming payment of her marriage contract from the orphans, and she was in the process of bringing them to the court. The orphans said to her: It is demeaning for us that you should go dressed in this manner, in house clothes. We would rather you come in more suitable attire. She went and dressed and covered herself with all of her clothes. They came before Ravina, who said to them: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who said that with regard to a widow, the court appraises the clothes that are upon her. Therefore, the court takes everything she is wearing into account in the calculation of her marriage contract payment.

They tricked her! She is shabbily dressed and they tell her she has to look good for court. So, she puts on all she owns! Now, she is standing in front of the judge looking as though she has lots of material goods! The judge deducts the price of everything she is wearing from the total that she would have otherwise been entitled too. Ah! Poor woman.

Looks can be deceiving, that’s why it’s important to have evidence. Now we see why, in Rav’s opinion: An orphan and a widow, disrobe and remove them. Meaning, that all should appear in plain clothes in court so that the judge does not rule based on their clothing.

Solicitations are so uncomfortable. Asking people for money is incredibly important, especially in a non-for-profit, but that doesn’t make it any less awkward. The first campaign that I was part of to raise money for the synagogue, was our endowment campaign. Not only did we learn to ask for money, but we were strategic on who would ask for the money and who would also be in the room. Usually, a clergy member would ask for the money, while a peer was in the room who could share that they were also giving. The beloved clergy person along with the peer would, hopefully, elicit more participation and at a higher level.

On the bottom of 52b and the top of 53a, we see Rav Papa is going to have a ketubah written out for his son. He will be negotiating with Abba of Sura. And, apparently, he wants Yehuda bar Meimar to go with him perhaps knowing this will mean he will get a larger dowry.

The Gemara relates: Rav Pappa, having arranged for his son to marry into the family of Abba of Sura, went to supervise the writing of the bride’s marriage contract. Yehuda bar Mareimar heard that Rav Pappa was coming, and came out to present himself before him, in honor of his arrival. When they came to the entrance of Abba of Sura’s house, Yehuda bar Mareimar took his leave of him, as he did not wish to enter. Rav Pappa said to him: Let the Master enter inside with me.

53a

Rav Pappa saw that Yehuda bar Mareimar was not amenable to the idea of entering the house. He said to him: What is on your mind? Do you not wish to enter due to that which Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Shinnana, do not be a partner in the transfer of an inheritance even from a bad son to a good son, as it is not known what seed will come from him? Perhaps the bad son will father worthy children. And all the more so, one should not be a partner in the transfer of an inheritance from a son to a daughter.

Rav Pappa continued: Are you worried that your arrival will pressure Abba of Sura to give his daughter a more substantial dowry? But this too is an ordinance of the Sages, that a father must provide a dowry for his daughter. This is as Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, as quoted above, that the Sages enacted this matter so that a man should take the initiative and write an agreement to give his daughter a dowry as large as the portion of his possessions that his son will receive as an inheritance. Yehuda bar Mareimar said to him: This applies only if the man gives of his own free will, but should one force him as well? Rav Pappa said to him: Did I say to you that you should enter and force him? I merely said that you should enter, but do not force him. He said to him: My very entrance is an act that will effectively force him, as he will increase her dowry in my honor.

So, we clearly see that Yehuda bar Mareimar does not want to go and does not want to be used to extract more money from Abba of Sura.

Eventually, Rav Pappa forced Yehuda bar Mareimar and he entered. He was silent, and sat without uttering a word.

So, he goes and says nothing. But what happens?

Abba of Sura thought that Yehuda bar Mareimar was angry with him for his failure to grant his daughter a suitable dowry. He therefore wrote down in the marriage contract all that he had as her dowry, to appease him.

Oh no! What Yehuda was scared would happen happened!

Ultimately, when he observed that Yehuda was still silent, Abba of Sura said to him: Even now the Master will not talk? By the Master’s life, I have left nothing for myself.

Yehuda bar Mareimar said to him: If you are acting for my sake, that which you wrote is also not amenable to me. Finally understanding his wishes, Abba of Sura said to Yehuda bar Mareimar: Now too, I will retract, as I acted in error. Yehuda bar Mareimar said to him: I did not speak so that you should turn yourself into the kind of person who retracts once he gives his word. You should uphold your agreement, but the agreement was not to my liking.

Poor (literally) Abba of Sura. All he wants to do is please Yehuda bar Mareimar and he ends up giving away all he has. What a mess!

The message? When we solicit, we should make sure that people are not punching above their pay grade to try and impress the people they are with. And (most importantly) if you are brining someone’s rabbi with you to solicit them – make sure the rabbi is not silent, and that they let them know that they are appreciated no matter how they chose to participate (or not).

The United States has a long-standing policy of not offering ransoms or making concessions to kidnappers. We read that one of the obligations a man has towards his wife, according to Jewish law, is to pay her ransom if she is taken captive. But today, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel on the daf tells us that there is an upper limit to paying ransom money and he believes that:

One does not redeem captives at more than their value. This policy is for the betterment of the world (מִפְּנֵי תִּקּוּן הָעוֹלָם).

What’s happening here?

In the world of the Talmud, it seems that being taken captive was quite common, hence it being standard that a man is required to redeem his wife. But, what if they ask too much? What if she is taken multiple times? What if they were in the process of divorcing? All these issues are discussed. But we may wonder – what does not paying more than the standard fee for a captured wife have to do with tikkun olam? With the betterment of the world?

According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, captives may never be redeemed for more than their value. While another commentator says he can pay 10x the normal rate, but only once, here we get the idea that, doing so, even once, would incentivize the captor or other captors to take more captives.

It seems to be similar to the reasoning the US government uses. If we pay a ransom, then the captors know we are open for business! They know how to exhort money from the government/individual. And, the kidnappers may take more and more “high stakes” individuals to try and extort even more money.

Is this the right approach? Like most Talmudic debates – the question continues to be debated. While the standard makes logical sense, and may in fact be a successful preventative – when it’s your family member that’s been taken this rule is heartless and cruel.

Today’s daf gets us into some very big topics, once again, that are still relavent and pressing today. The daf insists that rape is rape while bringing in the question of: What does consent look like?

Shmuel’s father said: The wife of an Israelite who was raped is forbidden to her husband, as we are concerned that perhaps her ordeal started as rape and ended willingly, i.e., during the act she may have acquiesced, and a married woman who willingly had relations with another man is forbidden to her husband.

I know. Try not to vomit. The beauty of this section is not what Shmuel’s father says, but the reaction to it.

Rav raised an objection to the opinion of Shmuel’s father from the mishna, which states that one of the stipulations of the marriage contract reads: If you are taken captive I will redeem you and restore you to me as a wife. This indicates that despite the possibility that she might have been raped during captivity, she remains permitted to her husband if he is not a priest, and there is no concern that she might have ultimately agreed to the act. Shmuel’s father was silent and did not respond.

Rav recited the following verse about Shmuel’s father: “The princes refrained from talking and laid a hand upon their mouths” (Job 29:9).

Rav cites the required ketubah clause of the mishnah as a refutation against Shmuel’s father (even if it’s not written, it is still enforceable by the courts because being required to redeem your wife is standard). The rule says that even if we are worried that she might have been raped as a captive, she is allowed to stay married to her husband.

What’s Shmuel’s father’s response? Silence. Rav then cites a verse that basically is insulting his intelligence.

According to the daf shavui commentary:
Interestingly, Shmuel’s father could have responded that the law was more lenient with a captive woman. After all, the captive woman may not have been raped, and we know from the second chapter, that there were various leniencies in this matter. This would differ from a normal case where we know a woman was raped. In my opinion, the Talmud is in fact, making Shmuel’s father look foolish to purposely discredit his view. The Talmud believes that this halakhah, that a raped woman may not return to her Israelite husband, is clearly wrong.

But, what if she doesn’t scream the entire encounter? What if she stops fighting? (Like I said, rape is still rape, as we will see with Rav’s refutation.)

The Gemara comments: And Shmuel’s father disagrees with the opinion of Rava. As Rava said: With regard to any case that starts as rape and ends willingly, even if she ultimately says: Leave him, and she further states that if he had not forcibly initiated intercourse with her, she would have hired him for intercourse, she is nevertheless permitted to her husband. What is the reason for this? The evil inclination took hold of her during the act, and therefore she is still considered to have engaged in intercourse against her will.

So, here, Rav is saying – rape is rape! Even in a twisted world where she tries to defend the rapist after the fact – he raped her. Period. It does not matter if she appeared to like it. Rape is rape.

But is there ever a situation where she wouldn’t be able to return to her husband (beside the priest’s wife)?

Rav Yehuda said: Those women stolen by kidnappers are permitted to their husbands, as, even if they had intercourse with their captors it is considered rape. The Rabbis said to Rav Yehuda: But while they are captives they bring their kidnappers bread. This indicates that they are not acting under duress. He replied: They do so due to fear. The Rabbis further inquired: But they send them arrows. Rav Yehuda again replied: This too is due to fear. However, I certainly agree that if the kidnappers leave them alone, and they go back to them of their own accord, they are forbidden to their husbands, as it is clear that they are no longer acting out of fear.

The rabbis clearly believe that rape is rape. We cannot judge victims based on their behavior – they are acting out of a survival instinct. The only way we can say that it wasn’t rape – is if she is actively choosing to run away with him when she is perfectly safe and has no fear of not doing so.

Really proud to see Rava and the rabbis stand up in defense of women.

The work “middah” that we often translate as positive character trait really means measurement. We think of honesty as something we always need to be more of, but we can be too honest and say things that only hurt and do not help or give our opinion where it does not belong. Generosity is, likewise, a middah where we usually need to give more. However, on today’s daf, we learn that there is an upper limit to giving.

Rabbi Ile’a said: In Usha the Sages instituted that one who dispenses his money to charity should not dispense more than one-fifth. That opinion is also taught in a baraita: One who scatters should not scatter more than one-fifth, lest he render himself destitute and need the help of other people. And an incident occurred involving a certain individual who sought to dispense more than one-fifth of his property as charity, and his friend did not let him act upon his wishes. And who was this friend? Rabbi Yeshevav. And some say that Rabbi Yeshevav was the one who wanted to give too much charity, and his friend did not let him do so, and who was the friend? Rabbi Akiva.

Rav Naḥman said, and some say it was Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov who said: What is the verse that alludes to this maximum amount of charity? “And of all that You shall give me, I will surely give a tenth of it [aser a’asrenu] to You” (Genesis 28:22). The double use of the verb that means to donate one-tenth indicates that Jacob, who issued this statement, was actually referring to two-tenths, i.e., one-fifth.

So, 1/5th or 20% is the upper limit on tithing. What’s the lower? 10%. Mind you, the fear is that we will give so much away that we ourselves will be forced to borrow or beg. Our daf does not imagine the kind of wealth that some have today.

Rick Warren, the mega-church, author, preacher, pastor does what we calls “reverse tithing.” Warren gives away 80% and keeps 20%. Of course, he is a God-fearing man who understands that what comes his way does not belong to him, it belongs to God. Most of us don’t see our income that way. But what if we did? Could you imagine how much good would be done in the world if that top 3% did the same?

We are far from that reality. And far from the reality of giving the minimum 10%. But let’s keep reaching for that 20.

On today’s episode of drama on the daf: When dad’s don’t pay child support.

Strange as this may sound, the Sages of the Mishna seem to be in agreement:

That even with regard to his daughter, there is no obligation to provide her sustenance, however, there is a mitzva to do so.

This seems rather strange. We know that men are obligated to provide for their wives, so it seems that, all the more so, they would be obligated to provide for their children. We also know that the Talmud is a always trying to look out for the orphan, so why not the child with a father?

Rabbis come to the rescue:

Rabbi Ile’a said that Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Ĥanina: In Usha the Sages instituted that a man should sustain his sons and daughters when they are minors.

Wait. So which is it? Is be obligated or not?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the halakha in accordance with his opinion or is the halakha not in accordance with his opinion? Must a man feed his young children in practice or not?
The Gemara answers: Come and hear: When they would come before Rav Yehuda to complain about a father who refused to sustain his children, he would say to them: The jackal [yarod] bears off spring and casts the obligation to feed them on the residents of the town? Even a jackal feeds its young, and it is certainly proper for a father to support his children.

OH! So the delinquent father is publicly shamed. I love it! Let’s read more.

When they would come before Rav Ĥisda to register a similar complaint, he would say to them: Turn over a mortar for him in public, as a raised platform, and let that father stand up and say about himself: The raven wants to care for its sons, and yet this man does not want to support his sons.

Yes, more!

When an incident of this kind would come before Rava, he would say to the father: Is it satisfactory to you that your sons are sustained through charity?

The Gemara adds: And we said this halakha only when he is not wealthy and must toil hard to provide food for his children, but if he is wealthy we coerce him against his will to sustain them.
Like this case of Rava, who coerced Rav Natan bar Ami, who was a wealthy man, to donate to charity, and collected from him four hundred dinars for charity.

The message? Dead beat dad’s have always been a thing and have always been a problem. Shame is a powerful tool and parents that can provide the basics for their children but do not should be ashamed and society should use that shame to pressure dad to step up.

Do we need to provide them with everything? No. Giving in to a child’s every want and desire is not healthy either. But food, clothing and shelter – that we need to do.

Yesterday, we were reminded that a man is obligated to provide his wife with various things, including clothing and conjugal rights. Today’s daf begins with the question: What does clothing mean? What do conjugal rights mean?

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says that she’era and kesuta should be interpreted as follows: In accordance with her flesh [she’era], i.e., her age, give her clothing [kesuta]. This means that he should not give the garments of a young girl to an elderly woman, nor those of an elderly woman to a young girl.

So, maybe “clothing” means give her age appropriate clothing. (I live in Miami, there is no such thing here, but I understand none the less.)

Similarly, kesuta and onata are linked: In accordance with the time of year [onata], give her clothing [kesuta], meaning that he should not give new, heavy clothes in the summer, nor worn-out garments in the rainy season, i.e., the winter, when she requires heavier, warmer clothes. The entire phrase, therefore, refers only to a husband’s obligation to provide clothing for his wife.

Ah! So, give her clothes appropriate for the season. This reminds me of a Hanukah where my parents gave me an orange tank top. It was thoughtful in that I loved the color orange. However, there was over a foot of snow on the ground outside . . .

Rav Yosef taught the following baraita: “She’era,” this is referring to closeness of flesh during intercourse, which teaches that he should not treat her in the manner of Persians, who have conjugal relations in their clothes. The Gemara comments: This baraita supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: With regard to one who says: I do not want to have intercourse with my wife unless I am in my clothes and she is in her clothes, he must divorce his wife and give her the payment for her marriage contract. This is in keeping with the opinion of the tanna of the baraita that the Torah mandates the intimacy of flesh during sexual relations.

Wow! I have heard of women being upset when their husbands kept on their socks during sex, but here, this man wants them both to keep on their clothing!

Rav Yosef says this teaches us a law that says a woman has the right to demand that her husband have sex with her while both of them are naked. One can imagine that, if a man only wants to have sex while clothed, or is only willing to have sex while clothed, what must go through his wife’s head. She must feel he is repulsed by her. She might feel like just a hole. She must feel he does not want anything to do with her body. Rav Huna says that if he denies her the right to sex in the nude, she can force him to divorce her and pay her the marital settlement, the ketubah.

What a gem! you are obligated to provide clothing but she doesn’t need to wear it while you’re having sex!

All kidding aside, I do love this section. It reminds us that sex is not just a physical act but should be one of intimacy. Sex is as close as two people can be to one another and so the rabbis require the removal of all barriers to that intimacy. They prefer it to be in a married relationship and prefer it to be skin to skin. Fully vulnerable. They care about how a woman is treated and how she feels. After reading so many pages about rape, it’s refreshing to hear the rabbis say that it’s not okay to have sex with your wife in a way that makes her feel unwanted or demeaned.

The debate over if a man has rights to a woman’s earnings turns to deeper questions on today’s daf – what are the expectations of a wife to her husband? Or a husband to his wife?

The mishna teaches that a husband is obligated to provide his wife with sustenance, redemption from captivity, and burial. The Sages taught in a baraita: The Rabbis instituted that a husband must provide his wife with her sustenance in exchange for his rights to her earnings, and similarly they decreed that a husband must tend to her burial in exchange for the fact that he inherits the dowry that she brought into the marriage and which is written in her marriage contract. Consequently, the husband may consume the produce of her property.

Here we get an exchange. He must provide protection, be there for her when she is in danger, provide a home and food, and bury her if she passes. For that, she must share all that is hers with him.

Then we get a new set of obligations from husband to wife:

Rava said: This tanna, in the baraita cited below, maintains that the obligation of a husband to provide his wife’s sustenance applies by Torah law, as it is taught “She’era”; this is sustenance, and it likewise states: “Who also eat the flesh [she’er] of my people” (Micah 3:3). “Kesuta” is understood in its literal sense as referring to clothing. “Onata”; this is her conjugal rights, which is stated in the Torah, and so it says: “If you shall afflict [te’aneh] my daughters” (Genesis 31:50), which indicates that a husband may not deprive his wife of her conjugal rights.The baraita continues: Rabbi Elazar says: “She’era”; this is her conjugal rights, and so it says: “None of you shall approach to any who is near [she’er] of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness” (Leviticus 18:6), which demonstrates that the word she’er is used in the context of sexual relations. “Kesuta” is understood in its literal sense as referring to clothing. “Onata”; this is sustenance, and so it says: “And He afflicted you [vayanekha], and made you suffer hunger, and fed you with manna” (Deuteronomy 8:3).

He is obligated in food/maintenance/sustenance, clothing, and sex.

It’s interesting, earlier on the daf, the gemara implies that a father loves his daughter more than a husband loves his wife (by saying the father would redeem her no matter if she gave him her wages or not, but that the husband wouldn’t). This is a time when marriages were more contract agreements than love bonds. But, we still have contracts, both explicit and implicit with our partners. It is not fair to expect our partners to be anything and everything to us, but we do walk in with certain expectations and criteria that we need our partner to meet, and if they don’t, will be a violation of our marriage vows. Making what those things are explicit can be very helpful in a healthy relationship.

What’s on your list? Is it food, clothing and sex? Is it looking out for you in your times of need? Is it slow dancing at celebrations? Willingness to travel?

Every verse in Torah has meaning. But, not all rabbis agree abotu the meaning of a verse – even when they agree about the laws. On our daf, two amoraim give two different verses to derive the law that a husband is warned in the Torah not to defame his wife.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the warning, i.e., the prohibition that serves as the source for the flogging for a defamer? Rabbi Elazar says that the prohibition is derived from the verse “You shall not go up and down as talebearer” (Leviticus 19:16). Rabbi Natan says that it is derived from: “Then you shall keep yourself from every evil thing [davar ra]” (Deuteronomy 23:10), which is expounded to mean dibbur ra, evil speech.

The Talmud now asks why did each amora not use the other verse?

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Rabbi Elazar did not state that it is derived from this verse quoted by Rabbi Natan? The Gemara answers: He requires that verse for the statement of Rabbi Pineḥas ben Yair, as it was taught: “Then you shall keep yourself from every evil thing”; from here Rabbi Pineḥas ben Yair said: A person should not think impure thoughts by day and thereby come by night to the impurity of an emission.

Elazar did not use the verse “and you shall keep yourself from every evil thing” because he uses that verse as warning a person not to think sexual thoughts of you might have a nocturnal emission.

The gem is the rule that every rabbi derives every law from interpreting Torah text, even when they don’t use verses the same way. This pattern of analysis leads the daf to question again and agin, why rabbis think a certain way and what do they do with certain verses (as the same thing would not be taught twice – every word of Torah has something novel to teach. This results in wild tangents like this tangent today about wet dreams in a section about defamation.