2,711 pages of Talmud. A gem a day.

After we saw some rabbis acting shady yesterday – today, one catches himself.

Rav Naḥman later said in regret: We have made ourselves like advisors of judges. We have acted like lawyers who give practical advice to litigants rather than like independent judges. The Gemara asks: At the outset, what did he hold, and ultimately, what did he hold that made him regret his action? The Gemara explains: At the outset, he held that the verse teaches: “And you should not hide yourself from your own flesh” (Isaiah 58:7), and therefore it is correct to give help and advice to relatives. And ultimately he held that in the case of an important person who must be very careful to avoid any impression of having favored his family in judgment, the situation is different.

Wow! So, here, he gave advice to a relative that was beneficial to her – and within the law. But later, he regretted it because of appearances. I love this! This is teachign us that judges should recuse themselves, because even if they rule impartially, it still might not look that way and it sets a bad precedent.

My second quick gem is a great expression that comes within a conversation about if a man can make his wife take oaths any time he wants.

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Eliezer: A person does not reside in a basket with a snake. A woman is not expected to live with a husband who constantly suspects her of stealing.

The Rabbis say to Rabbi Eliezer that if a husband can make his wife take an oath any time he wants, then no woman could live with her husband! He would be like a snake she is trapped in close quarters with.

The gem? If he can’t trust her, she will only suffer by staying in the relationship.

Today’s daf features two fabulous scenes of rabbis being put in check. The first comes after Rav Papa and Rav Huna tell a man that his seizure of a boat from a person who owed him money after his death was invalid because the debtor owed other people as well. On today’s daf we learn that they know this because the debtor owed money to Rav Papa and Rav Huna! So, it wasn’t okay for the other guy to seize the boat but . . .

They both seized the boat for himself. Rav Pappa steered it with an oar, while Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, pulled it with a rope. This Sage said: I acquired all of it; and that Sage said: I acquired all of it.

Ha! We can picture them fighting over the boat. What hypocrites!

They came before Rava to ask him who had acquired the boat. He said to them: You are white geese [kakei ḥivvarei], in reference to their white beards, who remove people’s cloaks, i.e., your actions were unlawful from the start. This is what Rav Naḥman said: And this, that whoever takes possession has acquired them, is the halakhaprovided that one seized them from the debtor while he was alive. In this case, however, the boat was seized after the debtor’s death, when the heirs had already taken possession of it.

When Rav Papa and Rav Huna come in front of Rava for a judgement, he tells them that neither of them get the boat. For the acquisition to have been valid, they would have had to receive the boat while the debtor was still alive. The rule is, once the debtor dies, the property belongs to the inheritors, and they need not pay back their father’s debts with movable property they inherited – not even for rabbis.
Here we see rabbis blatantly manipulating the law and acting in their own self-interest (what? law makers abusing the law? unheard of). The gem in this? Power can corrupt anyone— even rabbis! And, we have to be proud of Rava for not letting them get away with it.

We get another nod to the idea that just because someone is a rabbi does not mean they are always trustworthy a few lines later. What happens? A woman, in court, was obligated to take an oath that she was not liable to pay money to another person. But Rav Hisda’s daughter (who is married to Rava) claims that this woman is known to lie under oath. Rava accepts his wife’s words and thereby allows the claimant to take the oath that the woman does owe money and thereby recover his loan. However, a similar thing happens where Rav Papa claims that a document was paid off but Rava does not accept Rav Papa’s testimony since Jewish law requires two witnesses.

So, why does he accept her testimony when she is only one person, and not his when he is a Torah scholar?

Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: And should Rav Pappa not be trusted like Rav Ḥisda’s daughter, who as a woman is disqualified from testimony? Rava replied: I relied on Rav Ḥisda’s daughter because I know with certainty about her that she is always truthful. However, I cannot rely on the Master because I do not know with the same degree of certainty about him that he is always truthful, and I cannot rule on the basis of one witness unless I have complete certainty.

Wow!!! I love this little gem. While we maybe should be more inclined to trust rabbis and authority figures – no one is perfect, no one is above corruption, and we should really only completely trust those who have proven themselves worthy.

On today’s daf, we get a new Mishnah that sets up an interesting situation. What if a man dies and both his heirs, his wife, and people he borrowed money from all come to take their claim from his property? Who gets priority if there is not more than enough to go round?

Rabbi Tarfon says: The deposit or the loan will be given to the weakest one of them, i.e., the one most in need of the money. Rabbi Akiva says: One is not merciful in judgment. If the halakha is that it belongs to one party, one follows the halakha and leaves aside considerations of mercy. Rather, the halakha is that the money will be given to the heirs, as all require an oath but the heirs do not require an oath.

Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva seem to disagree. But, there is a general rule of thumb that the law always goes with Rabbi Akiva so this plays out interestingly in the next generation with Yohanan and Reish Lakish:

The Gemara relates: There were judges who judged a case of this kind in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, and Reish Lakish reversed their action. He dismissed the judges’ decision and restored the money to the heirs, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yoḥanan criticized his ruling and said to him: You acted in this case like one acts with regard to a ruling of Torah law, where any incorrect action taken by the court must be corrected.

I love this passage! While the law may go according to a particular sage, you still don’t treat the words of a sage as if they are Torah! This reminds us that people are only people – no matter how great they are.

The gemara debates if maybe Rabbi Tarfon is Rabbi Akiva’s teacher so that, in this case maybe it goes with Tarfon? Or if they are contemporaries. But then the ruling hits closer to home for Rabbi Yohanan.

The Gemara relates: The relatives of Rabbi Yoḥanan seized a cow of orphans from an alley because the orphans’ father owed them money. They came before Rabbi Yoḥanan for judgment, and he said to them: It is well that you seized the cow and it is yours, in accordance with the ruling of Rabbi Tarfon.

Hold on! When it comes to his relatives, Rabbi Yohanan seems to want to follow the interpretation of the law that would be the most beneficial to his family. But it doesn’t stop there.

They subsequently came before Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said to them: Go and return the cow to the orphans.

Yohanan holds that the seizure is effective, because he rules in accordance with R. Tarfon. But Resh Lakish holds like R. Akiva—seizure after the death of the father is not valid. Who will win the day?

They again came before Rabbi Yoḥanan, complaining that Reish Lakish had told them they must give back the cow, in opposition to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling. He said to them: What can I do, as one whose stature corresponds to my stature disagrees with me, and I cannot dismiss his opinion.

So, here we see that he cannot overrule his contemporary – who, by the way, was also his student for a time. This subtly reinforces the idea that the law goes according to Akiva.

What I love most about this text, aside from the emphasis that the words of the sages, while holy, are not the words of God, is that we get to see Rabbis Akiva and Tarfon interact while we are in the 10 days between Rosh haShana and Yom Kippur.

Akiva is the greatest sage of the Talmud and he gave us the prayer Aveiu Malkeinu.

Rabbi Tarfon is our social justice sage. Even here he wants the money to go to the person most in need. Some of his best known quotes are fabulously inspiring as we do the spiritual work of preparing for Yom Kippur. I will leave you with three:

• The day is short, and the labor is plenty; the laborers are slothful, while the reward is great, and the master of the house is pressing.
• You are not obliged to complete the work, but neither are you free to desist from it; if you have learned much Torah, great shall be your reward, for He who hires you will surely repay you for your toil; yet the requital of the pious is in the future.
• No man dies except through idleness.

Today’s gem is an old adage from Abaye (so ~300 CE).

Abaye said: There is a proverb that a cucumber in one’s possession is better than a gourd one will have only later.

״בּוּצִינָא טָב מִקָּרָא״

Daf Shevui has a slightly different translation, “Abaye cites a folk saying the same as our saying—a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. A young pumpkin in hand is better than a big one in the field.”

Does this remind anyone else of the marshmallow test? The marshmallow test claims if you put a marshmallow in front of a child and then tell her that she can have a second one if she can go 15 minutes without eating the first one, and then leave the room. Whether she’s patient enough to double her payout is supposedly indicative of a willpower that will pay dividends down the line, at school and eventually at work.

The talmud seems to be saying – you never know if that other marshmallow is really coming, so enjoy the one you have.

By the way, researchers have debunked the marshmallow test and shown that it’s really not indicative of much.

I would always pass the marshmallow test – I don’t like marshmallows… and I would always prefer a cucumber to a gourd! I wonder what the adult equivalent would be . . . one glass of wine now or a bottle in 45 minutes? That might be more of a challenge.

On page 81 we read:

The Gemara relates: A certain man had a yevama who happened before him for levirate marriage in the city of Pumbedita. His brother wanted to disqualify her from him by means of a bill of divorce, as the halakha is that if one of the potential yevamin gives the yevama a bill of divorce she may no longer enter into levirate marriage with the others. The brother who wished to perform levirate marriage said to him: What is your opinion? Why are you doing this? Is it due to the property, as you are jealous that his property will belong to me, in accordance with the halakha that the brother who performs levirate marriage inherits the late brother’s property, whereas if the yevama receives ḥalitza or a bill of divorce all the brothers share the inheritance equally? I will divide the property with you. Upon hearing this, the brother consented to him performing levirate marriage. However, when he married the woman, the husband refused to give his brother anything, and the case came before the court.

Wow! So one brother promises to split the property with the other borther so that the other brother does not disqualify their marraige – and then he goes back on his word and keeps the property all for himself! This case is so confusing to the rabbis that they send it to Rav Yosef, Abaye, Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappi, Rava, and Rav Minyumi, son of Rav Naḥumi who quote Hillel, Shammai, Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Natan as well as two different Mishna’s and a baraita! And then . . . it happens again!

There was a certain man who had a yevama happen before him for levirate marriage in the town of Mata Meḥasya, and his brother wanted to disqualify her from him by means of a bill of divorce. The man said to his brother: What is your opinion? Why are you doing this? If you are doing this due to the property of the dead brother, I will divide the property with you. The brother said to him: I am scared that you will do to me like the swindler from Pumbedita did, in the above story, when the man from Pumbedita promised he would share the inheritance and later retracted. The man said to him: If you wish, divide it for yourself from now. I am prepared for you to take the property already, although the acquisition will take effect only after I marry the yevama.

Here the brother who wants to divorce the woman replies that even if he agrees to split the inheritance, he is afraid that once the brother marries her he will take the inheritance and go back on the deal – like the story from Pumbedita! So the brother who wants to marry her says that he will split the inheritance now, even before he has yibbum.

I love this because I love game theory. (Who doesn’t?)
If the two brothers cooperate and keep their words, they get to split the inheritance and exclusion all the other brothers. So, this is the way in which they both make the most money. If the brother who wants to divorce her divorces her, then the pot gets shared amongst all the brothers and so these two get less. But, if the one who wants to marry her convinces his other brother not to divorce her first, and then goes back on his word – he gets it all! So, what is a brother to do? do you trust your brother and risk getting nothing or not trust him and get a smaller pot than if you cooperated?

Drumroll please . . . .

Ulla rules that, if the brother marries the widow, he gets everything, whether he divides the property before or after the marriage takes place doesn’t matter since he is the only one who inherits. To make it even stronger:

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Reish Lakish said: Whether he performed levirate marriage and afterward divided the property, or whether he divided the property and afterward performed levirate marriage, he has done nothing. The Gemara concludes: And the practical halakha is that he has done nothing.

So? If the brother who does not want to marry her is only interested in money, he should either man-up and marry her, or divorce her and split the pot with all of his brothers . . . or does he?

There is s problem with the mishnah. The property should belong to the wife! Why? Because all the first husband’s property is a pledge to her ketubah. So, it should belong to her and not to the brother(s).

Ha!

Sister-wives may have been a popular show, but the women of the Talmud don’t seem to be big fans.

An incident that occurred in which a certain woman brought in for her husband two maidservants as part of her dowry. The man went and married another woman in addition to the first. He subsequently brought in to the second wife one of the maidservants to attend to her needs.

So, a woman brought two slave women into her marriage. Her husband then went and married a second wife . . . and gave this second wife one of the first wife’s slaves! This really upset the first wife!

The first wife came before Rava and cried about the injustice done to her, but Rava took no notice of her, claiming she had no right to complain.

Now the rabbis debate why Rava dismissed her complaint.

He who observed this incident thought that Rava ruled this way because he holds that what he did is done, i.e., takes effect, and a husband may sell his wife’s usufruct property and use its produce as he sees fit. But that is not so, as the Sages instituted the ordinance that a husband owns the rights to the produce of his wife’s property for the gain of the house, and here the house does gain from his action, as the maidservant also performs work for the house.

The one who saw this thought that Rava ruled that the husband has a right to sell his wife’s property. But, according to Rav Papa, he can’t! So, why did he rule the way he did? The law is that the husband is required to use his wife’s property for the comfort of the home. While the 1st wife may be upset, the husband is technically within his rights since it’s for the good of the house.

It does make you wonder – is it really for the good of the house? While the second wife would be upset that she has no servants while the first wife has two – the first wife likely resents the second wife anyway – this is just adding fuel to the fire!

While the rabbis tell this story to illustrate what a man is allowed to do with his wife’s property, the might have told it as a warning not to marry multiple wives.

What do you bring into a marriage? The daf discusses the physical property that a woman may bring into the marriage, specifically today’s daf focuses on land. We have already seen that marrying a wealthy woman can be very beneficial to the husband and that he gets certain rights over her property and inherits from her. The daf begins with a story of a woman who wants to keep her property away from her husband. So, before she marries she gives her property in writing to her daughter.

But, things get tricky when she divorces and wants her property back from her daughter.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who was about to remarry after she was divorced or widowed, who sought to distance the rights to her property from her future husband. She therefore wrote a document stipulating that her property be given as a gift to her daughter before marriage. Ultimately, the daughter was married and then divorced. She wanted her daughter to return the property, and her daughter claimed that it was given to her as a gift.

Here, the mother is claiming that she did not really give the property to her daughter as a present. She only gave it to her so that the husband would not get a hold of the property. But the daughter wants to keep the land. What to do?

The mother came before Rav Naḥman for judgment. Rav Naḥman tore the document, accepting her claim that she did not intend to transfer ownership of her property. Rav Anan went before Mar Ukva, the Exilarch, and said to him: Let the Master observe Naḥman the farmer, how he tears people’s documents. Rav Anan was upset that Rav Naḥman destroyed a legitimate document. Mar Ukva said to him: Tell me, please, what was the actual incident?

Rav Anan said to Mar Ukva: This and that transpired; i.e., he apprised him of all the details. Mar Ukva said to him: Are you saying it was a document of evasion? This is what Rav Ḥanilai bar Idi said that Shmuel said: I am an authority who issues rulings and have issued the following directive: If a document of evasion comes to my hand, I will tear it, as it is clear that it was not intended for the actual transfer of property but merely to distance it from someone else.

Rav Nahman takes the mother’s claim and tears the document up. This upsets Anan who then goes to Mar Ukba, the exilarch, hoping to overturn Rav Nahman’s ruling. However, Mar Ukba agrees with Rav Nahman! He agrees with the mother that these kinds of documents are not written as real gifts, they are only a means of evading the husband. He rules that the daughter has no claim to it.

After seeing Rav Naḥman tear the document, Rava said to Rav Naḥman: What is the reason for your actions? Is it that you assume that it was not a wholehearted gift because a person does not abandon his own interests and give a gift to others? That applies only when it is given to others who are strangers, but to her daughter a mother would give property wholeheartedly. Rav Naḥman replied: Even so, where her interests clash with those of her daughter, her own interests are preferable to her, and therefore she did not intend to waive her rights.

Rava objects, you can’t assume it wasn’t a genuine gift when a woman is gifting it to her daughter!
Rav Nahman answers that even when it comes to a daughter, a person prefers to keep the property for herself. Therefore, her gift was not really a gift. It was only intended to keep the property from the husband.

What a mess! It makes me grateful for modern wills where intend is made clear. We have to wonder about the dynamics of the family. What does the husband think? Did he marry her for money? What about the wife? Why does she want to hide her property from her husband? And this daughter – does she feel used by her mother? Is she taking advantage of her mother?

Another day of drama on the daf reflecting family dynamics that are still tough to navigate today.

There are times when I get upset with the law. At time, the law can be antiquated, patriarchal, unfair, blind to helping the perpetrator of crimes and even at times unhelpful to victims. But, I was still surprised that on today’s daf, Rabban Gamliel expresses his embarrassment at a law 4 different times!!

The daf is questioning if a woman inherits property and then sells it – is the sale valid? The answer if yes if she is completely single. But, what if she is married (no)? What if she is betrothed (now it gets sticky, when did she inherit that property)?

Rabbi Yehuda said that the Sages said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman herself through betrothal, will he not acquire the property from the moment of their betrothal? Why, then, is her transaction valid? Rabban Gamliel said to them: With regard to the new property that she inherited after marriage, we are ashamed, because it is unclear why she cannot sell it, as it is hers; and you also seek to impose upon us a prohibition with regard to the old property that she owned beforehand?

Rabban Gamliel is ashamed of the law saying a married woman’s sale can be annulled. He does not want the sages to extend the rule to betrothed women as well.

This reminds me of a story Rabbi Shmuley Yankelowitz shared about a soldier who got into a little trouble and had to go before a judge. The soldier was suffering from PTSD and needed help. The judge told the soldier that he had to find him guilty and the minimum for the sentence was 24 hour in jail. When the soldier was escorted from the courtroom, the judge followed. When he was walked over to the jail, the judge followed. When he was brought into the jail cell, the judge followed. The soldier was confused. The judge said – the tells me that I have to send you to jail for 24 hours. It does not tell me that you have to be alone. If you, a hero, are going to be here for 24 hours, I want to be with you. Thank you for serving our country.

What is just? How do we expand justice in an imperfect system?

Ah! Gorgeous teaching on the daf today. We hear of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who would sit and study Torah with people so sick other rabbis wouldn’t associate with them in any way.

Rabbi Yoḥanan would announce: Be careful of the flies found on those afflicted with ra’atan, as they are carriers of the disease. Rabbi Zeira would not sit in a spot where the wind blew from the direction of someone afflicted with ra’atan. Rabbi Elazar would not enter the tent of one afflicted with ra’atan, and Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi would not eat eggs from an alley in which someone afflicted with ra’atan lived.

So, you are probably thinking waht I thought – this disease must be incredibly contageous and incredibly dangerous – like Ebola! Well . . .

As opposed to his colleagues, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi would attach himself to them and study Torah, saying as justification the verse: “The Torah is a loving hind and a graceful doe” (Proverbs 5:19). If it bestows grace on those who learn it, does it not protect them from illness?

Already, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi seems amazing. Like the nuns at the leprosy colonies back in the day. He truly lived words of Torah, being with the sick and teaching them and accompanying them. And God takes notice as well:

When Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi was on the verge of dying, they said to the Angel of Death: Go and perform his bidding, as he is a righteous man and deserves to die in the manner he sees fit.

So, basically, he gets to choose how he wants to die. (I would like to die at 101 years old in my sleep after having just made love to my husband in our fabulously expensive home.)

The Angel of Death went and appeared to him. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said to him: Show me my place in paradise. He said to him: Very well. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said to him: Give me your knife that you use to kill mortals, lest you frighten me on the way. He gave it to him. When he arrived there, in paradise, he lifted Rabbi Yehoshua so he could see his place, and he showed it to him. Rabbi Yehoshua jumped and fell into that other side, thereby escaping into paradise.

Ha! He takes the Grim Reapers scythe and after being shown heaven – jumps in so he never has to die! Did he just outsmart the Angel of Death?

The Angel of Death grabbed him by the corner of his cloak. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said to him: I swear that I will not come with you. The Holy One, blessed be He, said: If he ever in his life requested dissolution concerning an oath he had taken, he must return to this world with the Angel of Death, as he can have his oath dissolved this time also. If he did not ever request dissolution of an oath, he need not return. Since Rabbi Yehoshua had in fact never requested dissolution of an oath, he was allowed to stay in paradise.

Wow! He never broke a promise.

The Angel of Death said to him: At least give me my knife back. However, he did not give it to him, as he did not want any more people to die. A Divine Voice emerged and said to him: Give it to him, as it is necessary to kill the created beings; death makes our lives have meaning. Elijah the Prophet announced before him: Make way for the son of Levi, make way for the son of Levi.

So, because of who he was, honest, kind, teaching Torah to the sick – Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi doesn’t have to experience death. He goes straight from life to heaven. And, what does he do what he has the Angel of Death’s knife? He tries to keep it so that others will not have to suffer. He is truly compassionate at every opportunity.

The Gemara then talks about a similar incident with a righteous rabbi. But when that rabbi asks for the same treatment the Angel of Death refuses. He said to him: Bring a Torah scroll and see: Is there anything written in it that I have not fulfilled? I am therefore worthy of entering Paradise alive, as did Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. He said to him: But did you attach yourself to those afflicted with ra’atan and study Torah, as he did?

This kind of compassion is rare indeed. We admire in more modern figures like Mother Teresa. Now, we can also admire it in ancient ones.

The daf continues to debate what “blemish” a woman might have that would revoke/annul the betrothal. We have heard bad breath, a mole on the forehead, a low voice, scars, being sweaty, having odd breasts, and today:

The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a case of a woman who has an additional toe.

Why an additional toe? Because she was obviously born with that blemish and so the father cannot argue that the toe grew after they were married. So, with an additional toe, what proof could the father possibly bring? The Gemara answers: He can provide proof that the husband saw the extra toe before the betrothal and he became appeased about it.

This whole section can be quite upsetting. However, this morning I pulled back to look at the bigger picture. What is the Gemara trying to tell us? That we should not hide parts of ourselves from our potential partners – they should know as fully as possible what they are getting. We may have scars, moles, sweat a lot, and oddities with our bodies but we are still deserving of love. As long as we present ourselves as ourselves, then when we marry it will be secure.